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ABSTRACT : GRAMMAR , LEXIS AND CONTEXT 
Language teaching has been strongly influenced over recent years by talk 
of notions and functions , most notably through Wilkins' (1976) work on 
Notional Syllabuses . Yet the notional/functional syllabus has been 
criticized for failing to capture anything more than a superficial 
correspondence between form and meaning . 
In this thesis I argue for a framework in which a deeper congruence 
between form and meaning is developed . I identify regularities in the 
lexico-syntactic structure of English which express recognizable notional 
relationships , which in turn reflect deeper conceptualizations of 
relations between events and participants . These conceptualizations are 
represented on a semantic continuum of 'contextual distance' . By 
reference to this continuum , I argue that we can identify a clear 
congruence between increasing conceptual complexity and increasing lexico-
syntactic complexity . This account gives considerable prominence to the 
role of lexis , and to the interdependence between grammar , lexis and 
context in the signalling of meaning , something which has not always been 
adequately considered within linguistics or within applied linguistics . 
I then consider a possible application of these ideas to pedagogy . In 
many 'product' approaches to syllabus design and methodology , learners 
work with language forms whose meanings are to an extent already fixed , 
with grammar subsuming lexis and with cotext and context already clearly 
related by the materials designer . In such approaches the interdependence 
between grammar , lexis and context is sometimes lost sight of , and I 
argue for a revised approach in which this interdependence is made 
central . Thus learners are encouraged to fashion their own meanings by 
working with lexical items , and by learning to grammaticize these lexical 
items by reference to context . By separating out grammar and lexis in 
this way , learners are given direct access to the deeper congruence 
between form and meaning - between grammar , lexis and context . 
The format of the thesis is as follows . I begin with a selective review 
of work in linguistics (chapter one) and applied linguistics (chapter 
two) , arguing that the importance of the grammar/lexis relationship has 
not (by and large) been much investigated . In chapter three I introduce 
the continuum of contextual distance , outlining a general hypothesis in 
which relationships between grammar , lexis and context are linked to a 
deeper understanding of the congruence between form and meaning . I go on 
to develop the detail of this hypothesis , looking both at ideational 
meanings (chapter four) and interpersonal meanings (chapter five) . 
Stepping back from these detailed arguments , I conclude by presenting an 
approach to classroom methodology (chapter six) and to syllabus design 
(chapter seven) based on the concept of learner grammaticization . 
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- CHAPTER ONE - 
GRAMMAR AND LEXIS IN LINGUISTICS 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this section is to look at a variety of approaches taken to the 
description of language, with the aim of establishing to what extent certain 
linguists have considered relationships between lexis and grammar. 
It will be suggested that grammar and lexis have generally been regarded as quite 
distinct entities, and that consequently certain important generalizations about 
the 'meaning potential' of lexis with regard to grammar, and of grammar with 
regard to lexis , have not been fully appreciated. 
1. CHONSKY : TG & THE ROLE OF THE LEXICON 
1.1 THE STANDARD THEORY 
In Chomsky's original conception of transformational grammar ( 1957) the 
relationship between grammar, lexis and meaning is expressed through his term 
`linguistic competence'. This in itself consists of a number of separate 
competences - grammatical, phonological and semantic . Chomsky kept these 
competences separate because well-formedness within one kind of competence does 
not of itself entail well-formedness in another . So , for example , a sentence 
may be grammatically well formed , but semantically deviant , as with the 
sentence my wife is unmarried . As Chomsky put it: 
Grammar is best formulated as a self-contained study 
independent of semantics. In particular, the notion of 
grammaticalness cannot be identified with meaningfulness... 
( 1957:106) 
However , while he kept his grammatical , semantic and phonological categories 
distinct from each other , lexis was not considered by Chomsky to constitute a 
separate competence . Rather , his 'lexicon' was made available to the 
grammatical, phonological and semantic components in order, as it were, to give 
them final expression, so that words become marked as to their grammatical, 
phonological and semantic properties . The syntactic component, for example, 
generates a set of rules which define well-formed sentence structure, and these 
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then have access to the lexicon so that words can be fitted into grammatical 
patterns . It is important to note the directionality of Chomsky's model: 
although each component of linguistic competence has access to the lexicon, the 
lexicon does not have access to the grammar. In other words, underlying Chomsky's 
classification is the belief that lexis is subsidiary to grammar. It does not in 
itself define or significantly contribute to any kind of competence. On the 
contrary it is, in effect, merely a means of illustrating syntactic structure. 
According to the Standard Theory, structures generated from the syntactic 
component are sent to the semantic component for a semantic representation, and 
to the morphophonemic component for a phonological representation. Thus the 
syntactic component comprises the core of the system . The lexicon is not 
involved at all in these transformations, because in itself it consists of 
nothing more than a list of separate and unconnected lexical items. With such 
little importance attached to the lexicon, it is not surprising that with the 
Standard Theory (1957) , a great deal of work was left to be done by the 
syntactic component through transformations : language forms were generated 
entirely from the syntactic component , while the purpose of the lexicon was 
essentially to give substance to the final structure for purposes of 
exemplification . 
The primacy given to grammar meant that other components were interpretative of 
structures formulated entirely by the syntactic component. Chomsky was aware 
that this sharp delimitation of competences might create difficulties: 
The syntactic and semantic structure of natural languages 
evidently offers many mysteries, both of fact and of principle, 
and any attempt to delimit the boundaries of these domains must 
certainly be quite tentative. (1965:163) 
However, such caution was not clearly represented in the framework of the 
standard theory, although it has been argued (eg.Brown 1982:150) that if equal 
attention were given over to the semantic component and to the lexicon, it would 
quickly have become apparent that many descriptive tasks could have been handled 
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by any of the three, or have been divided up between them. Realizations such as 
this soon led to the modification of the Standard Theory during the 1960's. As 
well as giving increasing prominence to the semantic component, these years also 
witnessed a growing interest in the role of the lexicon, thereby raising 
fundamental questions concerning the relationship between grammar and lexis. 
1.2 THE REVISED THEORY 
1.2.1 Enriching the lexicon: derivational and inflectional morphology 
With the development of the revised theory (1965) the lexicon was gradually 
accorded greater prominence , both with respect to derivational morphology and 
with respect to inflectional morphology . 
Firstly , derivational morphology , previously considered a matter for the 
syntactic component , was handed over to the lexicon , so that existing word 
stock , together with rules for the analysis of existing words and the formation 
of new words , were located in the same place . This shift , from the syntactic 
component to the lexicon , took place in order to account for two distinct 
processes. The first of these was conversion, which involved the simple transfer 
of an item from one lexical class to another, such as the conversion from 'they 
manned the ship' to 'they shipped the man'. The second process was compounding, 
where two potentially free lexical forms may be juxtaposed to form a derived 
compound form - 'wind' and 'mill' to form 'windmill', 'back' and 'chat' to form 
`backchat', and so on. 
It is important to underline the reason why this transfer took place . In 
short , it became increasingly apparent that the applicability of derivation is 
not systematically accessible to the same kind of principled rule-making as 
syntax was held to be . So the lexicon became associated with procedures for 
conversion and compounding whose relevance was restricted to particular lexical 
items , leaving the syntactic component free to deal with general 'rules' which 
could form the basis for the systematic generation of transformations , 
unhindered by lexical irregularities . Thus the lexicon became , in part , a list 
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of lexical items marked for their particular patterns of derivation , each 
pattern applying only to a certain group of words. The derivation 'rule', for 
example, through which the noun 'length' can be derived from the adjective 'long' 
applies to 'long' but not to other adjectives . A thoroughgoing derivational 
approach referring indiscriminately to all lexical items of a particular class 
would, ofcourse, have led to a situation where marked forms would be generated on 
a large scale . This realisation led to the acceptance of a 'mixed lexicon', with 
many items entered as single, unique units. 
Although in one sense a solution , this process created a new set of problems, 
because derivational morphology is not the only area with 'rules' of limited 
applicability . If the lexicon was to concern itself with derivational 
irregularities , what of inflectional morphology ? This is concerned in part 
with aspects of word structure variations which have a direct bearing on 
grammatical categories such as number and gender : inflectional morphology, that 
is, accounts for the internal structure of words, and as such it makes no 
categorical distinction between aspects of grammar and considerations of lexis. 
How, then, should TG incorporate features of inflectional morphology ? - what 
should be the responsibility of the syntactic component, and where should the 
line be drawn between this and the lexicon ? . 
Number had previously been seen as a grammatical category , while gender was 
lexical (because gender is invariant - an arbitrary feature of individual lexical 
items) . Number and gender, though, function in a similar way. Adjectives derive 
their gender from the noun they modify, just as determiners must agree with the 
noun with which they associate in number. Similarly, just as with gender , some 
nouns are inherently plural (people, cattle) while others are inherently 
singular/`mass' (wine/water). The only way to account for these relatively 
arbitrary elements was to specify number as well as gender in the lexicon, using 
a '+/- count' notation. In this way, number also entered the lexicon. 
I have already noted that derivational morphology entered the lexicon on account 
of its immunity to rule-making, and number was placed in the lexicon for very 
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similar reasons: there is no systematic basis for the distinction between nouns 
which are inherently plural and nouns which take the -s suffix. The -s suffix - 
previously considered to be a matter for the grammar as part of the syntactic 
component - now entered the lexicon , thereby maintaining the principle that 
grammar is systematizable while lexis is not ; grammar exemplifies rules, lexis 
is characterized by a web of restrictions . In this respect lexis got defined 
more and more in terms of how it differed from grammar , even though this 
involved 'glossing over' the fact that semantic notions such as number infact 
made reference both to lexical and grammatical elements. However , not all 
modifications to TG involved this kind of grammar/lexis polarization . In the 
period following the development of the Standard Theory (Chomsky:1965) , the 
lexicon also took on a more influential role in direct relation to the syntactic 
and the semantic component , through the application of case grammar . 
1.2.2 Enriching the lexicon : case grammar 
The development of case grammar (cf. Fillmore 1968) was an early attempt to 
accommodate additional dimensions of meaning within TG , by seeking to explain 
deep structure through reference to the underlying similarity between such 
syntactically contrasting sentences as 'John killed Bill' and 'Bill was killed by 
John'. Using case grammar terminology, John is said to be the agent or direct 
initiator of the action in both cases, and Bill the patient. This gave rise to 
the notion that all the main verbs in a language can be defined semantically in 
terms of 'frame features' or 'case frames'. The verb 'open', for example, can 
occur in a variety of case frames: 
1. The door opened ( 
2. John opened the door ( 
3. The wind opened the door ( 	  
4. John opened the door with a chisel ( 
  
objective) 
object + agent) 
object + instrument) 





All this can be expressed more economically by using bracketing to specify the 
optional elements, so that 'open' can be specified as: 
Open [- 0 (I) (A) ] (Fillmore 1968:27) 
In this way it proved possible to construct a common logical representation which 
16 
explicitly demonstrates how two structures (such as active/passive) are 
semantically related one to the other . This had substantial repercussions for 
TG, allowing for previously convoluted transformations to be simplified on the 
basis of a lexical entry supplemented by syntactic specification through case 
frames. 
In the standard theory , the burden of accounting for systematic relationships 
between sentences had fallen largely on the transformational component . The verb 
GIVE , for example 7 was said to occur in two environments 
NP1 (GIVE) NP2 to NP3 	 eg. B111 gave the glass to Jane 
NP1 (GIVE) NP3 NP2 	 eg. Bill gave Mary the book 
The second structure here would be derived from the first through a 
transformation called 'dative movement' , involving preposition deletion and the 
reordering of the verb arguments . The difficulty was that this kind of rule was 
not universally applicable : it applies to verbs such as GIVE , OFFER and SEND , 
but not to BROADCAST or to TRANSMIT , neither of which takes the dative movement. 
The standard theory solution was to state the transformation in general terms in 
the syntactic component , and to mark exceptions to the rule in the lexicon . In 
this way verbs like TRANSMIT would be entered lexically together with the feature 
[-dative] . Rather as with number and gender , then , the lexicon was used as the 
depository of exceptions to 'grammatical rule' . 
But syntactic transformations of this kind are not the only way of treating 
relationships of this kind , and in wake of Fillmore's work the lexicon assumed 
much greater responsibility . The various possible environments for each verb 
were now listed in the lexicon , so that the entry for GIVE would be as follows : 
GIVE V , 	 NP pp (to NP) 
NP1 (AGENT) ---- NP2 (PATIENT) to NP3 (GOAL) 
NP1 (AGENT) ---- NP3 (GOAL) NP2 (PATIENT) 
This kind of entry shows both the relevant structures , together with a 
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functional specification for each , allowing the formulation of a basic logical 
representation which clearly shows how the two structures paraphrase each other. 
The important point here is that the semantic and syntactic relations 
which were handled previously through the syntactic component were now allocated 
quite satisfactorily to the lexicon , including all those operations which 
involve the rearrangement of the arguments of a lexical item within basic 
structures . So , whereas the earliest transformational models (cf.Chomsky 1957) 
involved a syntactic component which far outweighed the lexicon in terms of 
importance , later models have involved a substantial re-allocation of 
responsibilities (cf. Cook 1972;Brown 1986) . 
Implicit within this shift in the 'balance of power' between the syntactic 
component and the lexicon was a formalized recognition of the interdependence 
between grammar and lexis . Certain lexical items (and particularly verbs) are 
themselves marked for the various possible arguments with which they can co-occur 
in syntactic structure , and the acceptability or otherwise of specific 
grammatical operations (such as dative movement , discussed above) is clearly 
constrained at the lexical level . 
1.2.3 Case Grammar : some further implications and applications 
The adoption of case grammar , then , led to the specification within the lexicon 
of individual verbs in direct relation to the types of grammatical modification 
and transformation which they would allow . But this did not mean that the 
lexical realization of each related argument was similarly specified . For 
example , the verb GIVE is specified in the lexicon together with its permissible 
arguments (AGENT , PATIENT , GOAL) , but there are some lexical items which 
cannot (in the vast majority of cases) occur as AGENT or as PATIENT . We can say 
that 'cat', 'dog', 'man' and 'bone' all belong to the same nominal category, so 
that the grammar does not in itself differentiate between them . Clearly , 
though , mutual substitution between these lexical items is not always possible 
without leading to cases of semantic incongruity - 5. is fine, but 6. is dubious: 
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5. The man gave the dog a bone 
6. The bone gave the dog a man 
So only certain nouns can occur, depending on the verb selected. There is clearly 
a need to establish sub-categories of nouns and verbs , but to avoid the extreme 
of listing all possible subjects for 'give', it was decided to say simply that 
'give' is a verb which requires a noun phrase subject, but to leave the selection 
of the actual noun to be sorted out through the semantic component (Brown 
1986:103-5) . 
Given that it was one of the purposes of TG models to account for such matters as 
derivation and transformation systematically and economically , this kind of 
'delegation' to the semantic component made a lot of sense . Nevertheless , the 
issue of the acceptability or unacceptability of specific combinations of lexical 
items is a crucial one , for it raises further questions concerning the 
relationship between grammar and lexis . For example , case grammar tells us that 
with a lexical item such as OPEN , we have the option of selecting from agent and 
instrument, and we must have an objective. Given the lexical items 'John','open' 
and 'door', for example , it is clear that they are very likely to associate in 
the following way : 
7. John - open - door 
(Agent) - (Process) -(Objective) 
With these particular lexical items, then, we do not really need grammar to tell 
us which word plays what semantic role , so that in this example, the 
relationship between lexical item and semantic role can be inferred largely with 
reference to lexis . If the lexical choice had been different - if , for example, 
we had chosen the lexical association in 8 , then we would have to call on 
grammar to sort out the role distribution for us , through word order : 
8. John - strike - Bill 
The connection between case grammar and the grammar/lexis relationship is 
something which I will refer to in later sections of this chapter , and again in 
chapters six and seven . For this reason it is worth clarifying at this point how 
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this connection works out . According to Widdowson (1990) , the lexical 
association in 8 serves to identify those component parts of context - a process 
and two related participants - whose precise relationship one to another is 
ambiguous : is John acting as agent , or as patient ? We need to call on 
grammatical devices such as word order to clarify the distribution of role 
relationships . In effect , what Widdowson is suggesting is that the balance of 
power between grammar and lexis as represented in TG can be reversed : first we 
lay down the bare lexical items in ungrammaticized association , and then we 
supplement them by the addition of grammatical elements which give the word a 
more precise conceptual orientation . Grammatical inflection , for example , 
enables us to give semantic focus to bare lexical associations through 
giving them a location in time through tense and aspect : 
9. farmer - kill - duckling 
10. farmer is killing duckling 
Markings for tense and aspect , says Widdowson , are "communicative devices for 
getting features of context into focus" and hence : 
The greater the contribution of context in the sense of shared 
knowledge and experience , the less need there is for grammar to 
augment the association of words . The less effective the words are in 
identifying relevant features of context in that sense , the more 
dependent they become on grammatical modification of one sort or 
another . 
(1990:86) 
Widdowson thus sketches a basic relationship between grammar and lexis whereby : 
it is the function of grammar to reduce the range of meaning signalled 
by words so as to make them more effective in the identification of 
features of context ... 
(1990:92) 
In the application and development of case grammar to transformational grammars , 
this kind of perspective was not entirely absent . While the question of specific 
lexical associations in relation to each verb was left to the semantic component, 
case grammar directly addressed the notion that individual verbs themselves carry 
contextual information (information about agents , patients and other features of 
ideational context) , and that these arguments may be arranged in a variety of 
ways in relation to basic structure . 
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2. J.R.FIRTH 
2.1 Interrelations and the context of situation 
Firth's thinking is radically different from that of Chomsky. Wheras Chomsky's 
competence model consisted of discrete components, Firth emphasized the 
importance of establishing and investigating the relationships between them. For 
Firth, the central concept of semantics is what he termed the context of 
situation, made up of complex interactions between lexis, grammar and phonology. 
As Firth put it: 
Even when the phonetician, grammarian and lexicographer have 
finished, there remains the bigger integration, making use of 
all their work in semantic study, and it is for this 
situational and experiential study that I would reserve the 
term 'semantics'. (1951:193) 
These various components, then, should be regarded as having interrelations, as 
well as interior relations - the latter being Firth's term for relationships 
contracted between terms within a single category . But we cannot properly talk 
of meaning, according to Firth , without taking into account both interior 
relations and interrelations. When we talk of meaning, then, we use: 
...the whole complex of functions which a linguistic form may 
have. The principal components of this whole meaning are 
phonetic function, 	 lexical, morphological and syntactical 
(to be the province of a reformed system of grammar), and the 
function of a complete locution in the context of situation, or 
typical context of situation. (1968:174) 
In other words, meaning consists of a complex of relations between language and 
context, and each component of the language needs to be related to all other 
components . 
2.2 Firth's categorization : a brief overview 
It needs to be pointed out at the outset that Firth's categories are not easy to 
come to terms with, and it is sometimes difficult to see precisely how one is 
distinguished from another. For example, Firth refers to structure as a 
syntagmatic relationship between elements which can be either phonological or 
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grammatical. Structure, he says ,is " an interrelationship of elements within 
the text or part of the text" (1968:103). On other occasions Firth refers to such 
syntactic interrelations as colligation. When he does imply a distinction between 
structure and colligation, it seems to be that structure can be broken down into 
smaller, composite grammatical elements: 
The terms structure and elements of structure are not used to 
refer to a whole language or even to what may be called 
portions of a language, but exclusively to categories 
abstracted from common word or textual form. (1968:186) 
Colligation, on the other hand, is concerned with categories of structure which 
have a 'mutually expectant order', so that colligation is used exclusively to 
deal with relations contracted, syntagmatically, between elements of the grammar 
in text, or in portions of a text . Although sometimes used in a way very similar 
to this, it is only 'structure' which is used to refer to grammatical elements 
abstracted from their place within text. 
Then there is a further distinction, one which is thankfully rather more 
transparent, between structure and system. System is strictly a paradigmatic 
concept: 
A system such as a system of vowels or a system of grammatical 
forms is in the nature of a paradigm. (1968:103) 
Thus the paradigm of the verbal inflections - ing/ed - would in isolation fall 
within the scope of system. 
It is not entirely clear whether Firth had a paradigmatic lexical category. 
Perhaps the closest he came to this was in his use of the term exponent, which 
directs us to the phonological and orthographic 'shape' of a word or part of a 
word (1968:183). 
An example might serve to make these distinctions clearer . Underlying Firth's 
categories is a sense in which they feed into each other, as we move from 
language in isolation towards language in syntagmatic chains of mutual 
22 
expectancy. We could start with the exponent 'keep', which can be used to 
demonstrate the tabulated verbal paradigm 'keep-keeps-keeping-kept'. Here, 
perhaps, we have - at an abstracted level - an association between exponent/lexis 
(keep) and system/grammar (the paradigm of inflection which can be applied to 
it). But Firth considered such a level of analysis to be of little value : what 
matters is how these grammatical and lexical isolates function at the syntagmatic 
level, beginning with clause or sentence level, for "the verbal characteristics 
of the sentence are rarely in parallel with what you find in tabulated 
conjugations in the grammar books" (1968:103) . Firth then gives us the following 
example (ibid.) : 
11. He kept popping in and out of my office all the afternoon 
At the level of structure, we could abstract 'popping' in relation to the 
auxiliary of aspect 'kept': the relationship between the two, focussed on in 
isolation from the rest of the sentence, is a matter of structure . Then there is 
another verbal characteristic of the sentence which is of interest, associated 
with the adverbial phrase 'all the afternoon': 
One could not very well say' he kept popping in and out of my 
office at ten o'clock' or' at once'(1968:103) 
To the extent that such adverbial restrictions need to be read in conjunction 
both with 'kept' and with 'popping', we begin to see how the complexities of this 
sentence are a product of interrelations between grammatical elements, between 
elements of structure. However, as we focus more and more on the sentence as a 
unit, and on the way in which 'mutual expectancies' are set up between its 
component parts, we begin to see how the construction as a whole operates as a 
colligation . As Firth put it , 11 "is grammatically close-knit as a verbal 
piece . The elements of structure are ... interdependent (1968:103/4) . 
So far I have dealt principally with Firth's grammatical categories. For lexis, 
Firth used the term collocation with particular regularity . This, a syntagmatic 
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category, refers us to the habitual company that words keep, one to another, 
within text. There is a clear parallel here between collocation 
(lexical/syntagmatic) and colligation (grammatical/syntagmatic), and it is one 
which allows us to key in to Firth's treatment of grammar and lexis. In the above 
sentence, for example , could we not also make a collocational analysis, 
focussing on the relationship between 'keep' and 'pop' and 'all the afternoon'? 
Whatever the answer to this query, it begs the question of the precise 
relationship between colligation and collocation, and this requires that we first 
establish more clearly precisely how Firth defined each of these categories . 
Since he attached so much importance to interrelations between categories, we 
would expect Firth to have something to say about the grammar/lexis relationship 
in terms of a relationship between collocation and colligation. 
2.3 Collocation and colligation : a relationship between grammar & lexis? 
Firth's concept of collocation , then , is concerned with habitual lexical 
associations : 
(Collocation) is the study of key-words, pivotal words, leading words, 
by presenting them in the company they usually keep -that is to say, 
an element of their meaning is indicated when 
their habitual word accompaniments are shown.(1968:106/7) 
Thus the distribution in collocation of a word such as 'get' can be analysed once 
an exhaustive collection of collocations has been made, to indicate that 'get' 
assumes different meanings in different collocational environments - 'this music 
just gets me/get me one too/ that won't get you anywhere' (1968:20/21). 
It might have been possible to extend this notion of collocation to include more 
varied examples, to cover more extensively what is now referred to as formulaic 
language (cf. , for example , Bolinger 1976/Pawley and Syder 1983) , and this 
could have drawn on the relationship between certain frequently collocated 
lexical items and the kind of contexts of situation in which they occur . At one 
point Firth gives a detailed list of the different meanings of 'get' with 
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different collocations to illustrate each one, saying that each constitutes a 
"descriptive indication of the relationship of the collocations to generalized 
contexts of situation" (1968:20) . Thus some of his examples are highly 
suggestive of interpersonal contexts ('that won't get you anywhere') while others 
- the majority - are not ('silly ass/British Way of Life') . Firth did not, 
however, pursue the question of how different collocations may refer more or less 
clearly to particular contexts of situation, for his interest was primarily in 
the principles of collocation per se. 
If Firth was not entirely clear about the relationship between collocations and 
contexts, he was less clear on the relationship between words in collocation and 
grammar in colligation . Colligation deals with the mutual expectancy between 
elements of structure in syntagmatic association, within text or within 
sentences. I have already mentioned one quite compleA example (9) , but 
colligation does not always presuppose such close-knit complexities. On a much 
simpler level, the 3rd person singular masculine pronoun 'he' may be in 
colligation with a singular 3rd person verb such as 'smokes', as in 'he-
smokes'.Colligation, however, makes no reference to words as lexical items but 
only as representations of grammatical classes. So, for example, 'I watched 
him' may be a collocation in so far as the 'key' word, watch , habitually 
associates with an agent and patient, but as a colligation it simply relates 
pronouns to a past tense verb form . As Firth put it: 
The statement of meaning at the grammatical level is in terms of word 
and sentence classes ... and of the interrelation of those categories in 
colligation . Grammatical relations should not be regarded as relations 
between words as such - between watched and him in 'I watched him' - but 
between a personal pronoun , the past tense of a transitive verb .... 
In order to establish a relationship between grammar and lexis, then, Firth would 
have needed to formulate a relationship between collocation and colligation . In 
principle, ofcourse, he clearly implies that such a relationship exists, and that 
it should be properly accounted for . In reality, though, there is very little in 
25 
Firth's writing to support this notion in any detail. What, for example, should 
we make of collocations which involve grammatical elements, elements of 
structure, whose word order and inflection is completely fixed ? . If we take an 
expression such as 'how are you?', it is clear that along with the mutual 
dependency of the constituent lexical items comes a drainage of clear referential 
meaning. 'How are you?', in other words, operates as a single unit in its own 
right : its meaning can only be established through reference to the expression 
as a whole. It thus serves very well as an example of the Firthian notion that 
word meaning is dependent on word company . However , there are difficulties 
which Firth's categorisation does not help to solve. Firstly, where is the key 
word here? Given that the expression is in effect a single meaning unit, it is 
questionable whether the idea of a key word -one word which we can single out as 
in a sense dominant or 'determining' - is at all applicable. Secondly , this 
expression is grammatically unique : 'How are you?' completely loses its 
illocutionary force as a greeting as soon as the verb is inflected in any way 
(*How were you?). This crucial distinction is lost when the expression is 
presented as a colligation, where the change in structure gives us no clue as to 
the radical shift in meaning. Firth, as we have said, talks of colligations as 
`mutually expectant orders'.(1968:186). Clearly this expression does indeed 
illustrate a mutually expectant order, but in lexical rather than in grammatical 
terms . It is difficult, then, to maintain that it is the grammar which generates 
this lexical sequence. We cannot capture the formulaic nature of expressions such 
as this by reference to colligation or to structure - it is clearly a form of 
collocation but it cannot , in Firth's terms, be usefully analyse( as a 
colligation . 
Firth , I have said , emphasized the need to recognize that each of his 
categories - including colligal'ion and collocation - bear interrelations one to 
another . To establish a relationship between grammar and lexis , it would be 
necessary to establish a relationship between colligation and collocation . I 
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have suggested above that some formulaic expressions are mutually expectant not 
between abstracted grammatical classes but between specific lexical items , so 
that they are collocations but not (in any useful sense of the term) 
colligations 
But there are other cases where both colligation and collocation are 
simultaneously in evidence : 
12. Fred kicked the bucket 
In 12 there is a clear element of collocation . Although there is - as with 'how 
are you?' - no obviously self-selecting 'key word' , the collocation of 'kick' 
with 'bucket' is exceptional in that it gives a quite different meaning from , 
say , the collocation of 'kick' with almost every other inanimate noun . Thus the 
idiomatic reading of 'kick the bucket' (meaning 'die') is a product of the tight 
lexical interdependency between these particular lexical items . But at the same 
time 12 is extremely tight knit as a colligation : its word order , for example , 
is fixed so that we cannot say 'the bucket was kicked by Fred' and retain the 
idiomatic meaning . Unlike 'how are you?' , 12 cannot be regarded exclusively in 
collocational terms because , like regular colligations of the SVO pattern , it 
can be inflected : Fred has kicked/is kicking/kicks the bucket . In short , 12 
has features both of collocation and colligation . 
But although Firth allows for interrelations between the grammatical and lexical 
components of his framework , he has little to say by way of specific 
illustration. Yet his general approach clearly invites further investigation . 
In chapters 3-5 , I will look further into the question of the co-occurrence of 
inflectional restrictions with restrictions on lexical content exemplified by 
example 12 . 
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3. HALLIDAY 
3.1 Grammar & lexis in the Hallidayan framework : overview 
Halliday follows, atleast superficially, in the tradition of Firth, adapting some 
of Firth's categories and developing them into an overall framework (1964) . 
Grammar and lexis are seen by Halliday, as by Firth, as falling into separate 
categories. The first of these refers to paradigmatic relations , for which 
Halliday used the term choice relationships . Broadly speaking there are two 
types of choice category . One is grammatical, and is known as system. 
Grammatical systems are closed, because they involve choices between a small and 
finite number of possibilities, such as the choice between singular and plural, 
or between 'this' and 'that'. Whenever we a have a choice between grammatical 
elements which are commutable -grammar words, verbal inflections and so on - then 
these are elements of system . The other chain category is set . This too is 
paradigmatic, and it concerns lexical items abstracted from their context in 
text. In contrast to system, set is an open choice, because it deals with 
choices from a wide, and sometimes almost unlimited grouping of individual 
lexical items. 
Halliday's second main category concerns syntagmatic relations, which he calls 
chain relationships . Again there is a subdivision between grammatical and 
lexical components . The grammatical component is structure, which is roughly 
akin to Firth's colligation. The lexical component is collocation, concerned with 
the syntagmatic association between lexical item but, as we shall see, rather 
different from Firth's category of the same name. 
The distinction between grammar and lexis, says Halliday, is not always as stark 
as this categorisation may make it seem. Frequently , for example, we are not 
clearly dealing with system or with set - rather we are somewhere on a cline 
between the two, and "languages all have choices in the middle of this cline" 
(1964:22). 
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In the Hallidayan approach, grammar is much more powerful than lexis. Grammar, 
for example, deals both with choices between individual items (eg. this/that, 
I/you) and between categories (eg singular/plural or past/future) while lexis 
deals only with open set choices between discrete lexical items. Thus we can make 
many more generalizations about grammar than we can about lexis, and "any 
statement made in grammar can account for a larger number of events than a 
statement made in lexis" (1964:23). He then goes on to argue that: 
Since the purpose of the theory is to account for the largest number of 
events as simply as possible, this means that the theory of grammar is 
more powerful than the theory of lexis. So in making a description of 
language we try to bring in as much as we can within the framework of 
the grammar.(Ibid.) 
Halliday's overall framework can be summarized thus: 
CHOICE: 	 SYSTEM (paradigmatic/grammar) 	 SET (paradigmatic/lexis) 
CHAIN : STRUCTURE (syntagmatic/grammar) COLLOCATION (syntagmatic/lexis) 
Fig. 1 
For the purposes of this enquiry, it is the horizontal links in figure two which 
are the most important. What precisely is the relationship between system and 
set, and between structure and collocation, and what are the implications of the 
framework as a whole for the relationship between grammar and lexis? 
It will be argued that there is a tendency within Halliday's approach to define 
chain and choice categories so as to undermine Firth's insistence on the 
importance of interrelations between component categories. 
3.2 System and Set: grammar and lexis 
Halliday's distinction between grammatical systems and lexical sets reflects, 
quite clearly, a distinction between grammar and lexis . System involves choices 
between grammar words (this/that, I/you) or between grammatical categories 
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(singular/plural , past/present); set involves choices between content lexical 
items. Halliday gives little explicit consideration to the relationship between 
the two, but his overall framework, and particularly his distinction between 
chain and choice , make such a consideration essential. 
How might this be? Halliday's framework can be regarded from two contrasting 
perspectives . Firstly, as a model with four fundamental components - set, 
structure, system and collocation - which interrelate primarily through grammar. 
Thus, lexical items within set are chosen on the basis of and with reference to 
structure and to system, which in some way have already been formulated . The 
actual selection of lexical items occurs on a 'slot and filler' basis, as is made 
clear by Halliday's example: 
he was sitting there on the 
	  (1964:21) 
Here we have an illustration of how elements of system (the grammar words 
`he , was , on , the' together with the progressive inflection) are already 'in 
place' before a final content lexical item, such as 'bench', is chosen from 
set . So the choice of 'bench' to round off the sentence has the form of an 
independent 'slot filler'. "In lexis" says Halliday,"we make one choice at a 
time" (1964:34). But if the point about lexical choices is that they are made 
separately, one at a time , is there no sense in which a sequence of choices 
might be made? In the case of the above example , it is clear that some choices, 
quite a few infact, have already been made. 'Sit' has been chosen (also from 
set) and all the grammar words are in place . Have these already been selected 
from system, which therefore has some kind of priority, associated 
syntagmatically through structure? If system choices take precedence over set 
choices, there remains the further question of how choices are sequenced from 
within set. Does Halliday's example imply that 'sit' precedes the word final 
slot ? Perhaps I am making rather too much of what , after all , is only a single 
example , designed simply to illustrate the notion of open choices. This may be 
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so , but there remains the larger issue , namely that the very concepts of chain 
and choice must , by definition , presuppose some notion of sequence -you cannot 
have a choice in a void. 
Let me reformulate this problem from a rather different perspective . It seems 
difficult to see how we could have a choice between items of system -between, 
say , 'the' and 'a' or between 'on' and 'under', without having already in mind 
some kind of tangible referent in the ideational context which is being referred 
to .•The choice, from system , of 'on' in the above example is likely to refer to 
an object, such as a chair or a fence, which would form part of Halliday's 
ideational context. Surely, though, there must be cases where the kind of object 
referred to can influence our choice of grammar word in other ways. Thus 'he was 
sitting there on the fence/chair/bench' but: 
13. ? he was sitting there on the grey sky 
14. he was sitting there under/below the grey sky 
With 13 and 14, we have a very clear example of how a choice from set influences 
and takes priority over prepositional choices from system. In this case, atleast, 
set is prior to system. 
In principle Halliday does not rule out such interrelationships, because he 
accepts that grammar and lexis are not always clearly distinct: 
It is not the case...that all choices in language are clearly of one 
type or the other, closed or open. What we find is really a gradient or 
`cline' : that it, there is a continuous gradation in the patterns of 
formal choice in language. At one end we have a large number of 
systems...with a small number of fixed possibilities in each: here we 
are clearly in grammar. At the other end we have open sets...whose 
limits are hard to define: here we are equally clearly in lexis. But 
every language has choices which are round about the middle of this 
cline...and the interaction of one choice 
with others is still fairly complex. (1964:22) 
The problem is that - rather as with Firth - there is a tension which is not 
always satisfactorily resolved between general statements such as the above and 
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Halliday's more specific categorizations and illustrations. It is not always very 
easy to visualize this cline in operation given the very broad distinction made 
between system and set, and between structure and collocation. 
3.3 Structure and the relegation of lexis 
Once we begin to look at Halliday's framework in terms of dynamic interrelations 
between components, we cannot restrict ourselves to a consideration of system and 
set. I have already suggested that case grammar (and particularly Widdowson's 
implicit application of it) shows how the selection of particular verbs creates 
expectations in terms of associated lexical items and their semantic roles. 
Referring back once again to Halliday's example, the choice of 'sit' itself 
implies both an agent and an optional locative in syntagmatic relation to it. 
This raises the more general question of the relationship between choice and 
chain, because the choice of 'sit' need not be seen purely as a paradigmatic 
matter . 'Sit', in other words, itself implies an unfocussed relationship between 
agent, process and locative (eg. he-sit-chair). Consequently syntagmatic 
relations such as [agent-process-patient] need not be formulated exclusively at 
the (grammatical) level of structure: we could strongly argue that certain 
lexical items can also be seen to play a sizeable role here . Thus the 
syntagmatic implications of certain choices from set have a direct bearing on the 
relationship between set and structure. 
Halliday refers to grammar as a 'natural system': both general kinds of 
grammatical patterning and specific manifestations of each bear a natural 
relation to the meanings they have evolved to express. When a child says 'man 
clean car' 
the fact that this is separated into three segments reflects the 
interpretation of composite experiences into their component parts: the 
different grammatical functions assigned to 'man' , 'clean' and 'car' 
express the different roles of these parts with respect to the 
whole ; the distinction into word classes of verb and noun reflects the 
analysis of experiences into goings-on (expressed as verbs) and 
participants in the goings-on, expressed as nouns, and so on.(1983:XIV) 
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But it is not necessary to view the man-clean-car association purely in terms of 
'grammatical functions' . The very fact that we can so easily make sense of such 
an utterance is helped by the conceptual nature of these particular lexical items 
in association. Had the child said 'man car clean' we would still be able to 
make sense of it, partly because we recognize the noun/verb distinctions, but 
primarily because we know, from our knowledge of the world, that 'man' - being 
animate - must be the 'doer' of the action, the agent . We could argue , then , 
that the final 'grammaticized' sentence, eg. 'the man is cleaning the car', is 
conceptualized as much by lexis (set) as by syntagmatic grammar (structure) , 
with the latter very often refining and focussing the former (cf. Widdowson 
1990) . So the agent/process/patient roles can be inferred from lexical items 
taken from set, which are then given further focus by the grammar of structure, 
as 'the man is cleaning the car' is a further focussing of 'man clean car'. Here 
we have the loose beginnings of a relationship between grammar/structure and 
lexis/set. Halliday, however, does not allow for any such integration, because 
for him set is strictly paradigmatic. 
By way of summary, it is clear that 'the man is cleaning the car' could evolve 
from interrelations between set, system and structure. Ofcourse the syntagmatic 
framework of the sentence could, quite uncontroversially , be formulated in 
structure in terms of mutually expectant elements placed in order by the 
grammar , with a subsequent 'filling in' of the slots from set. This seems to be 
more or less Halliday's perspective, and can be represented as follows: 
1. STRUCTURE 
> 3. SET 
2. SYSTEM 	 fig. 2 
If, on the other hand, we allow that set has a wider role than this, implying 
relationships between case roles in the way that has been outlined , then set 
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could be seen to inform lexical content both paradigmatically and 
syntagmatically , in close association with structure. The choice of grammar 
words and of inflections -the man, the car, clean ing, could then be made from 









Clearly this is much too crude and superficial to constitute a principled 
reorientation of the Hallidayan framework, but it may atleast serve to 
demonstrate how the set/system/structure distinctions beg a number of questions 
about the relationship between grammar and lexis , a relationship which must take 
into account the dynamic, sequential implications of chain and choice. 
3.4 Collocation and the limitation of lexis 
For Halliday collocation is the basic formal pattern into which lexical items 
enter: 
A lexical set is simply a grouping of items which have a similar 
range of collocation . 'Chair', 'seat' and 'settee' belong to the same 
lexical set because they have a number of highly probable 
collocations in common: they collocate readily, for example , with 
'comfortable' and 'sit' . 
(1964:33) 
So collocation is serviced from set , in terms of 'probable' associations. 
Furthermore, such probabilities are a matter of degree: 
Wheras in grammar we can say : 'at this place in structure, these 
terms are possible , and all others are impossible', in lexis we 
can never say : 'only these items are possible'. Lexical sets in act 
are bounded only by probabilities. Given the item 'chair' we are 
more likely to find in the same utterance the items 'sit' or 
`comfortable' or 'high' than , say , 'haddock' or 'reap'... 
(ibid.) 
So Halliday defines collocation with reference to set, just as he defines set 
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with reference to structure (because set is the 'filler' while structure provides 
the 'slot'). He seems to be saying : 'just as we cannot make lexical choices from 
set without a priori structure, so we cannot construct collocations without 
reference to set'. The relationship would seem to be something like: 
Fig. 4 	 STRUCTURE 	 >SET 	 >COLLOCATION 
allows us to choose from 	 to form a 
This is a rather restrictive definition of collocation, because of its dependence 
on grammar (structure). It is not clear, for example, how such a framework would 
deal with relatively fixed expressions, where the grammar is marked (so that few, 
if any inflections are possible), and where the collocation is more or less 
invariable, as in 15 and 16 below: 
15. a stitch in time saves nine (*saved) 
16. sooner you than me! (*you are sooner than me) 
The idea, which I have already suggested, that expressions can make more or less 
clear reference to structure, and can be more or less the outcome of a free 
lexical choice, involves us in-accepting that grammar and lexis have a 
complementary but varying relationship . Halliday says that with lexis we can 
never say 'only these items are possible' (ibid.). Surely, though, this is 
exactly what we can say, atleast with regard to 15 above . Lexical fixity of this 
kind and restrictions on the grammar may go hand in hand - as I argued earlier 
with reference to the idiom in 12 . Halliday's collocation , though , cannot free 
itself from the grammar, and being based on grammar, it does not help to account 
for formulaic expressions with a unique lexical content . 
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4. SPEECH ACT THEORY 
4.1 Grammer, lexis and context : Introduction 
It has long been recognized that speech acts give the linguist particular 
problems in identifying and accounting for the variable meanings of language 
forms and their contexts of use. It is rare to find examples of a one-to-one 
relationship between language and illocutionary meaning. Rather, such meanings 
are invariably the product of relationships between language and context . But 
how far has this relationship been investigated in terms of the roles played by 
grammar and by lexis ? 
4.2 Lexical signalling : performative verbs 
There is a class of speech act which draws its illocutionary force largely from 
features of its lexical realisation; where, in effect, the verb signals the 
illocutionary force of the proposition. J.L.Austin, who identified these 
performatives or performative verbs, pointed out that in certain cases, the 
uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of the action" (1962:5). He 
gave the following examples: 
17. I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth 
18. I bet you sixpence he'll win 
19. I warn you not to spread gossip against him (Ibid.) 
In each of these examples the performative verb - name, bet, warn - signals the 
act (of naming, betting, warning) which is performed by virtue of the utterance. 
At first sight, it would seem that Austin is arguing for a relatively fixed, 
context-independent relationship between performative verbs and the acts they 
serve to express, and he is criticized for holding precisely this view (eg. 
Crombie 1985b:8). However, Austin was well aware of the ways in which linguistic 
configurations and contextual constraints can effect meaning, even with 
performative verbs. Dealing first with context, he pointed out that the 
circumstances, including other actions, must be appropriate" (1962:9) . Thus, for 
example, in uttering the performative 'I do' in the marriage ceremony , it is 
essential that the speaker -atleast within a christian culture - should not 
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already be married. 
Austin went on to talk about grammar as a means by which lexically signalled 
performatives might be made invalid, or 'unhappy' as he put it . He said that 
while 'I bet' may be a performative," 'I betted' and 'he bets' are clearly not 
performatives, but describe actions on my and his part respectively" (1962:63). 
Thus, for the illocutionary act of 'betting' to be valid, particular grammatical 
as well as lexical configurations are required . 
Austin then takes his argument a stage further. It is doubtful, he says, whether 
there is a precise 'grammatical' criterion whereby we can unambiguously identify 
a performative/non performative distinction. Even the first form (I bet) : 
.... may be used to describe how I habitually behave: 'I bet him (every 
morning) sixpence that it will rain' or 'I promise only 
when I intend to keep my word'. (1962:64) 
Austin's argument does not stand still; he is constantly challenging his own 
assertions and thereby developing new lines of enquiry . However, the general 
point is clear enough . Lexis does not independently signal a performative 
illocutionary act. 'Bet' can be modified by grammar, by associated lexical items 
and by context, so that it is performative in some circumstances, but not in 
others. Furthermore, there is no independent, exact role which we can assign 
either to lexis or to grammar in this process, because grammar, lexis and context 
are closely inter-dependent. 
More generally, the shortcomings of taking lexical signalling as a basis for the 
classification of illocutionary acts are clear. Some speech act verbs are in 
themselves ambiguous, so that when we speak about 'agreeing', we may be agreeing 
that something is true, or we may be agreeing to do something. Furthermore, there 
are a number of verbs which can express the same speech act - verbs such as 'beg, 
entreat, implore , beseech' (Mitchell 1981:105). More generally still, ofcourse, 
there are a great many speech act realizations which simply do not have any clear 
performative signposting, such as 'It wouldn't be a bad idea for you to ...'. 
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Consequently, although lexis can play a crucial signalling role in speech act 
exponents, we can only go so far in talking of lexis in isolation from other 
linguistic and contextual factors. 
4.3 Grammar , lexis and context : Searle and the Literal Force Hypothesis 
Searle (1969/79) is associated with what has become known as the Literal Force 
Hypothesis , namely the view that illocutionary force can , atleast with certain 
expressions , be built into sentence form . According to Searle certain syntactic 
forms -most notably some of the modal auxiliaries - are conventionally associated 
with certain speech acts, as is illustrated in the following examples: 
20. Could you dust the room ? 
21. would you like to dust the room ? 
22. You really ought to dust the room 
23. You should dust the room 
Searle, like Austin a speech act theorist with a background in philosophy, looked 
at examples such as these and commented on the relationship between their syntactic 
regularity and their frequent use as suasive speech acts. Speech act theory, says 
Searle, provides us with a framework whereby , under certain conditions, 20 would 
be understood as a request, rather than simply as a hypothetical question about a 
past ability, as in 'were you able to dust the room?'. He goes on to argue that: 
... within this framework certain forms will tend to become 
conventionally established as the standard idiomatic forms for 
indirect speech acts...I am suggesting that "can you", "could 
you", "I want you to", and numerous other forms are conventional 
ways of making requests. 
(1979:49) 
Searle developed a series of conditions designed to identify the criteria which 
must be validated if an utterance is to count as a particular illocutionary act. He 
gives four such conditions, as follows: 
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Future act A of the hearer 
1. The hearer is able to do the action A, and speaker 
believes this. 
2. It is not obvious to hearer and speaker that the hearer 
will perform the action in the normal course of events, 
and of his/her own accord. 
The speaker wants the hearer to do the action 
Essential 	 Counts as an attempt to get the hearer to do the action 
in question. 
(Adapted from Searle 1969:66) 
Searle examines each of these conditions in detail, building them into his overall 
theory designed to address the relationship between 'expression' and 'meaning'. 
Exactly how do these 'conventionalized' forms for indirect requests draw on these 
general conditions? To answer this question, Searle listed four 'generalizations': 
Generalisation 1 : S (speaker) can make an indirect request ...by either 
asking whether or stating that a preparatory condition concerning H's 
(hearer's) ability to do A (the action) obtains 
Generalisation 2 : S can make an indirect directive by either asking 
whether or stating that the propositional content condition obtains. 
Generalisation 3 : S can make an indirect directive by stating that the 
sincerity condition obtains .... 
Generalisation 4 : S can make an indirect directive by either stating 
that or asking whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A.... 
(1979:45) 
Searle listed example expressions which, at a 'pretheoretical level', illustrate 
these generalizations and the basis speech act conditions on which they are based: 
24. Can you reach the salt ? 
25. Can you pass the salt ? 
26. Could you be a little more quiet ? 
27. You could be a little more quiet 	 (1979:36) 
These examples relate to generalisation 1, because they ask whether (24-26) or 
state that (27) H is able to do the act - in other words, the preparatory 
condition. Similarly, generalisation 4, concerning the speakers belief that there 
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are good reasons for doing the act, is implied when we use the modal auxiliaries 
`should/ought'. Searle gives the following examples: 
28. You ought to be more polite to your mother 
29. You should leave immediately 
30. Ought you to eat quite so much spaghetti ? 
31. Should you be wearing John's tie ? 
	 (1979:37/38) 
Clearly , though , there are self evident difficulties with this view when taken to 
extremes . For example, the preparatory condition, which involves reference to the 
hearer's ability to perform the action, can be made more explicit by using the 
conventionalized form 'if you can' , as with: 
32. Would you pass me the salt, if you can ? 
However, this form is syntactically 'stigmatized', ie. its distribution is marked 
so that it cannot occur with direct or with indirect requests for information: 
*33. I want to know if you've got the spanner, if you can 
So, because there are distributional restrictions which seriously delimit the 
systematicity of LFH, it has come in for considerable criticism (eg. Levinson 
1983:266). 
Searle's examples of conventionalized syntactic forms ( 24 to 31 above) are all 
structured around lexical items which clearly illustrate his hypothesis. However, 
it is possible to think of the same syntactic forms occurring with lexical items 
which do not meet Searle's conditions for a valid request: 
34. Could you help him ? 
35. Could you hear him ? 
While both 34 and 35 refer to the ability of the hearer , only 34 clearly operates 
in addition , as a directive . Clearly , too , this has something to do with the 
difference between 'help' and 'hear'. We could argue that hearing is not something 
which the hearer could put into operation intentionally , as a matter of volition - 
either we happen to hear something , or we don't . Consequently , it is rather 
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difficult to regard 35 as a request for action , largely on account of the lexis . 
So in 35 the directive force of the syntactic form is to some extent countered by 
the use of a stative verb in the predicate . Indeed , it is because many statives 
express 'actions' which are innate rather than consciously brought about that these 
expressions are so difficult to interpret as directives -understand , see , hear , 
resemble , recognize etc. Logically , it is not possible to request or to advise 
someone to do something which they cannot do deliberately . So , while the syntax 
of these forms (34/5) does not in itself discriminate between directive and non 
directive meanings , the lexis quite clearly does . However , Searle's hypothesis 
does not distinguish in any clear way between grammar and lexis in its' statements 
about the relationship between 'form' and illocutionary force . 
Thus a change of lexical item can create ambiguity between a directive force and 
what Searle calls the 'literal' force . This relates to Searle's propositional 
content condition for requests , which he says concerns the speaker referring to a 
'future act' of the hearer . In essence , whether or not 'could you hear me ?' 
denotes a request depend on whether 'hear me' can in certain circumstances be seen 
to refer to a future act , or only to a past ability (the literal force) . 
There are other ways in which grammar and lexis can play distinct but mutually 
dependent roles in signalling particular illocutions . A change of performative 
verb , for example , can mark a shift from one kind of directive meaning to 
another : 
36. I warn you not to spread gossip against him 
37. I order you not to spread gossip against him 
Here there is a quite unambiguous change to Searle's preparatory condition , from a 
situation in which speaker implies that a warning can be backed up with punitive 
action in the event of non compliance (36) , to a situation where the question of 
punitive action is simply not relevant (37) . 
Another way in which the preparatory condition can be affected by a change of 
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lexical item is in the distinction between warnings and promises : 
38. If you do that again , I'll give you a punch on the nose 
39. If you do that again , I'll give you an apple pie 
Only in the case of promises does the speaker presuppose that the action is in the 
hearer's interests (cf. Searle's preparatory condition for promises , 1969:58/9). 
Consequently , the change from punch on the nose to apple pie 
marks a shift from 'against hearer's interests' (warning) to 'in hearer's 
interests' (promise) . It should be emphasized , however , that particular contexts 
of situation could always invalidate this distinction : 39 , for example , could be 
a threat if speaker knows that hearer hates apple pies . 
These and other examples will be looked at in detail in chapter 5 . For the 
present , they are worth mentioning in order to highlight the general point , that 
many speech act expressions involve an interdependence both between language and 
context , and between grammar and lexis . 
I have talked about lexical changes of illocutionary force , but what of 
grammatical changes , and (of particular concern here) changes to grammatical 
inflections ? That grammatical changes of this kind can substantially alter the 
illocutionary force of an utterance is virtually self evident . I have already 
mentioned how this can happen in connection with performative verbs : I bet ,vou may 
(given a supporting context) function as a performative , but I betted you cannot 
do so . 
The same principle can be seen to be at work with less direct expressions : 
40. Could you help me ? (valid as request form) 
41. Could you have helped me ? (invalid) 
42. You ought to leave immediately 	 (valid) 
43. You ought to have left immediately (invalid) 
44. Would you like to see Ghandi ? (valid) 
45. Would you have liked to have seen Ghandi ? (invalid) 
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So , just as lexical change within the same syntactic form can have repercussions 
for illocutionary force , so inflectional change can mark a difference in 
illocutionary force within the same lexical/collocational environment . Again , 
this point will be further investigated in chapter 5 . 
4.4- SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 
In this section I have suggested that the illocutionary force of speech act 
expressions is a product of interaction between grammar , lexis and context . Some 
speech act theorists (notably Austin) have focused on the lexis arguing that the 
lexical signalling of performative verbs in itself marks the speaker's 
illocutionary intent , unless this is cancelled by particular cotextual and 
contextual factors . Others , such as Searle , have given less attention to 
grammar and/or lexis per se , arguing instead for a generalized correspondence 
between conventionalized expression and directive illocutionary forces . What is 
missing is any clear conception of the variable roles of grammar and lexis within 
these expressions . 
As with the other sections in this chapter , I have not attempted to provide a 
rigorous , all embracing survey . But it is worth noting , in passing , that the 
Literal Force Hypothesis is not the only approach to the study of speech acts which 
takes little account of grammar and lexis . Sadock (1974) and Green (1975) , for 
example , have proposed an idiom theory . According to Sadock and Green , request 
forms like 'would/could you' are all idioms for, and semantically equivalent to 'I 
hereby request you to...', just as 'kick the bucket' is an idiom for 'die'. Idiom 
Theory ties in closely with a view of language acquisition in reference to 
formulaic language: some forms, including those which are idiomatic, are simply not 
analysed, but are recorded whole in the lexicon (cf. Peters 1983 and section 5/this 
chapter) . The problem with Idiom Theory is that it disregards both cotextual and 
contextual variables which distinguish between an expression operating 
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idiomatically (as a speech act) and an expression which is not idiomatic. Given 
that forms such as 'could you' have both a literal (ability) and an idiomatic 
(request) meaning, how can the hearer tell, purely on the basis of the language , 
which meaning is intended ? 
The undeniable role of context in disambiguating led others (eg. Gordon and Lakoff 
1975) to suggest that there should be an Inference Theory , whereby 'can you climb 
that tree ?' has an indirect request force (and not merely the literal force of a 
question about the hearer's ability) whenever the literal force is blocked by 
context. This is irrefutable, but it does not in itself take us very far in 
identifying what it is about language which allows us to recognize illocutionary 
forces in some circumstances, but not in others. 
I have suggested , however , that by making a broad distinction between grammar and 
lexis , it is possible to observe how both grammatical and lexical changes may lead 
to changes of illocutionary force in ways which are broadly predictable . In 
chapter five I will go into this in some detail . 
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5. FORMULAIC LANGUAGE 
5.1 Introduction 
The concept of formulaic language is based on the notion that the units of language 
acquisition may be stored mentally not (or not exclusively) in terms of their 
analysed grammatical form , but as expressions which are memorized as unanalysed 
'chunks'. For example , the sentence it's good to see you can be regarded , 
broadly speaking, from one of these two contrasting perspectives . From the 
analytic point of view , it constitutes a syntactic structure which consists of 
variable lexical items embedded within a syntagmatic grammatical chain . It could 
also , though , be seen as a formulaic utterance , familiar as an 'expression' and 
restricted in its' capacity for grammatical or lexical variation : we would be most 
unlikely to hear someone say 'it's staggering to see you' or 'it's good to view 
you' . 
Studies of formulaic language derive in part from analyses of language acquisition, 
and in part from study of adult , native speaker language production . I shall look 
at each , briefly , in turn . 
5.2 The units of language acquisition 
Many writers have pointed to the growing evidence that first and second language 
learners demonstrate a capacity to store and reproduce from memory very large 
numbers of 'phrases' (eg. Bolinger 1976 ; Vihman 1982 ; Gleason 1982) . Anne Peters 
has outlined a number of criteria for what may constitute a unit of language 
acquired and subsequently used in this way : 
a) Is the utterance used repeatedly and in exactly the same form ? 
b) Is the construction of the utterance to any productive pattern in the 
child's current speech ? 
c) Is the utterance inappropriate in some contexts in which it is used ? 
d) Does the utterance cohere phonologically ? 
e) Is the usage of the expression situationally dependent ? 
f) Is it a community-wide formula ? 
(1983:7-11) 
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It has been suggested (eg Slobin 1975) that units of language acquired on the basis 
of criteria such as the above may be stored , atleast initially , in a kind of 
'mental lexicon' , so that the learner effectively memorizes whole lists of self-
contained language expressions , prior to analyzing and breaking them down 
according to their particular linguistic properties . Slobin's reference to a 
mental lexicon is significant . His point is that irrespective of syntactic 
distinctions , all kinds of linguistic expressions , if they can be perceived by 
learners as being familiar form/meaning pairings , are effectively treated as if 
they were extended lexical items . In other words , both whole expressions and 
individual lexical items may be perceived as being in some sense 'self contained' 
without reference to their internal structure . 
5.3 The units of adult language production 
Studies of adult speech suggest that our capacity for storing 'chunks' of language 
in the mental lexicon does not necessarily diminish substantially as we move out of 
the early stages of language acquisition . How is it , for example , that native 
speakers are able to produce such long , fluent stretches of spontaneous connected 
discourse with such apparent ease ? According to Pawley and Syder : 
.... there is a puzzle here in that human capacities for encoding novel 
speech in advance or while speaking appear to be severely limited . Yet 
speakers commonly produce fluent multi - clause utterances which exceed 
these limits . 
(1983:191) 
In order to help solve this puzzle , Pawley and Syder have developed the notion of 
lexicalized sentence stems . These , say Pawley and Syder , are linguistic units 
of a4least clause length whose grammatical form and lexical content is to a greater 
or lesser degree fixed , and which serve to express a culturally recognized 
concept . They are not true idioms , but regular form/meaning pairings . 
The hypothesis outlined by Pawley and Syder runs counter to the traditional 
compartmentalization of language form into syntax (rules used for production) and 
the dictionary (fixed , arbitrary usages) . Many regular morpheme sequences , they 
say , are known both holistically (as lexicalized units) and analytically (as the 
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products of syntactic rules) . They go on to talk of the extent to which 
expressions may be judged to be nativelike . Illustrating this concept , Pawley and 
Syder point to how many expressions sound 'odd' if their lexical or grammatical 
constituents are altered . Thus 56 would generally be judged to be nativelike , 
while 57 would not : 
56. I'm so glad you could bring Harry 
57. That you could bring Harry gladdens me so 
(1983:195) 
Clearly , reference to syntactic distinctions alone does not help to explain this 
distinction , since both 56 and 57 are perfectly acceptable in grammatical terms . 
Pawley and Syder refer to a 'cline' or 'novelty scale' with entirely novel 
expressions at one end , and familiar , culturally recognized expressions at the 
other . In between are partly new collocations of lexical items , partly structural 
material . We can judge the extent to which an expression is lexicalized , say 
Pawley and Syder , by reference to the following criteria : 
a) Its' meaning is not totally predictable from its form 
b) It behaves as a minimal unit for certain syntactic purposes 
c) It is a social institution (ie. a culturally standardized term) 
These criteria are not so different from those proposed by Peters with reference to 
language acquisition . 
5.4 Grammar and lexis in formulaic language 
How is the work on formulaic language relevant to discussion of the relationship 
between grammar and lexis ? There are , perhaps , two areas of interest here . 
Firstly , the notion that formulaic units can be perceived , both by learners and 
by adult users , as being akin to lexical items . This in itself is a strong 
argument against the notion that grammar is by definition dominant , and that lexis 
is , as it were , essentially a sub-category whose primary function is to exemplify 
the 'inherent' meaning of grammatical forms . 
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Pawley and Syder argue strongly that the degree to which expressions behave as 
minimal units , akin to individual lexical items , is a matter of degree . This is 
what they call the process of lexicalization , and they suggest a system of 
notation whereby a recurrent collocation can be described so as to highlight its 
lexical and grammatical restrictions . For example , the expression I'm sorry to 
keep you malting can be represented as : 
I'm 
	
sorry to keep 	 you waiting 
NP be-TENSE sorry to keep-TENSE you waiting 
(1983:210) 
In this sentence stem , the obligatory lexical elements are spelled out - 'sorry to 
keep'/'you waiting'. Permissible inflections are indicated by 'TENSE' , so that we 
could say 'I was sorry ...' , or 'to have kept you ...' . Each sentence stem , 
Pawley and Syder argue , has "a more or less unique grammar" (1983:215) , and each 
is subject to a different range of phrase structure and transformational 
restrictions . 
What is significant about this view of formulaic language is its' explicit 
recognition of the fact that many expressions cannot be usefully appraised solely 
in grammatical terms . Instead , much of formulaic language is seen as a product of 
both grammatical and lexical configurations , with the two being so highly inter-
dependent that a linguistic description which ignored either component would be 
seriously deficient . As Pawley and Syder put it : 
any strict compartmentalization [between productive grammatical rules and 
unitary lexical items] would not truly reflect the native speaker's 
grammatical knowledge if the facts are .. that lexicalization and 
productivity are each matters of degree . 
(1983:220) 
This recognition of the interdependency between grammar and lexis has been largely 
absent from most other approaches to linguistic description which I have touched on 
in this chapter . In section 6 , then , I will review the work I have outlined in 
terms of the degree to which grammar and lexis have been seen as interdependent . 
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6. GRAMMAR AND LEXIS IN DESCRIPTIVE LINGUISTICS : SYNTHESIS 
The work reviewed in this chapter can be broadly divided between three categories, 
according to whether grammar , lexis or a dependent interrelation of the two has 
been accorded priority . In figure five , then , I present a diagrammatic summary 
of these various orientations ; the figure is to some extent simplified (and so 
idealized) , in order to provide a clear though highly generalized picture : 
The area denoted 'grammar' refers to those areas of linguistic description which 
are largely or entirely based on grammatical classification , but which does not 
also accommodate any clear interrelation with lexis . Thus in Choasky's standard 
theory , the syntactic component comprised the generative core of the system , 
while the lexicon was largely concerned with exceptions to grammatical 'rule' ; but 
with the incorporation and elaboration of case grammar within TG came a recognition 
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that the power of the syntactic component needed to be constrained through lexical 
entries which categorized their syntactic co-occurrence potential . In this way the 
development of TG saw a gradual recognition of the interdependence of grammar and 
lexis . 
In principle Halliday both accommodated a lexical level of linguistic description 
through his categories of set and collocation , and allowed for interaction between 
these and his grammatical categories of structure and system (figure 2) . But the 
kind of relationship between these components which Halliday formulated meant that 
lexical categories were entirely dependent on grammatical categories , so that 
lexis has no independent existence . In this sense there is a striking parallel 
between Chomsky's syntactic component (1956) and Halliday's structure/system 
network (1964/66) : in both cases lexis is effectively dependent on grammar . 
Firth , in contrast , proposed that interrelations between grammatical and lexical 
components should be deliberately sought after , and thus I put interrelations in 
the area of common ground between grammar and lexis (figure 5) . But I have 
suggested that there is little specific indication of how Firth's grammatical 
categories (of structure and colligation) interrelate with collocation in specific 
instances of analysis . Thus while relatively 'lexicalized' expressions - including 
idioms , proverbs and much of formulaic language - are clearly related to 
collocation , it is difficult to measure the extent to which both lexis 
(collocation) and grammar (colligation) may interact to varying degrees across a 
broader spectrum of linguistic expression . In short , colligation is defined so as 
to exclude lexis , and collocation is defined so as to exclude grammar . 
Halliday's concept of collocation , ofcourse , differs substantially from Firth's . 
For Halliday , collocation is explicitly serviced from set , and set is implicitly 
derived from structure , so that Halliday's collocation has a grammatical 
foundation which excludes analysis of language which is highly lexicalized . 
Pawley and Syder's concept of lexicalized sentence stems explicitly takes on board 
the notion of a variable 'balance of power' between grammar and lexis : as they put 
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it , "lexicalization and productivity are each matters of degree" (1983:220) . I 
have very briefly suggested that this sort of perspective may also be worth 
pursuing with regard to many speech act expressions , including Searle's 
conventionalized indirect forms . Yet with the exception of Austin's study of 
performative verbs (which looks at speech act expression from the lexical 
perspective) , I have placed speech act analysis outside the domain of 
grammar/lexis interaction in figure 5 ; by and large , the internal workings of 
grammar and lexis are not specifically addressed by the Literal Force Hypothesis , 
nor by Idiom Theory or Inference Theory . 
In chapters three to five , I will pick up again some of the issues raised in this 
chapter , arguing that grammar and lexis interrelate in predictable ways in the 
expression of specific meanings in relation to context . But first , we need to 
examine the extent to which interrelations between grammar and lexis have been 
taken on board by applied linguists in the field of language teaching and language 
syllabus design , and this is the subject of chapter two . 
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—CHAPTER TIO- 
GRAMMAR AND LEXIS IN PEDAGOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
I have suggested that linguists have generally paid rather less attention to lexis 
than to grammar and , in particular , that they have not fully addressed 
relationships between lexis and grammar . We now need to see to what extent the 
same is true of pedagogy , and to asses the degree to which linguists and speech 
act analysts have influenced the thinking of applied linguists in this regard . It 
is by no means unusual , after all , for teachers and syllabus designers to turn to 
linguist's descriptions of language as one source of guidance . To what extent has 
this been done , particularly with reference to the way language is conceptualized 
in course design ? Alternatively , have applied linguists been more aware of the 
relationships which hold between lexis and grammar ? 
It will be suggested that grammar has been given a great deal more attention than 
lexis in language pedagogy , sometimes to the extent that grammar has been assumed 
virtually to subsume lexis . This , however , has not always been the case . In the 
1930's the focus of interest was very much on words , and there is now once again a 
revival of interest in vocabulary teaching , and in the design and implementation 
of 'lexical syllabuses' . Indeed , ever since the 1930's lexis has been the 
mainstay of a wide range of learner dictionaries , running from Hornby (1948/74) 
through to the plethora of more recent works (eg. Longman 1983/87) . 
With these trends in mind , it is worth enquiring why this early interest in words 
did not continue to be widespread after the 1930's/40's . We also need to ask 
whether this shift , together with the more recent return of interest in words , 
has taken place against a clear appreciation of how grammar and lexis might relate 
one to the other . 
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1. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WORD BASED PARADIGM : BASIC ENGLISH 
1.1 Outline 
The 1930's witnessed a movement intended to establish the word as the basic unit 
for pedagogic description , and one of the first and most significant moves in this 
direction was the proposal for Basic English . Initiated by C.K. Ogden and I.A. 
Richards (Ogden 1930/1968) , Basic English aimed to establish a core minimum 
vocabulary for the learning of English of 850 words . Claiming that this could be 
used to express quite complex ideas through paraphrase , only 18 main verbs were 
included , together with the three basic verbal inflections -er/-ing/-ed . The 
absence of such verbs as ask or want could , said Ogden and Richards , be overcome 
by paraphrasing , so that 'ask' could be circumlocuted by 'put a question' , and 
'want' by 'have a desire for' . 
However , the project to establish Basic English suffered from a number of major 
drawbacks . Firstly , Basic English is a restricted , simplified language , and as 
such it is questionable whether it could help learners understand language which 
is not similarly simplified . More generally , Basic English may not prepare 
learners for further learning beyond the completion of formal programmes of study , 
because it is a closed system , constituting an accumulative code for language use 
rather than a generative framework for ongoing investment in novel , unfamiliar 
forms . 
Secondly , the word list included many lexical and grammatical words which , quite 
clearly , can have more than one meaning . Indeed , it has been estimated that 
these 850 words probably represent more than 12,000 meanings (Nation 1983:11) . 
Thirdly , the list was represented in a highly intuitive and introspective manner . 
Little indication was given to the potential frequency or subject range of any of 
these words in a given corpus . Furthermore , notions of how particular words , and 
especially grammar words , might or might not key in to certain structural 
patterns were not considered . In other words , criteria such as structural value 
and capacity for word building were not taken on board . Underlying this criticism 
lies what was perhaps the major fault of Basic English , namely that the word was 
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considered as a unit in isolation , with self contained meaning . Aside from the 
question of paraphrase , there was no serious consideration of the way in which 
words and grammar may relate to each other in the expression of meaning . Indeed , 
it is hardly surprising to be told that Basic English represents in the area of 
12,000 separate senses , given that words were referred to meaning only in the 
crudest and most unconnected of ways . The list was divided up between 100 
'operators' , 600 words representing 'things' , and 150 words representing 
'qualities' (Richards:1943) . There is no principled way in which operators , 
things and qualities can be related to each other , or to grammar . 
1.2 Grammar and lexis in Basic English 
Thus , because Ogden and Richards provided no principled means whereby the words in 
their list might link up to form syntactic structures and lexical associations , 
there was no clear way forward in developing a coherent teaching programme . It is 
difficult to see how grading and sequencing could be undertaken , given that no 
specific syntactic patterns emerge , and that no specific word meanings are 
preferred , there being no cotextual or contextual clues which would help to narrow 
them down . 
What is striking about the Basic English word list is the way in which grammatical 
and lexical elements remain quite distinct . While content lexical items are to be 
found in the 'things' and 'qualities' categories , grammar words (Richards' 
'operators') and grammatical inflections are listed separately . However , the 
content words do not exist as completely abstract entities , because , crude as it 
is , the 'things/qualities/operators' distinction could form the beginnings of a 
notional categorisation of words . The question then is how do these grammatical 
and lexical groupings link up together ? Although Ogden and Richards do not answer 
this question , the very fact that it is the lexical rather than grammatical 
elements which are given semantic labels seems to leave the way open for a lexical 
approach to establishing some kind of grammar/lexis relationship . Had Ogden and 
Richards been able to categorize their words in a less generalized fashion - for 
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example , by reference to their semantic roles as processes , agents , patients , 
goals etc. - then potential relationships between their grammatical and lexical 
components could have been formulated . 
The advantage of this alternative approach , as has already been suggested in 
chapter one , is that lexical items can be semantically marked in terms both of 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships which hold between them . For example , 
the syntagmatic pattern [agent - process - patient] , where certain verbs 
can/cannot fill the process slot , in itself suggests both associations between 
lexical items and possible links to grammatical features , such as word order or 
verbal inflection . This point has already been outlined and illustrated in 
discussion of Chomsky and Halliday . The important point is that Ogden and Richards 
were not so very far away from an approach such as this . 
2. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WORD BASED PARADIGM : MICHAEL NEST 
2.1 Outline 
Michael West is particularly noted for his General Service List (1953) . This list 
was the culmination of a number of studies made in the 1930's concerned with 
vocabulary selection for teaching purposes , and with which Harold Palmer was also 
closely associated . These studies helped create the report made to the Carnegie 
Conference of 1935 , and to the publication of the first General Service List of 
1936 . 
In some ways the list seemed to be an advance on Basic English , because it 
stressed the importance of taking into account such selectional criteria as word 
frequency , universality , structural value , subject range, word building and 
definition value . Bringing in subjective considerations of the potential value of 
words , both semantically (via universality , subject range and definition value) 
and syntactically (via structural value and word building) seemed to be a process 
with inherent advantages . Semantically , it was now possible to itemize words with 
reference to their potential range of meanings in linguistic contexts . 
Syntactically , grammatical criteria were introduced which seemed to invite the 
marking of particular words for their potential relationships through syntactic 
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structure . It was precisely on account of the absence of these considerations that 
Basic English has come in for so much criticism . In short , West's semantic and 
syntactic criteria seemed to acknowledge that a semantically coherent basis to 
course design required reference not only to words , but to the way they can 
associate with each other in meaningful lexico-syntactic patterns . 
However , while the Carnegie Conference report improved on Basic English by giving 
more focussed attention to meaning and to grammar , it failed to provide an 
approach which would sustain lexis as a viable 'level' of linguistic description 
separate from , though interrelated with grammar . 
2.2 Grammar and lexis in West's framework 
The problem with West's approach was that it led to a situation where words could 
no longer be seen as in any way distinguishable from grammar . We can begin by 
looking in greater detail at West's criteria for the selection of words . This 
involved two quite distinct kinds of 'processing' . The first of these involved 
distinguishing between the objective selection of words (via analysis of their 
frequency and subject range) , and the subjective 'streamlining' of these words 
according to their universality and definition value . So , for example , a 
frequent word - such as 'bench' - might be disregarded and replaced by another 
whose range of meaning was wider , such as 'seat'. Thus West's subjective criteria 
acted as a kind of filter , whereby some words were rejected , and others retained. 
The process looked something like this : 
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Perhaps the most important point to note here is that all of West's criteria for 







terms of universality or of subject range concerned individual lexical items . Thus 
one could easily enough be substituted for another , and it was precisely on this 
basis that West could introduce what we have referred to here as his subjective 
'filter' . 
The dangers of regarding lexis as no more than a compilation of individual items 
were then compounded with the further filtering of words through West's syntactic 













While West's lexical criteria were paradigmatic , his syntactic criteria were all 
syntagmatic . So , although each separate stage of the framework could perfectly 
well be justified on its own terms , the syntactic criteria were , when placed 
alongside the semantic criteria , by far the most powerful and embracing . That is 
to say , whatever words were finally selected through the 'semantic filter' , the 
only way to relate them , the only way to describe the emergence of actual , 
syntagmatic forms , was through and in terms of the syntactic criteria . This was a 
direct and inevitable consequence of the way in which the terms of each component 
grouping had been set up . In short , lexis is paradigmatic , and words are 
commutable . Grammar is syntagmatic , and thus only and exclusively through grammar 
can we talk of actual sentences , clauses , expressions . 
This distinction between semantic and syntactic criteria , then , represented a 
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distinction between words and grammar , together with a clear prioritizing in 
favour of the latter . West kept the semantic and syntactic components quite 
separate , allowing no balanced way in which they could be related to each other . 
There was thus no way of appraising , yet alone exploiting , the notion that 
particular structures might be developed by learners on the basis of starting out 
with a selected and associated vocabulary . 
2.3 West in the wider context 
In effect , West ended up by treating lexis very much in 'slot and filler' terms , 
in a way which is not entirely unrelated to the way Chomsky , and even Halliday , 
have accounted for lexis in relation to grammar . Lexis , that is , is seen largely 
as a means of breathing substance into grammatical structures . With this in mind, 
it is quite in order to suggest that West's work led quite naturally to the onset 
of the structural approach . As Widdowson has put it , West's framework : 
.... represented no extension of the traditional basis of limitation 
as far as grammar is concerned : the whole system of the language 
emerges as the material to be taught . (1964:127) . 
Ultimately , West allowed no means of linking words together other than by 
reference to grammar , and so it is not at all surprising that word counts 
gradually became less popular , as the focus of attention shifted to structure . 
It is interesting to compare West's work with that of Ogden and Richards . West 
defined words , in effect , as independent , individual units requiring reference 
to grammar to be made sense of . Ogden and Richards , in contrast , saw grammar in 
terms of distinct operations (inflections) and operators (grammar words) which , in 
effect , could only be associated into meaningful patterns by reference to lexis . 
Ogden and Richards kept their lexical and grammatical categories distinct , while 
allowing for them to be cross-referred . West started out the same way , by working 
separately with lexical ('semantic') and grammatical (syntactic) components . 
Unlike Ogden and Richards , though , West's definitions did not allow for the two 
to be kept separate , and thus the syntactic criteria virtually subsumed the 
lexical criteria . 
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3. FRIES AND THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH 
3.1 Outline 
There is thus a clear sense in which work on vocabulary selection led to the 
transfer of attention to structure , and to the relegation of lexis to a position 
of secondary importance . With the impetus coming chiefly from the United States , 
this new balance held sway in many quarters for some 30 years , from the 1940's 
through to the end of the 1960's . Fries , in his reaching and Learning English as 
a Foreign Language (1945) , was well aware of the concern amongst many language 
learners with the development of vocabulary . His somewhat dismissive explanation 
for this was to attribute it to their naive memories of their first language 
learning experience . The fact is , said Fries , that in Ll acquisition , the 
learning of grammar is so basic and fundamental that adults have forgotten the 
experience . The problem of learning a new language , Fries maintained , is not 
learning its vocabulary ; rather , it has to do with mastering its sound system and 
its grammatical structure . All the learner needs at first is enough basic 
vocabulary to practise the basic structures . In language , he said , there are 
four different kinds of words : function words , substitute words , words of 
negative/affirmative distribution , and content words . The first three of these 
need to be thoroughly mastered in the initial stages of language learning , with 
only a small number of content words required (1945:39) . Only on completion of 
this crucial first phase of structural learning can the learner move on to a 
greater development of vocabulary . Fries , then , made a stark distinction between 
vocabulary (which he equated with content words) and structure . 
It was Fries' assumption that through structure we can express an adequate 
variety of meanings with only a minimal use of content words . The function of 
these content words was chiefly to 'flesh out' structural patterns for the purposes 
of necessary pedagogic exemplification . Consequently no serious attempt was made 
to treat vocabulary as anything more than an appendage to grammar . 
3.2 Lexis , grammar and context : a pedagogic mismatch 
The notion that words , and particularly content words , have a role to play in 
59 
identifying features of the environment is one which I have already mentioned in 
the previous chapter . I have talked , with reference to Widdowson (1990) about how 
lexical items can be used to refer to participants (in the roles of 
actor/agent/patient etc.) , to related processes , and so on . It is interesting to 
note , then , that Fries himself indicated an awareness of precisely this function 
of vocabulary . The small content vocabulary which he recommended for the early 
stages of language learning should , he said , be easily conceptualized , and 
should thus be drawn from the immediate classroom environment (1945: 39/40) . 
Similarly , the later stages should culminate in the learning of vocabulary for 
special areas of experience . Fries thus implied that familiarity with vocabulary 
was a prerequisite for making sense of the world about us , and - by extension - 
for relating the form of the language to the contexts to which it refers . The 
structuralists , however , did not pursue this line of enquiry . Instead , they 
maintained that the essence of language learning consists of learning structure . 
In this context , the structural approach was a move backwards . 
At the beginning of this chapter , mention was made of Richards' notion that words 
can in some sense be marked for a generalized meaning which is related to but 
separate from grammar . Such a notion was firmly rejected by the structuralists . 
One of the chief drawbacks to the structural approach was its promulgation of a 
static conception of language , one which took little account of words or of 
contexts . There is an inevitable tension between the selection and description of 
structures without reference to words , and the need to present these structures 
meaningfully in the context of the classroom . Fries recognized that a small but 
appropriate vocabulary would be required for this . What he did not do was fully 
take on board the implications of such a belief . If an appropriate vocabulary is 
required to account for the constraints of the classroom context , then it surely 
follows that an appropriate selection of grammatical forms is needed too . 
Furthermore , there must be limits to the extent that we can carefully account for 
the one without at the same time bearing in mind the other . During the stages of 
language selection for a structural syllabus , the criteria available to the course 
designer largely concerned structure framed in isolation from lexis . This led to 
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pedagogic mismatches between language and the classroom context in which it was to 
be presented . As Widdowson has commented : 
The fact that a given word or structural item presents no difficulty 
for the learner and has a high coverage value must be disregarded 
if the classroom circumstances make it impossible to present the 
item meaningfully . (1964:137) 
So , the idea of selecting and grading target language with a view to its' 
meaningful contextualisation in the classroom was not given a high priority by the 
structuralists . Items of vocabulary were selected in terms of their abstracted 
potential value , but without reference to any particular association with other 
words , or with context . Considerations of the relationship between grammar , 
lexis and context were not developed : contextualisation was considered to be a 
methodological matter . Hence the mismatch . 
Thus the structuralist's relegation of context to the presentation stage went , 
quite logically , hand in hand with their lack of interest in relationships between 
grammar , lexis and context . However , this relegation is perfectly explicable if 
we bear in mind that the structural approach was a logical conclusion to West's 
categorizations . West , I have said , defined criteria for lexical and grammatical 
selection so that the latter subsumed the former . relations between grammar and 
lexis , or between lexis and context were left , in effect , undiscovered . Fries' 
starting point - that words are subsidiary to grammar - thus neatly took up from 
where West had left off . West began with the word yet finished with the entire 
structural system of the language . Fries started with the primacy of grammar , 
and kept vocabulary as subsidiary from the very outset . 
Halliday , though beginning with categorizations which seem to account for a 
lexical 'level' of language , quite clearly de-emphasized lexis in favour of 
grammar in the way he defines his categories and relates one to the other . There 
is some similarity between this and the work of Michael West , 35 years earlier . 
More generally , both Chomsky and Halliday take a slot-and-filler approach to the 
grammar/lexis relationship , and there is , again , more that a slight resemblance 
to the principles which guided the work of the structuralists . 
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4. WILKINS AND THE NOTIONAL/FUNCTIONAL SYLLABUS 
4.1 Introduction 
In what ways did the notional/functional syllabus consider relationships between 
grammar and lexis ? In 1972 , four years prior to the publication of Notional 
Syllabuses , Wilkins criticizes what he saw as the downgrading of lexis throughout 
the structuralist years . Such a view , he said , might be acceptable in the 
absence of any obvious need to learn a language quickly . However , while learning 
mostly vocabulary and very little grammar would be of precious little value to the 
learner , learning all structure and next to no vocabulary would be a great deal 
worse : 
.... without grammar very little can be conveyed , without vocabulary 
nothing can be conveyed . 
(1972:111) 
Nevertheless , Wilkins decided to play safe , concluding that the delaying of 
vocabulary expansion in courses with long term aims could do no harm . In the 
majority of situations , the standard pattern of emphasis on grammar prior to 
development of vocabulary is the wisest approach (1972:133) . This is a striking 
statement . It recalls that made by Fries 27 years earlier , that grammar should be 
the central point of concern in the early stages of language teaching . 
4.2 Grammar and lexis : the semantico-grammatical category 
In discussing the notional component of his system (the semantico-grammatical 
category) , Wilkins is ultimately uncommitted on the precise role and importance of 
lexis . He begins by talking about the semantico-grammatical category , as the name 
implies , in terms of a relatively close relationship between meaning and grammar . 
At this point , he makes no reference to lexis whatsoever : 
It is because of the close relationship between semantics and grammar 
that it is feasible to approach decisions about grammatical forms to 
be taught through semantics . 
(1976:22) 
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So , what matters in terms of semantics is the grammar of the language : no mention 
of lexis here . However , when he comes to discuss the various sub-components of 
the semantico-grammatical component , we find Wilkins making frequent reference to 
the semantic significance of lexis . In his discussion of time , for example , he 
talks about the crucial signalling value of deictic lexis - words which mark the 
days of the week , words like 'now' and 'then' , and grammar words which link up 
clauses such as 'while' , and 'when' . He goes on to make the point that the 
logical organisation of time "is rarely directly reflected in the grammatical 
organisation of time" (1976:29) . Wilkins' point is clear enough : time is 
signalled in language through a whole variety of devices , some grammatical , some 
lexical - tense (grammar) and deixis (lexis) , for example , interact and regularly 
cross-refer in the expression of temporal relationships . 
Similarly in his discussion of frequency and sequencing , Wilkins makes as much 
play of the significance of lexical markers (then , next , during etc.) as he does 
of grammatical devices such as the 'present habitual' . He points out , indeed , 
that language frequently does not mark such notions as repetition or frequency in 
the verb , but through some specific lexical marker" (1976:30) . 
Wilkins then goes on to look at 'relational meanings' . Here he acknowledges the 
work of Fillmore on case relations , to which I have already made reference in 
chapter one 	 In relationships between parts of a sentence , says Wilkins , roles 
such as agent , initiator , beneficiary and instrument are represented 
linguistically as relations between nouns , nouns and verbs etc. The importance of 
such role relations is not lost on Wilkins . He comments : 
Without an awareness of the similarity in the underlying semantic 
functions that different forms of the sentence may contain , there 
is no way of controlling them and relating them to one another. 
(1976:36) 
Wilkins' position on case roles clearly implies that lexical choices have 
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predictable semantic consequences . He gives , for example , the following 
illustration of the operation of case : 
John boiled the milk (1976:36) 
Here , says Wilkins , John plays the role of initiator of the action , but he is 
not directly the agent . Clearly , though , this is not simply on account of the 
noun-verb-noun structure , but has to do with the choice of the lexical item 
'boiled' as opposed , say , to 'poured' or 'diluted' . If we were to say 'John 
poured the milk' , then John becomes direct agent . This distinction is essentially 
a lexical one , but it is one which Wilkins does not make explicit . For Wilkins , 
it is 'different forms' of the sentence which contain different semantic functions 
(1976:36) and it is the correspondence between form and meaning (rather than 
between lexis , grammar and meaning) which he seeks to emphasize . Given that 
Wilkins had already discussed how lexical items and grammatical forms interact in 
the creation of meanings (with reference to time , frequency) , he could perhaps 
have set his discussion of case roles more clearly in this context . 
So , in his discussion of the various sub-categories of semantico-grammatical 
meaning , Wilkins talks both of grammar and lexis . He seems , though , unwilling 
to formally acknowledge this relationship when he comes to make more general 
statements about the meanings of notional categories . These categories , after all 
, are termed 'semantico-grammatical' , rather than '/exicc.grammatical' . When it 
comes to defining , then , Wilkins leaves us with the impression that grammar can , 
in general terms , be seen to subsume lexis . 
4.3 Communicative Function and Modal Meaning 
Both grammar and lexis have a role to play , says Wilkins , in the expression of 
communicative function . Nevertheless , the two can be and should be treated 
separately . What , first , of the grammar ? At which stage in the design of a 
notional-functional syllabus should the grammar of functions be accounted for ? 
Wilkins is ambivalent about this . There are , it seems , two contradictory forces 
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at work . On the one hand , there is quite obviously no one-to-one relationship 
between language form and functional meaning . On the other , we should look for a 
recurrent association between a given function and certain linguistic features" 
(1976:56) . Although functions may be regarded from any number of perspectives : 
... there are conventional interpretations that would be put upon 
sentences in the absence of contextual information that would 
contradict them . 
(1976:57) 
For example , he says , the grammatical label 'interogative' and the functional 
label 'question' can , at a level of contextual abstraction , be used 
interchangeably . The notional/functional syllabus exploits 'conventions of use' . 
The problem is that Wilkins is not prepared to commit himself to asserting , except 
in the most general terms , how far along this line of form/function similarities a 
syllabus designer might be able to go . His point about the interogative/question 
correlation is self-evident and extremely generalized . Surely it ought to be 
possible to make rather more specific statements than this . 
I have already argued, in discussion of speech acts , that given certain 
assumptions about context , we can make quite detailed statement about the 
relationships holding between grammar, lexis and context (cf. section 4.3) . In 
making these points , ofcourse , it was necessary to draw links between grammar , 
lexis and context . Just as Searle talks of the way in which certain forms "tend to 
become conventionally established as the standard idiomatic forms for indirect 
speech acts" (1969:49) , so Wilkins talks of the "conventional interpretations ... 
put upon sentences" (1976:57) . Both Searle and Wilkins appeal to conventionalized 
form/meaning correspondences without referring to the underlying 
grammar/lexis/context network in search of deeper accounts of the relationship 
between meaning and expression . It seems quite clear , then , that Wilkins was 
influenced by speech act theorists in this regard . Yet at the same time , Wilkins 
seems to be suggesting that the N/F syllabus sets out to exploit such 'conventions 
of use' . 
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Wilkins , however , is cagey about going as far as this . In the final analysis , 
he says , the choice of grammatical exponents for functions will , to a substantial 
extent , be determined by "the exact sociolinguistic conditions under which 
communication takes place" (1976:57) . This , ofcourse , is true enough , but it is 
a point which applies virtually to all statements about meaning in context . To an 
extent , the syllabus designer is in the business of making generalizations about 
meanings in context , while showing an awareness of the influence of 'exact 
sociolinguistic conditions' in his/her choice of language , and in the extent to 
which variations and flexibility are allowed for at the level of classroom 
implementation . 
Wilkins talks of 'grammatical exponents' of communicative function , but what of 
lexis ? He is more hesitant here . Categories of communicative function "do not so 
much demand a specific lexical content as operate on a lexicon determined by other 
factors" - such as situation , accounted for by a prior needs analysis . Needs 
analysis "goes part of the way towards defining the lexical content of learning" 
(ibid.) . Thus Wilkins sketches a broad distinction between grammar and lexis . The 
former can be accounted for partly by exploiting 'conventional interpretations' , 
though only to a very limited degree . Lexis is much more dependent on the choice 
of particular contexts . 
So saying , Wilkins effectively sees no need to make any kind of clear comment 
about the relationship between grammar and lexis Ofcourse functional exponents 
must make reference to both , but this is essentially down to the constraints of 
particular contexts of situation , about which Wilkins has little to say : wait for 
the needs analysis . 
4.4 SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 
A difficulty with Wilkins' approach is the way in which grammar and lexis , and his 
three main categories (of notions , functions and modal meaning) , remain 
essentially distinct and unrelated . He talks quite separately of the grammatical 
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and lexical components of communicative function . How , though , can we say both 
that 'there are conventional interpretations put upon sentences' , and that 
'categories of communicative function draw their lexical content from the 
particular context in which they are put to use' ? What role does lexis play in 
situations where these conventional interpretations are considered feasible ? 
Had Wilkins allowed for some 'cross-fertilization' between his three categories , 
he might have been able to say more about how grammar , lexis and context can 
inform each other . What is the role of propositions (semantico-grammatical) in 
indirect , modal constructions (modal meaning) which can signal directive 
illocutions (communicative function) ? In chapter one , the suggestion was made 
that these categories can indeed be seen to relate one to the other . Indeed , it 
could be argued that consideration of a grammar/lexis relationship virtually 
compels us to deal with interrelations of this kind . 
Within Wilkins' approach there is a tendency to regard lexis more in terms of a 
compilation of individual items , whose value and function is unpredictable , than 
as a level of language which might be comparable to , and which might interact with 
grammar . The hypothesis suggested by Wilkins has a strong appeal , partly on 
account of its ultimate simplicity . By representing language as broadly semantico-
grammatical , Wilkins suggests that at the level of syllabus design , grammar has a 
kind of self contained meaning . 
67 
5. THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF COHMUNICATIVE SYLLABUS DESIGN 
5.1 Introduction 
With the exploitation , within applied linguistics , of Hymes' concept of 
communicative competence (1966) , syllabus designers found it necessary to deal 
with a number of syllabus components simultaneously . It was no longer a matter of 
working primarily with grammar . With functions and notions as well as structures 
to cope with , the question arose of how to provide an adequate organisational 
framework . How could this enriched and much more complex menu of syllabus 
components best be handled ? The job of the syllabus designer was no longer chiefly 
one simply of selecting and sequencing . There was now the additional difficulty of 
integrating diverse components into a coherent teaching programme . To what degree 
have designers of content syllabuses coped effectively with these demands , and 
what have the implications been for the relationships between grammar , lexis and 
context ? 
5.2 THE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE AND ITS PROBLEMS 
The organising principle involves taking a single component of the syllabus , and 
using it as the pivotal or key component . All other components are sequenced in 
terms of the organising principle . All other components are integrated in terms of 
it . If , as is most commonly the case , grammar is taken as the organising 
component , then the syllabus will be based around a grammatical sequence . 
Functional exponents would then be placed alongside structures to which they could 
be seen to make reference . The sequence , though , would be framed essentially in 
grammatical terms . There would , ofcourse , be a functional sequence of sorts , 
but it would be determined by the grammar . So we often find coursebooks which 
place request exponents together in a unit , because they all share certain modal 
(ie. 'structural') forms . In a situation such as this , then , the functional 
component would be organized in line with structural grading . 
This situation can very easily give rise to a rather haphazard functional 
development (Johnson:1982/67) . For example , what do we do about functional 
exponents which do not , or do not with any regularity involve similar structural 
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elements ? The organising principle provides no clear guidelines for coping with 
such a difficulty . Strictly speaking , non structural items (such as functional or 
rhetorical forms) can only be systematically introduced where they happen to 
conform to structural regularities . Consequently , the kind of lexical and 
grammatical variety which is invariably needed for a coherent functional 
development is simply not available . 
This view is contentious . It could be argued that it does not allow for sufficient 
flexibility or negotiation between syllabus and methodology . Clearly the syllabus 
need not , and arguably should not prescribe the absolute limits on what 
constitutes target language . A syllabus must to some extent be an idealized 
construct : a guide to teachers and learners , but not a straightjacket . It must 
allow for adjustment , alteration and addition , in accordance with the actual 
circumstances of teaching . 
It was , perhaps , with this in mind that Brumfit proposed his 'spiral syllabus' 
(1980:121) . His argument is that since functional items cannot be systematically 
integrated with structural items , only the latter should be sequenced by the 
syllabus designer . This would be the core grammatical sequence (or 'ladder' as 
Brumfit put it) . Brumfit suggests that functional and rhetorical forms should 
remain as checklist specifications , to be integrated into the grammatical core by 
the teacher , during the course of the actual teaching programme . Thus the 
syllabus designer provides the core grammatical sequence , allowing the teacher to 
integrate functional items on an ad hoc basis . Brumfit referred to this as a 
'cross-fertilization' between a grammatical 'ladder' and a functional-notional 
'spiral' embellished around it . The difficulty with this is that it does nothing 
in principle to solve the problem of how structures and functions can be mutually 
accommodated . It merely shifts the responsibility away from the syllabus 
designer , towards the teacher . 
We are still left , then , with the problem of a grammatical organising principle 
which seeks to impose a framework of integration between language components which 
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is highly restrictive in linguistic terms . The more rigid the organising 
principle , the more it becomes necessary to rely on a highly flexible approach in 
methodology to make up for the constraints imposed by the syllabus organisation . 
In many ways the organising principle looks like a hangover from the structural 
syllabus . It is difficult to see how such an approach can cope adequately with the 
competing demands for sequencing and integrating diverse components . Indeed , the 
organising principle has little to say , directly , about integration per se . The 
point seems to be that if we start out with , say , a core grammatical sequence , 
then this in itself will largely determine the question of integration . Functional 
items are 'integrated' with a prior structural sequence , so that sequencing 
effectively determines integrating . Why should this be so ? The answer , perhaps , 
is that the organising principle works most comfortably with a single component . 
If we make structure the core component , then functional 'organisation' will be 
established in terms of the structural core . The two cannot very easily be given 
equal weight , so that integrating follows on from and is subservient to 
sequencing . 
5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE FOR GRAMMAR AND LEXIS 
I have suggested that grammar-based courses often invest grammar with a kind of 
self contained meaning : lexical items are assumed to naturally 'fit' into the 
independent meaning of the grammar . I have talked , too , of how with a structural 
organising principle , grammatical items are assumed to 'fit' into units which are 
grammatically labelled and grammatically organized . There is a striking 
similarity here between the organisation of syllabuses , and the way in which their 
linguistic components are conceptualized . Both pressupose that components of 
language can be quite rigidly prioritized , both de-emphasize the importance of 
integration , on an equal footing , between one component and another . In other 
words , there is a correspondence between the approach taken to linguistic 
description and its application within syllabus design : grammar is very often 
taken to be dominant over , and largely independent of lexis . 
What is lacking , in both cases , is adequate flexibility . How , for example , 
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would an organising principle approach deal with the following exponents : 
1. If you do that again , I'll give you a punch on the nose ! (?warning) 
2. If you do that again , I'll give you a box of chocolates ! (?promise) 
3. You really must buy some cake ! (?order) 
4. You really must have some cake ! (?insistent offer) 
With a grammatical organising principle , 1 and 2 might be dealt with under the 
structural heading of 'conditionals' . 3 and 4 might come in a unit on modality . 
Clearly , though , these examples show a mutual modification between grammar and 
lexis , which is not at all evident from the grammatical labelling . What we have 
here , quite clearly , is not just grammar , but different combinations of grammar 
and lexis which give rise to different kinds of meaning . 
We could , alternatively , imagine a functional organising principle . Here , 1 and 
2 might be located separately , one in a unit on promises , the other on warnings . 
Similarly 3 and 4 might be divided between offers and orders . But would this be a 
more satisfactory solution ? As the simple lexical distinctions make clear , the 
difference between a warning and a promise may be marked lexically but not 
grammatically , so that it would be useful to highlight , by putting the two 
together , how one can easily 'become' the other . With a strictly functional 
organisation , as with a grammatical one , it would not be easy to highlight this 
kind of interdependency . 
Ideally , what would be worth investigating is the possibility of separate 
grammatical and lexical components , without one effectively subsuming the other . 
Thus we would not simply have a unit on modal verbs . Rather , there might be a 
series of units on modal verbs in association with different lexical items . 
Different combinations , together with different contexts , yielding different 
meanings . Ofcourse , many coursebooks include units of this kind , and have been 
doing so over a number of years . However , a syllabus which spelled out , in 
principle , that there are both grammatical and lexical aspects to 'meaning 
potential' , should make it easier for learners to learn to e).ploit such a system . 
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Notional Syllabuses contains no clear guidelines on language should be organized 
for a teaching programme . Wilkins saw no intrinsic way of ordering categories , or 
of linking one unit up to the next . He said merely that the situational or 
stylistic appropriacy of grammar can be taken as the main criterion for selection 
(1976:65) . Such a formulation disregards the situational and stylistic appropriacy 
of lexis . 
Wilkins , ofcourse , was writing in the context of a wider project undertaken by 
the Council of Europe . Another product of this project was Van Ek 's Threshold 
Level (1975) . Van Ek provided no discussion whatsoever on the rationale for 
including the words listed in his lexical checklist . It is debatable , 
infact , whether Threshold can be regarded as anything more than a proto syllabus . 
Its' linguistic content is specified only in the form of separate and unrelated 
checklists . Matters of sequencing and integrating are left out of account . 
With the majority of coursebooks it is grammar which is taken as the main 
component , with lexis relegated to a position of subsidiary importance . The 
relationship between grammar and lexis for which Widdowson (1990) argues (cf. 
chapter one : section 1) - that grammar acts on lexical associations to fix them 
more precisely in relation to context - is not , and arguably could not be 
accommodated . The adoption of a single organizing principle does not , ofcourse , 
necessitate a grammatical organization ; course programmes of varying orientation - 
shifting , for example from a grammatical to a functional basis - are perfectly 
feasible (cf. Johnson 1982 ; Allen 1980) . But this kind of variation does not 
allow for greater flexibility in terms of sequencing or integrating at any one 
point in the syllabus , so that lexis is likely to remain subsumed by grammar . 
I have suggested that an alternative approach could involve the separating out of 
lexis from grammar so that - congruent with Widdowson's (1990) approach - grammar 
is applied to lexis , rather than the other way around . In chapter 7 I will look 
into this alternative approach in some detail , while in chapter 6 I consider the 
kind of methodology which would be facilitated by such a syllabus design . 
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6. THE RELATIONAL SYLLABUS 
6.1 Outline : Informing the syllabus 
The Relational Syllabus (Crombie 1985b) is based on different kinds of relationship 
which exist between propositions , or arguments , or conversational moves . Crombie 
identifies 2 basic kinds of binary relations , which she refers to as 'binary 
values' . 
The first of these is concerned with interactive semantic relations , such as 
elicitation/response . The second is concerned with general semantic relations , 
such as contrast or cause/effect . Dealing first with the general semantic 
relations , Crombie provides a detailed taxonomy , which includes the following 
categories (my examples) : 
Temporal Relations a) Chronological sequence 
b) Temporal overlap (simultaneity) 
Matching Relations a) re. differences (contrast) 
b) re. similarities (comparison) 
Cause/Effect 	 a) Reason/Result (Bill left because he was hungry) 
b) Grounds/Conclusion (he left , so he missed the party) 
c) Means/Result (Bill escaped by getting a taxi) 
d) Means/Purpose (Bill got a taxi so as to escape) 
e) Condition/Consequence (Had Bill got a taxi ....) 
Interactive semantic relations often occur in conversational discourse in alliance 
with general semantic relations . For example : 
Utterance 	 Interactive 	 General Semantic 
Relationship Relationship 
a. Why did he get here so late ? 	 Elicitation 	 Result 
b. He missed the bus 	 Replying 	 Reason 
Informative 
(adapted from Crombie 1985b:50) 
A 'why' question , says Crombie , frequently signals a result or a conclusion of 
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some kind , while asking for the reason/result pairing to be completed through 
supplying a reason/justification . The above example illustrates how general 
semantic relations (such as reason/result) can span moves in a conversational 
exchange , emphasizing the point that the discourse values which they represent are 
not confined to the intra-sentential level . 
Much of Crombie's work is concerned with developing and analysing 
interpropositional relationships of this kind . She argues strongly that binary 
values are basic to our understanding of how language is structured , both at the 
level of the sentence and at the level of connected discourse . They thus 
constitute a strong basis for the construction of a relational syllabus . 
Binary relations , says Crombie , are fundamental categories of meaning . Unlike 
Wilkins' notions and functions (1976) , they are not isolated units of linguistic 
description ; rather , they are discourse values . So a syllabus based on binary 
relationships will encourage the development of language courses where there is a 
concentration on the creation and interpretation of coherent discourse" (1985b:2) . 
Crombie argues that since the total number of such binary relations is limited and 
analytically manageable , so that the syllabus designer is not faced with the 
difficulty of making an arbitrary selection . Furthermore , the validity of basing 
a syllabus on binary relationships is further enhanced given the fact that they 
have "a high degree of comparability across languages" (1985b:3) . 
6.2 OUTLINE : THE SYLLABUS FRAMEWORK 
Crombie suggests two possible approaches to the development of relational syllabus 
inventories . The first she calls homogenous . Here the syllabus would be composed 
entirely of relational frames (like reason/result or elicitation/response) , 
together with 'relational cues' (linguistic signalling of relational frames) . 
The second she calls the cooperative inventory . This is composed in part of 
labelled items ie. learning units subdivided according to aspects of form and 
meaning . These divide into three : 
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1. Structurally labelled learning units 
2. Semantically labelled learning units - emphasizing the association between 
grammatical forms and conceptual categories : for example , 'because' 
clauses together with the reason/result relation . 
3. Relational learning units - with the focus directly on binary values , 
Crombie's term for the functional patterns of interactional and 
general semantic relations , as they occur in the context of 
connected discourse . 
Crombie's suggestion is that these three types of unit could be used to inform the 
sequencing of the syllabus : 
In such a three-tiered system , syntactically labelled learning units 
could feed into semantically labelled learning units and semantically 
labelled learning units could , in turn , feed into relational 
learning units . Thus , the implementation of semantically labelled 
learning units would involve the grammatical expertise acquired in 
structurally labelled learning units ; the implementation of relational 
units would involve the exploitation of the grammatical expertise 	  
acrd the understanding acquired through the association of a grammatical 
form with a particular conceptual category .... which has been the focus 
of attention in semantically labelled learning units . 
(1985b:86) 
Crombie's own preference is for the introduction of grammatical constructions in a 
systematic and discourse motivated way . She thus advocates considerable 
flexibility in the way one type of learning unit feeds into another . For this 
purpose she suggests the introduction of 'extension and integration' units , where 
newly introduced relational patterns are set against relational realizations which 
have already been introduced (1985b:87) . Thus the organisation of the syllabus 
would be cyclical . 
6.3 ORGANISATION AND INTEGRATION IN THE RELATIONAL SYLLABUS 
How does the relational syllabus compare to the other syllabus designs I have been 
looking at , and to what extent does Crombie's work on binary values deal more 
adequately than before with grammar/lexis relationships ? The organising principle 
approach has been criticized for leading to a 'distortion' of linguistic components 
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and for being a rather crude and insensitive tool for integrating components 
together . Crombie's conceptualisation of relational values would seem to go a very 
long way towards solving this problem . This is because her syllabus is based on 
relational values which do not themselves make cut-and-dried distinctions between 
general semantic relations (not so far removed from Wilkins' semantico-grammatical 
category) and interactive relations (bearing some similarities with Wilkins' 
communicative functions ) . Similarly there is no rigid distinction made between 
language at sentence level and language at the level of extended discourse . 
Crombie's categories neatly cut across such distinctions , emphasizing their 
fundamental similarities , rather (as was the case with Wilkins) their differences. 
Thus the very way in which language is conceptualized in the relational syllabus - 
its forms and its meanings - emphasizes the links between one 'level' of language 
and another . 
Crombie's suggestions for the design of the syllabus further enhance this 
perspective . The learning units are designed so as to allow for a flexible 
development , from focus on form through to focus on meaning in discourse . What is 
most striking about Crombie's proposals for syllabus organisation is that her 
structural , semantic and relational units do not in any divisive way distinguish 
between interactional and general semantic relations . Thus her suggested 
development from less to more emphasis on connected discourse , her flexible 
approach to sequencing , is based on a fundamental integration between levels of 
language . 
6.4 GRAMMAR AND LEXIS IN THE RELATIONAL SYLLABUS 
Crombie makes frequent reference to 'lexico-grammar', and to the fact that binary 
values may be signalled not only through the grammar , but also through the lexis 
this is justified in a variety of ways . She says , for example , that in 
discourse , patterns such as problem/solution are often explicitly signalled by 
lexical means , as are relational values : (grammar) words like however and becaus, 
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play an explicit role in highlighting interpropositional relationships . 
She makes a number of further statements which would seem to support precisely the 
kind of interdependence of grammar and lexis which is left unaccounted for in other 
content syllabus designs . Since these comments have a direct bearing on the 
subject of this chapter , it is worth quoting them in full : 
1. Because lexical items of various types 	  all play an important 
role in relational value realisation and signalling , a concentration 
on relational values creates an environment in which all aspects 
of the linguistic system must be treated as being equally significant. 
(1985b:107) 
2. A relational syllabus encourages an awareness of the stylistic and 
informational implications of grammatical and lexical choices . For 
example , in looking at various encodings of Reason-Result in English, 
we see that there are a number of different ways of emphasizing the 
reason member of the relation : it can , in complex sentences , be 
placed in initial position ; it can be embedded with anaphoric 
reference (....and because he did so...) ; it can be placed in a 
separate sentence or tone group ; it can receive contrastive or 
contradictory emphasis within a cleft sentence construction . 
(1985b:107) 
The difficulties start when we move away from the general to the more specific 
statements . Despite the former , Crombie makes rather little use of lexis in her 
more detailed statements about types of tlinary value signalling . In the second of 
the two quotes above , her general statement about the implications of "grammatical 
and lexical choices" is followed by illustrations pertaining only to the grammar . 
Similarly , we have a 'structurally labelled' learning unit but not a 'lexico-
grammatically' labelled unit . If grammar and lexis both play a part in signalling 
kinds of interpropositional meaning - and Crombie is very clear that they do - then 
what exactly are the implications for the relationship between the two ? . Under 
what circumstances and in what ways are meanings signalled by the grammar , and 
what is the role of lexis in these cases ? These and related questions provide the 
framework for the following three chapters . Here we can only look at a few 
examples , in order to make the general point a little clearer . 
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Crombie draws a stark distinction between two kinds of language . The first 
comprises lexico-syntactically signalled binary values which can be identified 
even when their realizing linguistic units have been abstracted" . The second 
concerns unitary values (functions and functional exponents) which are "rarely 
identified linguistically" and which are generally tied to particular contexts of 
situation (1985b:5) . This is , perhaps , something of an over-generalization . I 
have already suggested (cf. chapter 1 : section 4) that some forms signal 
functional meanings rather more clearly than others , and that both grammar and 
lexis play crucial roles here . The point is that some forms , as Searle (1979) 
has pointed out , signal illocutionary meaning with considerable regularity (eg. 
indirect request forms) . That this is not the case with all functional exponents 
does not in itself argue against their value , en bloc . 
With this point in mind , it is worth questioning whether interpropositional values 
are so very different that they can be considered , in effect , to regularly signal 
their meaning transparently . What , for example , should we make of the following 
examples ? 
7. Jane bribed the guard , and so she escaped 
	 (means/result) 
8. Jane bribed the guard , and so she sinned 
	 (grounds/Conclusion) 
9. Janet forced the guests to get out of the room (?reason/result) 
10. Janet forced the lock to get out of the room (means/Purpose) 
With 7 we have a clear implication of a means/result relation - Jane's intention 
was to escape , and she did so by bribing the guard . In 8 , such a reading is not 
possible : in all likelihood , 8 signals a grounds/conclusion relation - by virtue 
of bribing the guard , Jane committed a sin . With 9 , we have what amounts to a 
general causative relation , with the stress on Jane's causative action . In 
contrast , 10 strongly suggests a means/purpose relation - Jane forced the lock in 
order to get out of the room . 
Crombie's point , that functional exponents are highly context sensitive , and 
therefore are "rarely identified linguistically", is ofcourse a tenable one . She 
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points out how changes of lexical item can mark distinctions between threats and 
promises (1985b:5) . But it is not just functional exponents which are subject to 
this kind of modification , since many binary values are also semantically 
sensitive to lexical change . They are probably less sensitive in general terms 
than unitary values , but the difference is one of degree . Since binary values are 
sensitive to lexical change of this kind , there is a case for building this 
grammar/lexis interdependency rather more systematically into those relational 
learning units which focus on language form : 'structurally labelled' could well be 
replaced by 'lexico—syntactically signalled' . 
What of cases where there is no signalling grammar word of any kind ? Here , lexis 
can play a still more explicit role : 
11.  Seeing the flames , Bill ran upstairs {'reason/result,) 
12.  Fighting the flames , Bill ran upstairs (simultaneity) 
13.  Leaving the flames , Bill ran upstairs (?sequence) 
Crombie concentrates her attention on the explicit conjunctive/grammatical 
signalling of general semantic relations . But where such relations are not coded 
so explicitly (as with the adverbial clauses of 11-13) it is the lexis as much as 
the grammar which is used to code the interpropositional meaning . 
What is important to note is that to say 'grammar and lexis each have a role to 
play in signalling meaning' does not in itself say anything about how this may 
happen , or about how such an insight might be built into a syllabus framework in 
an organized and principled way . To do this we would need to go further . We would 
need to establish a grammar/lexis relationship through which statements could be 
made about the 'meaning potential' of the one in relation to the other . 
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7. THE LEXICAL SYLLABUS 
7.1 OUTLINE 
Much of the work done on lexical syllabuses has evolved from recent studies of word 
combinations and word usages made on the basis of computer-held texts . In an 
article explaining the rationale for a lexical syllabus , Sinclair and Renouf 
(1988) begin by lamenting precisely the relegation of lexis with which this chapter 
has been concerned . There has not , they say , been a systematic approach to the 
exploitation of lexis in language teaching . Despite a recent interest taken in a 
lexical approach to language study (eg. McCarthy:1984) , the problem remains that 
vocabulary is , generally speaking , still regarded as the means by which other 
features of the language are exemplified . 
In order to do something about this problem , Sinclair and Renouf propose that 
lexical criteria should inform decisions on the content and the organising 
framework of a syllabus . With this in mind , they suggest that the main focus of 
study should be on : 
1. The commonest word forms in the language 
2. Their central patterns of usage 
3. The combinations which they typically form 
(1988:148) 
Firstly , how should we go about deciding what the commonest word forms are ? The 
best indication of this comes from computer-held banks of text , such as the 
Birmingham Collection of English Text . We should look at this data together with 
information about cotextual variations and patterns of usage . Sometimes , they 
say , word paradigms share a common body of meanings , so that get , gets , getting 
and got may share a common identity of form with systematic correlations in 
meaning . But this is not always the case . They give the example of the clearly 
related lexical pairing certain and certainly , which have quite different ranges 
of use . Certain functions most frequently as a determiner as in a certain 
number of students . Certainly is invariably used as an adverb , as with it will 
certainly be interesting (1988:147/8) . 
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In a similar way , the same word may occur in different contexts of use . Take the 
verb see . Most people , say Sinclair and Renouf , would probably say that its 
most common meaning is in the sense of seeing through one's eyes . Yet data based 
studies indicate that it is most frequently used in interactive discourse - l see 
and you see . 
So the same word can take on different meanings in different contexts . In many 
cases , this variability involves what Sinclair and Renouf call delexicality . This 
they define as : 
... the tendency of certain commoner transitive verbs to carry 
particular nouns or adjectives ... (1988:153) 
An example is the verb have . In most coursebooks , have is given a concrete 
meaning (have a bath/have a meal) , yet its commonest delexical occurrence is with 
various kinds of abstract noun - have a look , have a strong feeling for , have 
minor doubts etc. (ibid.) 
Delexicality shows how patterns of usage and combinations of words are often 
indivisible . Some word combinations are highly lexicalized , such as a happy 
marriage . Others may involve grammatical idiosyncracies , so that 'Bill acceded to 
Jane's demands' is more common that 'Jane's demands were acceded to' . Common 
grammar words , too , have habitual patterns of collocation -each hour , each day, 
and so on . 
In applying such ideas to syllabus design , Sinclair and Renouf make lexis and 
lexical combinations the primary consideration . Instead of leading to a piecemeal 
acquisition of a large vocabulary , the lexical syllabus : 
.... concentrates on making full use of the words that the learner 
already has , at any particular stage . It teaches that there is 
far more general utility in the recombination of known elements 
than in the addition of less easily usable items . (1988:155) 
Thus , instead of building up phrases , the learner will be gradually breaking 
them down , sensing the variability" (1988:156). By arranging language according to 
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common combinations of a core vocabulary , and by allowing the learner to rearrange 
these combinations , Sinclair and Renouf seem to be saying that a lexical 
organization will provide the learner with an appropriate type and range of input . 
This distinctive notion contrasts with other forms of content syllabus : 
In the construction of a balanced and comprehensive course , the 
designer will no doubt keep a tally of structures , notions and 
functions , as well as vocabulary . But in the presentation of 
materials based on a lexical syllabus , it is not strictly 
necessary to draw attention to these check lists . If the analysis 
of the words and phrases has been done correctly , then all the 
relevant grammar, etc. should appear in a proper proportion . Verb 
tenses , for example , which are often the main organising feature 
of a course , are combinations of some of the commonest words in 
the language . 	 (1988:155) 
7.2 GRAMMAR AND LEXIS IN THE LEXICAL SYLLABUS 
Before evaluating these ideas , two cautionary points are worth making . Firstly , 
Sinclair and Renouf say very little about the design features of a lexical 
syllabus , so that some of the comments which follow are based on rather a sketchy 
notion of how these might be implemented . Secondly , although a series of 
coursebooks based to some degree on these ideas has been published (D. and J. 
Willis:1988) , there is at present a paucity of published material to explain in 
any detail the principles on which the course is based . 
This said , the first point to be made is that Sinclair and Renouf do not make 
clear how an inventory of lexical items/collocations constitutes the basis for a 
pedagogical syllabus design . The prerequisites for this are , surely , clear 
criteria for sequencing and (possibly) for integrating . In the absence of any 
notion of what constitutes complexity , it is not atall easy to see how a sequence 
of target language , however loosely framed , could be properly formulated . If the 
criterion is simply 'start with the most frequent items , and proceed towards less 
frequent ones , then this raises a whole web of difficulties . Let us say , for 
example , that unit one is based around the 25 most frequent words . On the basis 
of the Birmingham corpus , these would be as follows : 
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1. the 10. was 19. had 
2. of 11. is 20. but 
3. and 12. he 21. they 
4. to 13. for 22. at 
5. a 14. you 23. his 
6. in 15. on 24. have 
7. that 16. with 25. not 
8. I 17. as 
9. it 18. be 
Now clearly these grammar words cannot be made sense of without reference to their 
combination with other , content words . But here we get to tricky ground . If , 
for example , we choose to focus on have (no. 24 above) , should we start with some 
of its most frequent , abstract delexical uses , like have an idea ? This could 
prove difficult for two reasons . Firstly , although Sinclair and Renouf point out 
that textbooks over concentrate on the more concrete uses of have (like have a 
bath) , such uses have a strong pedagogic justification : they are relatively easy 
to conceptualize and to contextualize . An important point for elementary learners. 
Secondly , have an idea is difficult to introduce without some clarifying context : 
'John had a bath' conveys a clearer , more independent kind of meaning than 'John 
had an idea' . To overcome this difficulty , we would have to draw in quite a large 
amount of other language . How , though , should this other language be chosen , 
and what sort of lexical combinations should it draw on ? I noted in section 3 that 
in the structural syllabus little account was taken of the context in which 
language is to be presented , and a similar point might be raised here . The point 
is that decisions about contextualisation and decisions about lexical selection 
must go hand in hand . The one inevitably influences the other . 
This criticism might be taken to be rather excessive . However , the underlying 
point , that we need systematic reference to criteria other than lexis in order to 
select and sequence efficiently , is not given a great deal of attention by 
Sinclair and Renouf . The standard criterion for doing this is , ofcourse , 
grammar . We surely need to consider not only lexis in relation to contexts of use, 
but also grammar . But Sinclair and Renouf state categorically that a proper 
analysis of words and phrases will in some unexplained way give us the structures , 
the functions , and so on . This is an argument which it is difficult to come to 
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terms with . Surely , to have a "proper proportion" of structures , or notions , or 
functions , we need in addition to have some policy on sequencing and integrating . 
How else could we put together language expressions which share a common structure 
and which share a common area of meaning ? How else , within the framework of a 
content syllabus , can we encourage learners to perceive such quasi-systematic 
regularities ? It is difficult to see how such a framework could arise purely on 
the basis of a 'correct' analysis of words and phrases (1988:155) . A lexical data-
base is not a syllabus , even if it is notated in terms of collocations and so 
forth : it is , at best , an informed checklist . 
This brings me to a second point , concerning integration . Although Sinclair and 
Renouf talk at length about different kinds of lexical association , there is 
little mention of how such combinations may be regarded as being more or less 
'lexicalized' . They do indeed mention that some expressions are syntactically 
stigmatized - we say 'Bill acceded to Jane's demands' more often that we say 
'Jane's demands were acceded to' , though there might be some debate about the 
validity of presuming that one is a paraphrase of the other . The point , though , 
is that degrees of collocation/colligation - the idea that it may be more or less 
possible to make sense of an expression in terms of a grammatical analysis - is 
barely touched upon . We are left with the feeling that word combinations can be 
almost equally regarded as typical lexical collocations , across the whole 
continuum from basic colligations through to highly formulaic expressions . To take 
account of such a continuum , the syllabus designer is virtually compelled to 
consider how best to integrate grammar with lexis , structures with functions . 
The more we try to define structures with reference to lexis , and to organize a 
syllabus accordingly , the less easy it is to retain a sufficiently explicit 
structural component . It is thus all the more difficult for learners to invest in 
the generative capacity of grammar . 
Sinclair and Renouf appear to be sidestepping the whole question of interrelations 
between grammar and lexis when they comment that - verb tenses ... are combinations 
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of some of the commonest words in the language" (1988:155) . This point is taken up 
by the Willises who , in a paper outlining the rationale for the lexical syllabus 
(1988b) comment : 
.... what , in the structural syllabus , constitutes a structure ? The 
answer , surely , is that structures are no more than common collocations. 
In listing the three conditionals one is doing no more than saying that 
the word IF collocates strongly with certain verb forms -WILL , WOULD , 
WOULD HAVE , HAD and so on . In the same way what pedagogic grammars tell 
us about the present perfect tense can be reduced to a series of 
statements to do with collocations . 
(1988b:3/4) 
If by 'collocation' the Willises mean 'string of words' - and if we include grammar 
words in this category - then there is a self evident truth to their statement . 
But where does it get us in terms of advancing a new , lexical approach to language 
teaching ? At a very simple level , one of the great advantages to grammatical 
classification is that it allows learners both to perceive system at work in 
language form , and at the same time to massively economize on what would otherwise 
become an infinite list of possible word combinations . 
What Sinclair/Renouf and the Willises are after is an approach to language teaching 
which focuses the learners attention on word meaning , encouraging them to "see 
sentences as combinations of meaningful units" (Willises 1988b:5) , rather than as 
mechanically manipulated structures . Such an objective has much to commend it , 
and it is not inconsistent with the approach adopted in chapters 6 and 7 of this 
thesis . What is lacking , though , is a framework accommodating both language 
description and language teaching , which allows a synthesis between grammar (as 
the most systematic and generalisable categorization of language form) and words 
(as the meaningful components of grammatical structure) . It seems that the 
proponents of the lexical syllabus are arguing for grammar to be radically de-
emphasized in a way which is unecessary and uneconomical ; so much so that a 
principled and pedagogically viable relationship between grammar and lexis is not 
argued for . 
When it comes to exploiting relationships between grammar and lexis , then 	 a 
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lexical syllabus where grammar is something of a disembodied checklist is unlikely 
to be any more effective than a grammatical syllabus with a lexical checklist . 
There is a striking similarity between the ideas of Sinclair and Renouf , and the 
criticisms which were made earlier about Basic English . In both cases , there is 
insufficient focus on the interdependencies of lexis and grammar . Basic English 
failed partly because it concentrated too much on lexis , and because it kept 
grammar and lexis , in effect , as separate checklists . There was no clear way 
forward in terms of visualizing how the two could be integrated in an informed 
sequence . It could be argued that the proposals for the lexical syllabus suffer 
from similar drawbacks . 
8. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 
In these first two chapters , I have suggested that relationships between grammar 
and lexis have not been much considered , either in descriptive linguistics or in 
language pedagogy . By and large , grammar has been held to be the dominant and 
determining element , with lexis regarded as subordinate and dependent category . 
Although it is difficult to ascertain with any precision the extent to which 
developments in pedagogy have been directly influenced by linguists , it seems 
clear enough that the notional/functional syllabus - which has been by far the most 
influential approach to syllabus design over the past 15 years - was directly 
informed by work on speech acts (Searle 1969) and case grammar (cf. Fillmore 1968). 
The most notable exceptions to this have been Wilkins and Crombie , both of whom 
have given more attention to the way in which grammar and lexis can each contribute 
to the expression of meaning . Both with Wilkins and Crombie , though , the 
perception that lexis as well as grammar has meaning potential has not been greatly 
exploited , and neither has provided a framework whereby the relationship between 
the two might be explicitly examined . 
Work on speech acts and on formulaic language has clearly been influential , most 
notably with the notional/functional and with the lexical syllabus . Wilkins saw 
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the potential for making generalizations about speech act realizations , but he 
made no attempt to develop these , or to make similar generalizations about the 
role of lexis . Sinclair and Renouf have taken the opposite tack , dealing with 
language in general from a lexical point of view , with grammar pushed very 
forcefully out of the limelight . But whether with a grammatical emphasis (as with 
the structural syllabus) or with a lexical emphasis (as with Basic English and the 
lexical syllabus) , approaches to course design have for the most part emphasized 
either grammar or lexis , while having little to say about interrelations between 
the two . The following three chapters provide a linguistic analysis which 
investigates relationships between grammar , lexis and contexts in some detail . 
Drawing on this analysis I return in chapters six and seven to questions of 
pedagogic exploitation, in an attempt to resolve some of the problems I have 
outlined in this chapter . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GRAMMAR , LEXIS AND CONTEXT : OVERVIEW OF A HYPOTHESIS 
1. BACKGROUND : GRAMMAR AND MEANING 
The purpose of this section is to outline the work of various linguists which 
provides specific background to the theory presented subsequently in section 2 . 
1.1 GRAMMATICIIATION : GRAMMAR AS PROCESS 
1.1.1 A continuum of grammaticization : over time 
What is grammar ? I suggested in chapter one that it has often been regarded as a 
construct which is static , systematic , and all embracing . Thus Chomsky (1957/65) 
utilizes grammar as the central and determining component of his framework . 
Similarly , Halliday (1964/1966/1983) argues that it is through grammar and through 
grammar alone that we can account for the largest number of events as simply as 
possible" (1964:23) . Yet many examples of language use demonstrate quite clearly 
that grammar is a device which we make more or less use of . For example , early 
child language is largely ungrammaticized , as is pidgin language . Where does 
grammar come into play here ? 
According to Givon (1979a/1979b/1984) , both pidgin and child language provide 
illustration of grammar as a developmental process : crudely , from [-grammar] , as 
with pidgin languages , through to [+ grammar] , as with creoles . We start out 
with relatively unsystematic forms of communication , using all available 
resources ; gradually we develop grammar as a means of formally coding meanings 
which would otherwise remain open to ambiguity . Thus central to Givon's thinking 
is his conceptualization of the diachronic process of grammaticization . This 
process operates along a continuum : 
least grammaticized 	 most grammaticized 
PRAGMATIC MODE 	  SYNTACTIC MODE 
Ontogenetic : early pragmatic -> later syntactic 
Pidgins/creoles : nongrammar -> grammar 
Register level : unplanned/informal -> planned/formal 
Fig. 1 	 (Givon 1979a:82) 
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So each of these 'separate' areas (ontogenetic etc.) makes common reference to the 
gradual development of grammar as a process of diachronic development . 
1.1.2 A continuum of grammaticization : at any one point in time 
But just as children learn gradually to grammaticize , to formally code certain 
meanings into recognized syntactic structures , so all languages are themselves 
involved in this process of diachronic change . It is not simply that pidgins 
develop into creoles ; rather , at any one point in time all languages show 
indications of diachronic development . Thus we are able to identify forms 
coexisting in the language of mature speakers which may be more or less 
grammaticized . As Givon puts it : 
A mature speaker has not lost his earlier mode but , rather , has slowly 
acquired progressively-more-syntacticized registers . (1979a:107) 
Givon exemplifies the pragmatic and syntactic modes as follows : 
PRAGMATIC MODE 
a) topic-comment structure 
b) loose conjunction 
c) no use of grammatical morphology 




elaborate use of grammatical morphology 
semantically complex verbs 
(adapted from Givon 1979a:5'11) 
1.2 GRAMMATICIZATION AND MEANING 
1.2.1 Discourse and the origins of grammaticization 
What motivates the rise of grammaticization ? According to Givon , grammar has its 
origins in discourse . As Givon puts it , 	 .... syntax cannot be explained or 
understood without reference to its use in communication- so that syntactic 
structure can be shown to "emanate from the properties of human discourse' 
(1979b:49) . Hatch (1978) makes similar points , specifically with reference to the 
early stages of language learning , although rather more cautiously : 
It is assumed that one first learns how to manipulate structures 	 that 
gradually builds up a repertoire of structures and then 	 somehow , learns 
how to put the structures to use in discourse . we would like to consider 
the possibility that just the reverse happens . One learns how to do 
conversation ... and out of this interaction syntactic structures are 
developed . 	 (1978:404) 
89 
But it is not only in language acquisition that grammaticization is said to grow 
out of discourse . According to Givon , this process is also found in the shift 
from pidgin to creole , and in the diachronic development of all languages : 
I would like to suggest that all [these developments] represent processes 
by which loose , paratactic , PRAGMATIC discourse structures develop -
over time - into tight , GRAMMATICALIZED syntactic structures . (1979a:82/3) 
1.2.2 Grammar and the coding of meaning 
Central to Givon's framework is the discourse motivated origin of grammaticization. 
This concept has far reaching consequences . Grammar is said to develop out of the 
processes of communication , and communication - unequivocally -has to do with the 
expression and negotiation of meaning . Thus grammar and meaning are closely bound 
up with each other . Givon puts it this way : 
Rather than wind up with a formal and AUTONOMOUS level of structural 
organization in language , we do indeed find syntax to be a DEPENDENT , 
functionally motivated entity whose formal properties reflect - perhaps 
not completely but nearly so - the properties of the explanatory 
parameters that motivate its rise . 
(1979a:82) 
In 1 and 2 below , for example , we have examples of pragmatic language which is 
ungrammaticized and clearly dependent on context for its interpretation : 4 is 
particularly context dependent (who is the agent ? Who the patient ?) : 
1. farmer - kill - duckling 
2. farmer - kill - lion 
According to Widdowson (1990) , with 1 and 2 we have a kind of unfocussed 
proposition . In cases of ambiguity (2) , however , we need to call on grammatical 
devices such as word order to clarify what role relations are intended . 
Grammatical inflection (ie. grammaticizing 1 and 2) enables us to give such 
processes a location in time , through tense and aspect (farmer killed/is killing 
duckling etc) . Marking for tense and aspect , says Widdowson , are "communicative 
devices for getting features of context into focus" and hence : 
The less effective the words are in identifying relevant features of 
context ... , the more dependent they become on grammatical modification of 
one sort or another. 
(1990:86) 
So grammar has a functional role in coding and clarifying meanings . This 
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functional perspective involves a rejection of the structuralist tradition in 
linguistics : the notion of function played no explicit role in structuralist 
descriptions of language structure (Bloomfield 1933/Chomsky 1957) . For Givon , 
central to any grammatical analysis is the synthesis between form and meaning , or 
between code and message : 
It is only because the coding relation between structure and function in 
syntax is non-arbitrary 
	  that one could proceed to infer common 
function from common structure . 
(1984:33) 
1.3 GRAMMAR , MEANING AND NOTIONS 
It is possible , I think , to make a broad distinction between two levels of 
correspondence between form and meaning . The first I shall refer to it as surface 
form/meaning correlations , and the second as deep form/meaning congruences . 
Surface correlations have to do with more or less self evident links between basic 
grammatical forms (such as the system of tense) and general areas of meaning (such 
as temporal distinctions) . These links are relatively transparent , so that they 
sometimes find expression within the very metalanguage of grammatical description ; 
thus we talk about the present tense , the past tense and so on . If we are to 
confine ourselves to observing this kind of form/meaning correlation , then the 
kind of deep rooted functional basis to .grammaticization which Givon argues for is 
likely to be overlooked . In stark contrast to Givon , then , we find linguists 
such as Palmer defining the scope of form/meaning study in the following way : 
What we need , and what all grammars have ever provided , is an analysis 
that is formal in the sense that it illustrates formal regularities and 
can be justified formally in that formal evidence is always available , 
but also semantic in the sense that it relies on obvious semantic clues 
for some of its categorization .... 
	 (1965:7) 
It is quite clear , I think , that Palmer's approach falls squarely within the 
'surface' camp . We should not , he seems to say , regard grammar as functional in 
the Givon sense . Rather , there is a level of 'formal regularity' which can be 
justified in its own terms . Some of these formal regularities may be categorized 
in semantic terms , but only where semantic clues are 'obvious'. 
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What , then , of the deeper congruence ? Deeper regularities involve correlations 
which are less self evident , and which tend to require more involved 
conceptualizations . Conceptualizations , for example , to do with how 
relationships between participants and processes get lexico-grammatically coded . 
As Yule (1976) points out , such accounts are not at all common even in the more 
recent descriptive grammars (eg. Quirk et al. 1972) . Yet the more transparent , 
surface form/meaning correlations , such as tense/time , are common parlance . 
Ofcourse this surface/deep distinction is not an absolute . It is presumably less a 
matter of two diametrically opposed polarities , and rather more a case of two end 
points on what is effectively a continuum of meaning transparency 
	 Nevertheless 
the distinction will serve atleast to provide an introductory framework for the 
following discussion . 
1.3.1 Surface form/meaning correlations 
In the search for predictable correlations between form and meaning , linguists 
have for some time tried to develop a finite list of semantic categories which 
serve to 'explain' particular formal regularities . These semantic categories are 
often referred to as notions ; that is , basic conceptual categories - such as time 
or cause/effect - which can be seen to bear some degree of correlation with the 
language forms which express them . Jespersen , usually acknowledged to be the 
source of modern notional accounts , introduces his concept of notional categories 
in the following way : 
.... beside , or above , or behind , the syntactic categories which 
depend on the structure of each language as it is actually found , there 
are some extralingual categories which are independent of the more or 
less accidental facts of existing languages 	  
(1924:55) 
Implicit within Jespersen's statement is the belief that 'form' and 'notion' are 
essentially discrete entities . Thus notions are 'independent' of language forms as 
they are actually found , and the facts about language are 'more or less 
accidental' . While it would be beyond the scope of any theory so far devised to 
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suggest that all the facts of grammatical form can be explained in terms of 
underlying notional pressures , it is worth noting that Jesperson is rather more 
cautious than , say , Givon would be . For Givon the functional/communicative 
origins of grammar should incline us to minimize the 'accidental' wherever 
possible . 
For example , Jesperson discusses the correlations between tense and temporal 
distinctions : there are many cases of surface realizations of time -the -eydsuffix 
correlating with past time , and so on (1924:56) . But , says Jesperson , verbal 
inflections do not simply map on to temporal distinctions , because we find past 
tense forms which are used to express 'unreality in present time' - if we knew or I 
wish I knew (ibid.) . Jesperson concludes : 
Syntactic categories thus , Janus-like , face both ways , towards form , 
and towards notion . They stand midway and form the connecting link 
between the world of sounds and the world of ideas . 
(1924:56/7) 
Jesperson seems to be saying two things here . Firstly , that because tense 
inflections do not merely express clear temporal distinctions -because in addition 
they signal , for example , unreality -we cannot make simple statements about tense 
having a single notional purport . This is uncontroversial enough . Secondly , 
though , he implies that this in itself limits the potency of notional accounts : 
but why should this be so ? The syntactic coding of unreality is simply another 
notional category which happens to have some syntactic features in common with 
temporal indicators . Jesperson might have pursued this distinction further . In 
the case of unreality , we often find 'past' forms which are used as markers of 
hypothetical meaning : if Bill had left , he would have 	  In other words , 
there is another kind of congruence here , between hypothetical/unreal and 'past 
tense' forms . In section 5 I discuss this in some detail . 
In short , while there is no evidence to support the belief that form and meaning - 
language and notion - invariably correspond in a systematic way , there are 
limitations imposed by some linguists which may not always be necessary or 
justified . 
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1.3.2 Fora/weaning congruences : conceptual and linguistic independence 
I suggested above that deep form/meaning congruences involve establishing a level 
of conceptual analysis which is absent from the 'surface' approach . What is 
usually involved is treating regularities in English structure as expressing 
recognizable notional relationships which , in turn , reflect deeper 
conceptualizations of the relationships between participants and processes . Such 
accounts have the potential to explain a great deal more about the function of 
grammar (and , indeed , of lexis) than is possible using only a surface analysis . 
Indeed , it is partly on account of the superficiality of the latter that so many 
'notional' and 'functional' pedagogic materials have been criticized (Widdowson 
1979/Brumfit 1981/Yule 1986) . Absent from the kind of notional account provided by 
Wilkins (1976) is the idea that a notional grammar may give us insights into what 
Lyons refers to as : 
	  the congruence which holds , in varying degrees , between the 
grammatical and the semantic structure of language . 	 (1968:167) 
A clear example of this kind of congruence is the correspondence between what is 
termed conceptual independence and linguistic independence . The principle of 
conceptual and linguistic independence is defined by Heiman (1983) in the following 
way : 
The linguistic separateness of an expression corresponds to the 
conceptual independence of the object or event which it represents 
(1983:783) 
How might such a broadly stated principle work out with actual language ? The 
notion of conceptual/linguistic independence ties in with work done by Givon 
(1980) . He suggests that within the class of complement taking verbs , we can 
establish a scale representing degrees of influence exerted by the agent of the 
main clause verb over the agent of the complement clause (1980:335) . The greater 
the influence of the former , the less the independence of the latter . Thus 
influence is greatest in 5 , weakest in 3 : 
3. Jane hoped that Bill would leave / had left 
4. Jane ordered Bill to leave 
5. Jane forced Bill to leave 	 (1980:369) 
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So Jane's influence over Bill is weakest in 3 , where Bill remains capable of 
independent action ; in 4 it is potentially increased and in 5 it is such that Bill 
is no longer an independent agent . Sentences 3-5 represent part of a scale of 
increasing influence , which Givon calls a binding hierarchy . Although Givon does 
not make this explicit , it is clear that Haiman's notion of conceptual 
independence is highly relevant here : the stronger the influence of the agent in 
the main clause , the less conceptually independent is agent of the complement 
clause . In notional terms , these are degrees of influence between cause (Jane) 
and effect (Bill's leaving) . 
Now according to Haiman's principle of 'linguistic separateness' (ibid.) , this 
semantic concept should be reflected in the language : more conceptual 
independence , more linguistic separateness . And indeed this turns out to be the 
case . As Givon puts it : 
The higher a verb is on the binding scale [ie. the stronger the element 
of influence] , the less would its complement tend to be syntactically 
coded as an independent/main clause . 
(1980:337) 
So in 3 , where influence (of Jane over Bill) is weakest , we find that the 
complement clause need not simply preserve the tense/aspect markings of the main 
clause ; in 4 and 5 , where influence is greater and Bill is less capable of acting 
independently , the complement clause is more or less fixed in relation to the 
tense/aspect marking of the main clause . We cannot , for example, say Jane forced 
Sill [to be leaving/to have left] . 
1.4 SYNTHESIS 
In looking at Givon's concept of a binding hierarchy , we have in effect come full 
circle , for the idea of a clause appearing as more or less independent calls to 
mind our starting point - the Givonian notion of a continuum of grammaticization 
This continuum extends from the pragmatic mode (least grammaticized) through to the 
syntactic mode (most grammaticized) , and one linguistic reflection of this is 
degrees to which a clause is subject to tight subordination (cf. 1.1.2 above) . 
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Though Givon does not make this explicit , it seems clear enough that the scale of 
influence corresponds to the continuum of grammaticization : that is , the greater 
the influence , the tighter the subordination of complement clause to the main 
clause . Thus the binding hierarchy neatly brings together many of the elements I 
have looked at in this section : grammaticization , the functional coding of 
grammar , conceptual and linguistic independence , and the 'deep' congruences 
existing between form and notional accounts of relations between participants and 
processes . By way of summary : 
* GRAMMAR EMERGES GRADUALLY FROM DISCOURSE * 
grammaticization : 
  
   
PRAGMATIC MODE 
	
diachronic 	 SYNTACTIC MODE 
ontogenetic 
pidgin/creole 
* SO GRAMMAR IS FUNCTIONAL : IT CODES MEANINGS * 
form/meaning correlations : 
-> 
SURFACE 	 DEEP 
DEGREES OF CONCEPTUAL/LINGUISTIC DEPENDENCE 
pragmatic 
	 syntactic 
Fig. 2 	 the binding hierarchy 
2. GRAMMAR , LEXIS AND CONTEXT : PRESENTING A HYPOTHESIS 
2.1.1 Preliminaries : Defining grammar and lexis 
The rest of this chapter is concerned with outlining a hypothesis on deep 
correlations between form and meaning : between grammar/lexis on the one hand , and 
meaning and context on the other . Givon's concept of grammar as being a functional 
process which codes meaning in broadly predictable ways is central , as is his 
framework of grammaticization . In the most general terms , I will be arguing that 
language - perhaps all language - can be represented on a continuum of 
grammaticization : the more grammaticized 	 the less clauses are coded 
independently . Unlike Givon , though 	 I will be arguing that we need to take much 
more account of lexis , and of the interdependence between lexis and grammar in 
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this respect . Corresponding to this linguistic continuum I propose a semantic 
framework which , atleast in part , keys in quite closely with Givon's concept of 
semantic influence/independence . However , my semantic framework is somewhat 
broader than Givon's . Since , however , I will be arguing that lexis as well as 
grammar needs to be brought into the equation , it is useful at this point to 
indicate in general terms how I distinguish between the two . 
Grammar and lcxis are two extremes at each end of what is a complex continuum . 
Clearly one could write an entire thesis on this matter , but I will restrict 
myself to a simple categorization . 
What distinguishes grammar and lexis is specificity of reference ; that is , the 
most grammatical components of language are those which have the widest range of 
reference , and the most lexical are those with the most specific range of 
reference (Widdowson 1983:93/4) . Thus I consider inflectional morphology to be 
essentially a matter of grammar , because inflectional morphemes - such as the -ed 
past morpheme - may refer the lexical items on which they operate to virtually any 
activity , and thus their range of reference is extremely wide . The distinction , 
conventionally made by linguists , between grammar words and content words (eg. 
Bolinger 1975:121) can be mapped onto this continuum . Content words - bicycle , 
house etc. - have a specificity of reference which is self evidently much wider 
than grammar words like by and to . 
2.1.2 Preliminaries : a brief outline of the hypothesis 
The rest of this chapter is concerned with providing a concise overview of a 
hypothesis about the relationships between grammar , lexis and context . Since this 
involves a considerable diversity of argument , it may be as well to begin with an 
extremely brief set of statements covering the entire hypothesis : 
1. An account of the congruence between grammar/lexis and meaning - here I 
present a form/meaning continuum , a continuum of contextual distance . This 
continuum extends from CONTEXTUAL at one end through to CONCEPTUAL at the other . 
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As we move from the former to the latter , we shift from meanings which express 
simple relationships between participants and processes in the ideational context , 
through to more complex meanings which are conceptually abstracted . That is , 
meanings which involve a conceptual disengagement from the 'concrete' , iconic 
representation of the ideational context . Language reflects this semantic 
distinction - between contextual and conceptual - in predictable ways . Language 
which specifically codes more conceptual (ie. more contextually distanced) meanings 
is characterized by certain lexical and grammatical features which are largely 
absent from language coding contextual meanings . 
2. The systematicity of grammatical rule and mutual modification - We are 
accustomed to talk of a basic distinction between formulaic language -characterized 
by its grammatical and lexical 'fixity' and thus compared to lexical items (cf. 
Pawley/Syder 1983 ) - and the 'rule based' language of the grammar books , 
characterized by its systematic , formal structures and its emphasis on grammar 
(cf. Chomsky 1957/Halliday 1964) . It seems to me , though , that such a view is 
misleading ; instead of a more or less clear dichotomy between rule (grammar) and 
convention/formulaicity (lexis) , what we actually have is a much more fluid 
continuum , with various intermediate points where grammar and lexis interact in 
complex and not entirely systematic ways 
In the rest of section two I will provide an overview of point 1 above , beginning 
with a general account of the form/meaning congruence represented through the 
continuum of contextual distance , then developing this a little further by 
presenting an overview of the linguistic congruence involved . 
2.2 OVERVIEW 
2.2.1 The continuum of contextual distance and a form/meaning congruence 
In terms of form , I have been struck for some time by the way in which so many 
syntactically complex forms seem to show , with considerable consistency across 
different structures , what I refer to as inflectional restriction . Let me return 
briefly to an earlier example from Givon's binding hierarchy : 
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6. Jane forced Bill to leave the house 
Here we have a clear example of inflectional restriction on the verb phrase in the 
complement clause ; that is , the strength of Jane's influence over Bill is 
reflected in the high level of inflectional restriction - [Bill to leave] is 
virtually immune to grammatical inflection on the verb : 
?7. Jane forced Bill : to be leaving : the house 
to have left 
But it is not just a matter of inflectional restriction . What is equally striking 
is the way in which so many complex forms involve verb forms which are not in 
themselves marked for any clear temporal context . For example , the infinitive 
form [to leave] in 6 , which could be past , present or future depending on the 
main clause verb phrase . Because the [to leave] verb phrase is itself temporally 
unmarked , I refer to it as being opaque . 
But what of lexis ? Just as there is grammatical restriction , so there seems to 
be a class of lexical item - the statives - which are , more or less , 
unacceptable : 
?8 Jane forced Bill : to hear 
to resemble 
to recognize 
So I am suggesting that there are three interrelated aspects of form - grammatical 
restriction , opacity and lexical restriction - which are in some predictable way 
congruent with certain meanings . Part of this congruence will be accounted for 
by reference to Givon's concept of causal influence and independence -ie. there is 
a correspondence between the expression of causal influence on the one hand , and 
opacity and grammatical/lexical restriction on the other 
However , the framework suggested here is somewhat broader , since it is necessary 
to account for other examples of linguistic restriction , examples which have 
nothing to do with degrees of influence between causes and effects : 
Tom 
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9a A stitch in time saves nine : 
*9b A stitch in time saved/will save nine (grammatical restriction) 
*9c A stitch in time rescues nine (lexical restriction) 
To account for language such as the proverb in 13 (together with a variety of 
equally different forms) , I propose a wider framework , a continuum of contextual 
distance . Put simply , this is a framework which posits that language forms code 
meanings which are conceptually more or less distant from the ideational context 
ie. the context of participants and processes . Language which is closest to the 
ideational context is language which is essentially referential ; that is , it is 
the language we use simply to report basic ideational relationships between states, 
events and participants . Much of simple syntax performs this function : 
10. Bill left the house 
But as we move along this continuum , language forms become progressively more 
distanced from the ideational context . Contextually distanced language , as I 
suggested above , specifically codes conceptually abstracted meanings involving a 
conceptual disengagement from the representation of simple ideational 
relationships . There are various ways in which this can happen , and I suggest 
four : i) degrees of causal determinacy (the term I use to refer to Givon's 
'influence') ; ii) degrees of referential abstraction (idioms and proverbs) ; iii) 
degrees of interpersonal coding ; iv) degrees of hypothetical meaning . I shall 
very briefly define each of these components , but it may help to begin with a 
diagrammatic representation : 
C 
	  causal determinacy 	 0 
N 
	
increasing contextual distance   referential abstraction C 
CONTEXTUAL 	  
increasing grammatical restriction + 	  interpersonal meaning 	 P 
increasing lexical restriction 
increasing opacity   hypothetical meaning 
A 
Fig. 3 
The first component in figure 3 , then , is causal determinacy . This has to do 
with degrees of influence between causes and effect (cf. Givon's hierarchy) . In 
11 , for example , there is no clear coding of a cause/effect relationship : 
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11. Jane screamed . Bill left the house 
We might , depending on the context , understand 11 to imply that Bill left because 
Jane screamed : but even here Bill's departure is not conceived as being strongly 
determined by Jane's action . In 6 , however , Jane is conceived as being the 
direct and determining cause of Bill's departure : 
6. Jane forced Bill to leave the house 
Where causes are clearly coded as in themselves directly anticipating or bringing 
about certain effects , they are conceived as being determining , as in 6 . The 
conceptualization of causal determinacy is a kind of conceptual abstraction which 
is far removed from expressions of simple contextual relationships (eg. 6 and 11). 
Congruent with this contextual distance , language which codes causal determinacy 
is inflectionally and lexically restricted , as I argued with examples 7 and 8 
above . 
The second component - referential abstraction - concerns the degree to which 
certain language expressions serve to identify specific participants , objects and 
processes in the ideational context . In 10 we can pick out a clear participant 
(Bill) , a process (left) and an object (the house) . In 9 , though , we cannot : a 
stitch in Lillie does not refer to any specific object or process ; rather , the 
entire proverb represents a kind of abstraction away from the referring function of 
language such as 10 . Thus I argue that 9 is more conceptual , more abstracted and 
distant from the ideational context than 10 . Congruent with this is the evident 
inflectional and lexical restriction illustrated in 9b and 9c . 
The third component is interpersonal meaning . Compare 10 , essentially a 
description of ideational components which does not involve any lexico-syntactic 
coding of interpersonal elements , with 12 , which clearly does : 
12. Bill , could you please leave the house 
In 12 , then , there are specific lexico-syntactic forms - the modal stem could you 
together with the lexical insertion of please - which code an interpersonal , 
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suasive meaning , but which do not themselves refer to ideational participants or 
processes . Thus I argue that 12 is more interpersonal and therefore more 
contextually distant than 10 . Notice once again the restrictions on such forms 
inflectional (12a) and lexical (12b) : 
?12a Could you please be leaving the house ? 
?12b Could you please recognize the house ? 
Finally there is hypothetical meaning : the more hypothetical (and thus the less 
'real') , the more distanced from the 'actuality' of directly representing the 
ideational context . Compare , then , 10 (contextually 'close') with 13 
(contextually distanced) : 
13. If Bill had left the house , he would have 	  
Notice the opacity of the verb phrase in [Bill had left the house] , where had left 
does not express the temporal sense of 'past perfect' ; rather , the form is used 
to signal the 'hypothetical distance' of past and impossible events . 
It is important , at this point , to clarify the relationships between the two 
continua which I have now introduced . The Givonian continuum of grammaticization 
is essentially a linguistic framework : although he argues that grammaticization 
has a semantic , functional motivation , there is no clear sense in which the 
continuum as a whole has an explicit semantic thread . The continuum of contextual 
distance has both a linguistic and a semantic perspective . Semantically , it 
represents degrees of conceptual abstraction developing out from an ideational , 
essentially referential starting point . Linguistically , it shows how forms which 
specifically code conceptual meanings (hypothetical , interpersonal etc.) are 
regularly marked by congruent linguistic features - inflectional restriction , 
lexical restriction and opacity . 
2.2.2 Ideational language and the ideational context 
So , following figure 3 , I identify four categories of meaning each of which 
provides us with a framework by which to measure contextual distance : increasing 
levels of hypothetical/interpersonal/referentially abstracted and determinate 
meanings on the meaning side , congruent with increasing degrees of linguistic 
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restriction and opacity on the side of language form . 
Central to the whole concept of contextual distance is language which is at the 
contextual extreme of the continuum in figure 3 ; language which simply refers to 
components of the ideational context (as in 14) , but which does not involve the 
coding of complex conceptualizations of cause and effect , of unreality and so on . 
This I will refer to as contextual language . There is no absolutely clear way of 
delineating contextual language , precisely because it is one point on a continuum. 
It can , though , be loosely defined in the following way : 
a) Contextual language always involves reference to the fundamental 
components of the ideational context : as defined by Halliday (1975) , these are 
participants and processes , together with the categorisation of the quality and 
quantity of things (1975:108) . 
b) Contextual language always involves expression of what Halliday calls 'the 
expression of logical relations' (1975:53) ie. the basic role relationships which 
hold between components of the ideational context : agent/process/patient and so 
forth . 
c) Contextual language does not involve the coding of conceptual meanings ; 
rather , it comprises the common point of departure from which the various 
components of contextual distance branch off . In other words , contextual 
language is non hypothetical , unmarked for interpersonal meaning , directly 
referential rather than abstracted , and unmarked as to causal determinacy . In 
very general terms , all these components of conceptual meaning involve the 
expression of judgements : the perception of causal determinacy , the conception of 
hypothetical worlds , and so on . In contrast , ideational language focuses on the 
simple reporting of states and events . 
Examples of contextual language are : 
14. Jane lives in France 
15. The farmer killed the duckling 
16. Bill loves Anne 
17. Fred threw a stone at Ken 
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3. CONTEXTUAL AND CONCEPTUAL LEXICO-GRAMMAR 
3.1 Outline 
The four components of contextual distance (hypothetical , interpersonal etc.) bear 
a clear congruence with grammatical and lexical features . Indeed , the congruence 
is sufficiently systematic that I argue for a distinction between two kinds of 
grammatical coding : contextual lexico-grammar (which codes meanings at the 
contextual extreme of the continuum) and conceptual lexico-gramsar (towards the 
conceptual extreme) . Given Givon's point that grammar must reflect its functional 
origins , and that there are degrees of grammaticization , we should expect to 
discover some kind of form/meaning congruence along the scale of grammaticization 
My purpose here is to give this idea a more concrete basis , and in so doing to 
give greater prominence to lexis than is given by Givon . 
I shall begin with conceptual lexico-grammar , defining some aspects of grammar and 
lexis which we typically find coding contextually distanced meanings . Conceptual 
language has , as I have already suggested , one or more of the following features: 
1) OPACITY : where a verb phrase (main verb together with the primary 
auxiliaries do/be/have) does not in itself code temporal distinctions between 
past/present/future , but instead 'assumes' these either from an associated main 
clause verb phrase , or from context . For example , with Bill forced Jane to 
leave , the VP [to leave] assumes its past meaning from the main clause verb forced 
2) INFLECTIONAL RESTRICTION : where a verb phrase (consisting of main verb 
together with the auxiliaries do/be/have) is inflectionally fixed or semi-fixed , 
as I argued with respect to 7 and 12a in section 2.2.1 . 
3) LEXICAL RESTRICTION : where there are restrictions on the class of lexical 
item which can be used within the verb phrase . This restriction usually involves 
the class of stative verbs ie. verbs which signal non volitional states , states 
which cannot as a rule be brought about intentionally . So , for example , we can 
say Bill forced Jane to leave Anne (dynamic verb) but we cannot say Bill forced 
Jane to resemble Anne (stative verb) . 
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In contrast , contextual lexico-grammar - the grammar of contextual language (see 
2.2.2 above) - is largely concerned with signalling the clear temporal parameters 
of definite ideational states and events , by which I mean states/events which are 
said to have taken place/existed or to be taking place/existing , and hence to be 
matters of contextual 'reality'. This sense of 'definiteness' , of 'reality' is 
coded through language which has the following features : 
1) TRANSPARENCY - where the verb phrase ( main verb together with the primary 
auxiliaries be/do/have) has the primary function of coding the temporal 
features of states/events in the ideational context , through tense and 
aspect. Present and past tense forms often perform this function , so that 
with [Rill had _left] we understand that had left codes the temporal context 
of past time . I call this transparency because , in contrast to 
conceptual/opaque forms , we can usually establish that a transparent verb 
phrase codes temporal meaning simply by reference to the single clause in 
which it operates . 
2) MAXIMUM INFLECTABILITY - with contextual grammar , we can generally switch 
between one inflectional form and another without restriction . Wheras 
dependent clauses in conceptual grammar may be highly restricted , with 
contextual grammar there is in principle no such restriction : 
18. The farmer kills 
killed 
is killing 
has killed etc. 
the duckling 
   
3) MINIMUM LEXICAL RESTRICTION - again in contrast to conceptual language , 
there are very few restrictions on the class of lexical item which can be used, 
so that we can shift unrestricted between statives and non statives . The only 
clear exception to this is the progressive form , which is unacceptable with a 
number of statives 
What I have defined above is an idealization of language form at either extreme of 
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the continuum of contextual distance . Infact , ofcourse , the very concept of 
continuum implies that there are degrees of conceptual grammar just as there are 
degrees of contextual distance . So what we find is more or less opacity , more or 
less inflectability , more or less clear lexical restriction . 
In the following section I provide a clearer idea of what I mean by opacity and 
restriction , giving examples from various components of conceptual meaning . 
3.2 DEFINING CONCEPTUAL LEXICO-GRAMMAR : INFLECTIONAL & LEXICAL RESTRICTION 
I will start with inflectional restriction , illustrating it by reference to causal 
determinacy . I have already referred to Givon's (1980) binding hierarchy , which 
focuses on the influence of the agent in complement structures (section 1.3.2 
above) 	 I prefer , though , to talk in more general terms of causal determinacy : 
the degree to which a cause is expressed so as to anticipate or exercise control 
over a resulting effect . In 19 , Jane's expectation does not in itself serve to 
bring about (ie. determine) an outcome , wheras her action in 20 clearly does : 
19. Jane expected Bill to leave 
20. Jane forced Bill to leave 
Thus 20 expresses greater determinacy than 19 , and congruent with this , 20 is 
more inflectionally and lexically restricted : 
21. Jane expected Bill to 
22. Jane expected Bill to 
23. Jane forced Bill to 









(low determinacy : inflectionally 
unrestricted) 
her (low determinacy : lexically 
unrestricted) 
(high determinacy : inflectional 
restriction) 
her (high determinacy : lexical 
restriction) 
Such lexical restrictions are usually on the class of stative verbs (see list in 
Appendix A) . Since statives generally signal non volitional states , they are 
incongruous with forms (as with 24) which signal actions brought about through the 
volitional intervention of others . 
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These inflectional and lexical restrictions are linguistic constraints which 
directly reflect conceptual constraints placed on the agent of the complement 
clause (as in 20) by the determinate action of the agent of the main clause . This 
pattern , whereby lexical and inflectional constraints are congruent with 
conceptual constraints , recurs again and again with conceptual forms coding causal 
determinacy , interpersonal meaning and (sometimes) hypothetical meaning : 
no clear inflectional restriction clear inflectional restriction 
no clear lexical restriction 






increasing contextual distance 
Fig. 5 
3.3 DEFINING CONCEPTUAL LEXICO-GRAMMAR : TRANSPARENCY & OPACITY 
3.3.1 Opacity and temporal coding : introduction 
Opaque verb phrases , consisting of a main verb together with the primary 
auxiliaries do/be/have , do not in themselves clearly code the temporal parameters 
of the state or event which they represent . They do not , in other words , signal 
whether the state/event is past , present or future . What we often find is that 
this temporal coding has been shifted from a dependent clause verb phrase to a main 
clause verb phrase , as in 25 : 
25. :Jane collapsed: as a result of : hearing : the news (causal determinacy) 
main clause VP 	 dependent clause VP 
past tense coding is read into dependent clause 
Alternatively , this temporal coding may shift out of the sentence altogether , 
into the surrounding discourse context , as with 26 : 
26. A: What are your plans for :tomorrow: 
B: :I'n playing : tennis 
tense coding inferred from discourse context 
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I use the term opaque precisely on account of this complexity . Opaque verb forms 
are not semantically self contained , but are dependent for their interpretation on 
co-reference either to context or to other parts of the immediate cotext : 
	 + CONTEXT 1 (26) 
OPAQUE VP + 	  
	 + COTEXT 1 	 (25) 
Fig. 6 
3.3.2 TEMPORAL OPACITY 
Verb phrases which are temporally opaque do not independently code distinctions 
between past/present/future . Instead , this temporal coding is 'read into' the 
opaque VP from other parts of the immediate cotext : 
27. Jane forced : Bill to leave : the house 
	 (causal determinacy) 
	
forces : 	 +- 	 + 
	
+---+----+ 	 1 
past or present time reference is 
'read into'cloaque VP from main VP 
MAIN VP 	 OPAQUE VP 
28. Bill : escaped 	 : by : bribing : the guard (causal determinacy) 
will escape 1 +----+----+ 
However , note that with 27 and 28 the opaque verb phrase does not independently 
code aspect , so that [to leave] in 27 and [leaving] in 28 are unmarked as to 
whether these events are perceived as 'progressive' or 'completed' . Where 
inflectional changes are possible , the temporally opaque VP does code aspect (as 
in 29) , though temporal reference is still taken from the main clause : 
MAIN VP 	 OPAQUE VP 
+ 	 + 	 + 	 + 
29. Jane : expected : Bill to : be leaving the house : progressive aspect 
	
expects : 	 + 	 + 
+- + 	 + 	 : have left the house : perfective aspect 
+ 	 + 	 + 
+ 	 > 	 + 
past/present reference 'read in' from main VP 
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In addition , temporally opaque verb phrases may 'borrow' coding of mood , often 
from modal auxiliaries , as in 30 : 
MODAL 	 OPAQUE VP 
	
30. Bill : will : 	 :leave : the house 	 (hypothetical meaning) 
	
may : 	 +---+--+ 
+--+---+ 
degree of certainty 'read into' opaque VP 
Here again , the opaque VP does not independently code temporal distinctions , 
though the opaque VP in 33/4 does code perfective aspect : 
opaque VP cooed as future re. time of speaking 
+---->----+ + 
+---+--+ +---+--+----+ +---+--+ 
33. He : will : 	 : have left : 	 : soon 
	 + + 	 + + 	 (hypothetical meaning) 
	 + + 	 + + 	  
34. He : will : 	 : have left : 	 : already 
+---+--+ +---+--+----+ +----+ 	 + 
+---->----+ + 	  
opaque VP coded as past re. time of speaking 
3.3.3 CONCEPTUAL OPACITY 
Conceptually opaque verb phrases may have some or all of the features of temporally 
opaque VP's . Their distinguishing feature is that , in addition , they serve to 
code a specific conceptual meaning . Conceptually opaque VP's , although they 
resemble a transparent VP , incorporate part of its transparent , temporal meaning 
within a 'new' , conceptual one , as in 35 : 
35. If Bill left at 4.00 , he'd be here by now 	 (hypothetical meaning) 
The VP [Bill left at 4.00] in 35 resembles a transparent VP , coding a past 
meaning . But used in 35 it does not code a past meaning ; instead it codes an 
unlikely condition (and hence a hypothetical/conceptual meaning) , read in co-
reference with the consequence clause . But in order to code this conceptual 
meaning , the 'past' transparent meaning is not entirely disregarded , since the 
'temporal distance' implicit in this sense of 'pastness' is used to code a sense of 
hypothetical distance . That is , just as a past event is temporally distanced from 
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the present , so in 35 a 'past' form is used to code hypothetical distance from the 
'reality' of actual states/events . 
A similar process can be observed with expressions of interpersonal meaning . In 36 
the 'past' (temporally distanced) meaning of the auxiliary could is used to code a 
conceptual (interpersonal) sense of social distance , of polite deference , between 
interlocutors : 
36. Could you help me ? 
And , as another example : 
37. I am leaving :(tomorrow) 	 (hypothetical and determinate meaning) 
I leave 
In 37 'present' forms are used to code a future meaning , through co-reference to 
cotext ( 'tomorrow') or context . Used transparently , these forms may code actions 
which are definitely going on at/around the time of speaking (present progressive) 
or habitually (present simple) . Furthermore , it is well known that used with a 
future sense , the present (progressive) forms imply that the future event is more 
or less definite by virtue of being the outcome of a present arrangement or present 
cause (Leech 1971:57-62) . So the VP in 37 is conceptually opaque because the 
definiteness implicit in the transparent use of present tenses is carried over into 
the new conceptual meaning . Thus it is implied that the future event will (almost 
definitely) take place . 
3.3.4 SUMMARY 
Opacity is a complex phenomenon , and I do not pretend to have provided a 
theoretically rigorous definition . Indeed , such a definition is likely to be 
elusive because , as with lexical and inflectional restriction , opacity is 
something of a 'more or less' matter . There is no clear dividing line between 
transparent and opaque , nor between temporal and conceptual opacity . Figure seven 
summarizes the points I have made : 
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THE CODING FUNCTION OF VERBS AND VERB PHRASES 
(defined as main verb plus auxiliaries be/do/have) 
TRANSPARENCY 	 OPACITY 
VP clearly codes temporal context 	 VP 'borrows' temporal coding 
of state/event : past/present/future 




no clearly independent coding of 	 as with temporal cpacity , and 
temporal context , though aspect 
	 VP codes 'new' conceptual 
Fig. 7 	 may be coded (eg. 27-34) 	 meaning (eg 35-7) 
3.4 SYNTHESIS 
In this section I look at the implications of conceptual grammar for the wider 
hypothesis on contextual distance , looking both at the strengths and limitations 
of this conceptualization of form/meaning congruences . 
3.4.1 Conceptual fora and independent clauses 
I have now provided a general overview of the form/meaning congruence which 
underpins the continuum of contextual distance (fig.3) . The more conceptual the 
meaning which is coded by a particular form , the less that form resembles an 
independent clause (cf. Givon 1980:337) . Conceptual lexico-grammar is , by 
definition , language which is dependent in a number of ways : opacity involves 
dependence of one VP either on another or on context , inflectional restriction 
frequently marks a clause as conceptually dependent on , or constrained by , 
another , and so forth . 
Because contextual distance is a matter of continuum rather than binary opposition, 
the distinction between contextual and conceptual lexico-grammar is not black and 
white . Nevertheless , the following table illustrates some of those forms which 
seem to fall fairly clearly within one camp or the other : 
CONTEXTUAL FORMS : 
1. The present and present perfect tenses , whether or not progressive in 
aspect - where these forms primarily code the temporal parameters of 
states/events occurring at or around or up to the time of speaking 
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2. The past and past perfect tenses , whether or not progressive in aspect - 
where these form primarily code states/events which occurred at some point 
or over some period in the past . 
CONCEPTUAL FORMS : 
1. Future forms : including will , going to , present progressive (future) 
All future forms are hypothetical by definition 
2. The passive form : which , I shall argue , implies a kind of determinacy 
3. The gerund : ie. any use of the -ing inflection which is opaque (eg. 10) 
4. The infinitive (bare or with to) : which has no clear transparent parallel 
in contextual language 
5. The modal auxiliaries : coding hypothetical and interpersonal meaning , and 
determinacy . 
3.4.2 Lexico-grammatical coding and the continuum of contextual distance 
Conceptual lexico-grammar codes conceptual meanings (hypothetical , interpersonal 
etc.) , meanings which when expressed through less grammaticized forms are not 
clearly coded , but remain a matter of inference : these latter are thus located 
towards the pragmatic end of Givon's continuum of grammaticization . Thus with 38 
and 39 , the interpersonal meaning , the illocutionary force remains wide open to 
context in the absence of the clearer lexico-grammatical coding of 40 : 
38. The policeman's crossing the road (warning? threat?) (contextual form) 
39. I'm in the bath ! (offer ? warning ? ) 	 (contextual form) 
40. Could you please get a move on/answer the phone ? 	 (conceptual form) 
And similarly the more contextual form of 41 codes cause/effect , but it is only 
the conceptual form of 42 which clearly codes a strongly determinate cause : 
41. [Jane screamed] , so [Bill left the house] 
42. Jane forced Bill to leave the house 
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In what follows I argue that when conceptual meanings are clearly coded in the 
language , some features of conceptual lexico-gramsar are very likely indeed to be 
used . What I am not saying , though , is that conceptual forms necessarily code 
conceptual meanings which are inviolable and without ambiguity . The form/meaning 
relationship here is certainly not arbitrary , but neither is it completely 
isomorphic . That is , there is rarely if ever a strict one-to-one relationship 
between form and coded conceptual meaning (as Lyons argues 1981:16) . Hence when I 
refer to the way in which conceptual forms 'code' conceptual meanings, what I mean 
is that conceptual meanings are strongly implied through the very form of the 
language . 
3.4.3 Contextual distance and its limitations 
So I am not suggesting that this form/meaning congruence is unimpeachable in all 
cases . Jespersen's reference to the 'more or less accidental facts of existing 
languages' (1924:55) is a cautionary note well worth bearing in mind ; language is 
not an artificial construct , deliberately and self consciously designed to make 
systematic the formal coding of meaning in all cases . Rather , as I suggested in 
2.2.2 , we can only go so far in any attempt to account for the shape of language 
expression ; context , in particular , is something which poses clear limitations 
on semantic study . As Katz and Fodor (1963) have pointed out , any semantic theory 
which attempts to account for the interpretation of sentences cannot account for 
the 'socio-physical' setting of the act of speech (1963:176-181) . 
Moreover , I do not pretend that all language which involves conceptual form is 
necessarily an expression of one or other category of conceptual meaning as I have 
defined it . In particular , I pay very little attention to the way in which many 
'conceptual' forms are used to perform a discourse function , as markers of 
backgrounding/foregrounding , of indicating whether information is 'new' or 'old' 
(cf. Quirk et al. 1985:919) . Nevertheless this is clearly an important area of 
form/meaning congruence . To some extent it overlaps with the analysis I provide 
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here ; that is , there are certain conceptual forms which code a component of 
contextual distance and perform a discourse function . In 30 below , for example , 
we have a subordinate clause which involves an opaque and restricted verb phrase 
marking information as being backgrounded : 
(determinate cause) 
43. As a result of [slipping on the ice] , he broke his ankle 
(backgrounded) 
There are other apparently 'conceptual' forms which , while they clearly perform a 
discourse function similar to that in 43 , do not seem to code any clear conceptual 
meaning : 
44. As well as [doing the shopping] , I've cleaned the entire house 
(backgrounded) 
There has been considerable discussion in the literature on precisely this point - 
the extent to which particular forms may , as with 43 , express what Haiman refers 
to as the "competing motivations ... for expression on the same linguistic 
dimension" (1983:781) . That is , a single form - such as an inflectionally 
restricted verb phrase - may simultaneously code more than one semantic parameter , 
as in 43 where the opaque and restricted VP slipping indicates that the event is 
both backgrounded and functions as a determinate cause . 
This said , I move on in the following four sections to look at the four components 
of contextual distance , arguing that in each case there is a clear congruence 
between form and meaning which is consistent with the continuum of contextual 
distance as I have represented it in figure 3 . 
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4. CAUSAL DETERMINACY 
4.1 Overview : cause and contextual distance 
In 1.3.2 I discussed Givon's (1980) concept of a binding scale referring to degrees 
by which certain outcomes are influenced or predicted : 1 hope -› I order -> 
force . These are all expressions of causal determinacy , which in very general 
terms I define as : 
The degree to which a state or event is expressed as in itself 
anticipating or bringing about the occurrence of another 
state or event . 
But how , in conceptual terms , does causal determinacy represent meaning which is 
contextually distanced ? The contextual extreme of the continuum (fig. 3) , has to 
do with the simple , direct reference to components of the ideational context 
(section 2.2.2) . Such language effectively represents the world as it is (or as it 
is said to be) : definite states/events which have occurred or are occurring . 
There is no room here for explicitly coding cause/effect relationships , because 
such relationships involve making complex subjective judgements about the 
relationship between one state/event and another . The more we code such complex 
conceptualizations , the more conceptual ie. the more contextually distanced is our 
meaning . 
But cause/effect is not a black and white phenomenon : there are degrees of 
cause/effect conceptualization which have to do with degrees of causal determinacy. 
That is , the more we express a cause as strongly anticipating or bringing about an 
effect , the more contextually distanced such a conceptualization is . Thus there 
are degrees of determinacy , from zero (where no kind of cause/effect relationship 
is expressed) through to very high (as in I forced him to leave) . These degrees 
correspond to the continuum of contextual distance : the more determinate , the 
more contextually distanced , and the more restricted and opaque. In this section 
I provide an overview of this continuum , and of the form/meaning congruence which 
it represents . 
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4.2 THE CODING OF DETERMINACY & DEGREES OF CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE 
contextual lexico-grammar 	 > conceptual lexico-grammar 
contextual   
 -* 	
 -conceptual 
no grammatical 	 lexico-grammatical 	 lexico-grammatical 
coding of cause/effect coding of general 	 coding of causal 
cause/effect 	 determinacy (via opacity 
(eg. via conjuncts) 	 and restriction) 
increasing grammaticization (form) 
Fig.9 	 increasing contextual distance (meaning) 
4.2.1 No coding of cause/effect 
Here we are concerned with the juxtaposition of syntactically simple clauses . 
Such forms are grammatically unmarked as to determinacy , ie. there is no clear 
grammatical coding of determinacy (45) , though determinacy may nevertheless be 
strongly implied through selection of particular lexical items (46) : 
45. The sun rose . The market stalls began to open 
(no sense in which stalls opening was determined by sun rising) 
46. The sun rose . The flowers began to open 
But in 46 it is only the lexical content which implies determinacy , in the sense 
that the sun's rising in itself brings about the opening of flowers - but such an 
interpretation is dependent on knowledge of the world (extralinguistic) and our 
presumptions are open to challenge depending on the particular ideational context 
(eg. battery operated plastic flowers which open quite irrespective of what the sun 
is doing !) . 
4.2.2 Lexico-grammatical coding of general cause/effect 
Cause/effect is grammatically coded through clauses linked by certain conjuncts , 
such as because , so , therefore . Such forms are grammatically coded (via the 
conjunct) as signalling a cause/effect relationship , but they are unmarked as to 
the degree of determinacy , which depends on lexical choice : (47) implies more 
determinacy than 48 
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47. The sun rose so the flowers opened 
48. Bill saw the car so he bought it 
So it is the lexis here rather than the grammar which indicates varying degrees of 
determinacy - high in 47 , low in 48 . But in the absence of conceptual lexico-
grammar , the degree of implied determinacy is variable . Thus , although 
cause/effect is by definition a conceptual abstraction , the kind of cause/effect 
expressed in 47/48 is not highly conceptual . 
4.2.3 Lexico-grammatical coding of high determinacy 
High levels of determinacy are coded both grammatically and lexically . This coding 
is expressed through the use of highly dependent clauses which are opaque and 
inflectionally very restricted . High determinacy is frequently marked by such 
conjuncts such as as a result of/in order to , or by complement taking verbs such 
as force or order . It is on account of these latter , lexically marked forms (I 
ordered him to ... / she forced me to ...) that I refer in figure 9 to the lexico-
grammatical coding of high determinacy . Because there is clear coding , 
associations of lexical items which do not in themselves imply determinacy are 
generally unacceptable 
*49. Bill saw the car in order to buy it 
?50. Bill bought the car as a result of seeing it 
Congruent with this increasing inflectional restriction is increasing lexical 
restriction . By lexical restriction I mean that , particularly with high coding , 
certain lexical items are (more or less) unacceptable , as with 49 and 50 above . 
In most cases these unacceptable lexical items belong to the class of statives , 
and there is a logical explanation for this . Determinacy has to do with 
states/events which strongly anticipate or in themselves bring about another 
state/event , and as such it includes the conscious 	 intentional determinacy 
of participants (by means of/in order to etc.) . But stative verbs refer to states 
which are , in most contexts , not brought about through conscious volition - 
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resemble , hear , recognize etc. Here lies the incongruity of statives , because it 
is a logical nonsense to talk of someone being forced to do something which they 
cannot consciously implement (? I forced him to resemble her) or of someone 
consciously bringing about an event through action which is itself non 
intentionally done (I scared John by means of looking at him) . In Appendix A I 
categorize the stative verbs . 
4.2.4 Types of high determinacy : Participant and circumstantial 
There are 2 sources to which we can attribute causal determinacy : we can attribute 
it to the conscious intention of a participant , or we can express it as determined 
by force of circumstances . These are conceptualizations with which we are 
extremely familiar in everyday life . Whenever we see ourselves as having 
deliberately made something happen , or whenever we express a wish , desire or 
intention to bring something about , we effectively make reference to participant 
determinacy of one degree or another . Similarly , when we see ourselves as the 
victims of forces beyond our control , we are conceiving of a kind of 
circumstantial determinacy . The distinction between participant and circumstantial 
determinacy is a crucial one , since I will be arguing in chapter four that each 
has its own lexico-grammatical reflexes . For now , though , it will suffice to 
present a definition of each , and to take note of the congruence between form and 
meaning which underlies the whole notion of high determinacy : 
PARTICIPANT DETERMINACY - where a participant is said to consciously 
anticipate or to bring about a new state of affairs . For example : 
51. Jane lied in order to embarrass me (Jane's action intentionally anticipates ) 
52. Bill forced Fred to lie down (Sill intentionally brings about a result) 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETERMINACY - where a state/event is expressed as itself 
either determining or presupposing the occurrence of another state/event , 
irrespective of the volition of participants whose independence is 
constrained by force of circumstances . For example : 
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53. Fred was murdered (Fred is viewed as the undergoer , subject to force of 
circumstances beyond his control) 
54. Bill fell as a result of slipping on the ice (irrespective of Bill's 
wishes) 
Note again the linguistic restrictions , inflectional (eg. the fixed participle of 
the passive in 53) and lexical (?Feed was resembled ) , together with the opacity 
of the 'past' participle in 53 and of the 'progressive' form in 54 . 
In chapter four I will take this argument further , arguing that within the 
category of high determinacy there are degrees of determinacy , and that congruent 
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coding of high determinacy 
(lexico grammatical) 
increasing grammaticization/contextual distance 
Fig. 10 
Infact determinacy , and its congruent linguistic restrictions and opacity , finds 
expression not only within the category of causal determinacy , but also within 
hypothetical meaning and interpersonal meaning , and I shall therefore refer to it 
again in the following sections . In Appendix C I present an overview of the entire 
continuum of contextual distance , which shows the way in which determinacy recurs 
again and again in expressions of conceptual meanings . 
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5 HYPOTHETICAL MEANING 
5.1 Hypothetical meaning and contextual distance : two categories 
The relationship between hypothetical meaning and contextual distance is fairly 
self evident : if contextual language has to do with representing definite states 
and events in the ideational context , then whenever we use language to code states 
or events which are imaginary or unreal , we are necessarily expressing 
hypothetical meaning . Wheras contextual language reports on the world as we 
observe it , hypothetical language is world creating language . 
I make a fundamental distinction , though , between two interconnected kinds of 
hypothetical language . The first is the language of modality ; the language we use 
to talk about the future , to express obligation , to make logical deductions etc. 
My second category is the language we use to express degrees of unreality : we may 
simply assert something as true (Bill left) , we may question its likelihood (Sill 
may leave) , or we may 'create' a proposition which is entirely unreal and 
hypothetical (had Bill left ...) . What we have here is increasing degrees of 
unreality , and thus of contextual distance . In the argument which follows I 
identify a predictable linguistic congruence with this continuum . 
5.2 PARTICIPANT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL MODALITY 
In this section I introduce a distinction between participant and circumstantial 
modality , suggesting that looking at modality in this way gives us interesting 
insights into the expression of the motivating force behind people's actions . 
We can signal participant modality in one of two ways . Firstly , we may refer tb a 
future volitional action whose realization is strongly anticipated at the moment of 
speaking by the agent (55) or by the speaker (56) : 
55. Jane's going to leave , her mind is made up ! 
56. Jane must leave , I insist on it ! 
Thus in 55 the speaker is talking of Jane's leaving as something which Jane 
currently plans/anticipates bringing about . Jane , in other words , is understood 
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to hold a current intention to bring about a future event . In 56 the speaker 
implies a present determination to bring about Jane's leaving . This meaning is 
strongly related to participant determinacy (4.2.4) ; the only difference is that 
with participant determinacy , we tend to use language which specifically refers to 
a state/event acting as a determining cause (eg. Jane „LW in order to leave) , 
wheras in 55 and 56 the speaker merely implies a determining state -a state of mind 
(Jane's intention in 55 , the speaker's in 56) . I will refer to this kind of 
participant modality as strong participant modality , strong on account of the 
implicit sense of clear determinacy . 
Secondly , we can refer to a volitional action (past , present or future) which by 
implication simply involves the conscious volition of the participant agent , but 
which is not in any sense anticipated or determined , as in 57 below : 
57. Jane : should leave 	 : She has responsibilities ! 
: should have left 
With 57 there is no sense in which Jane's action is directly sought , determined , 
anticipated , but there is still the implication that Jane's leaving is an act of 
conscious volition . 
We signal circumstantial modality when we refer to an action in which , by 
implication , it is understood that the participant may be an undergoer or 
experiencer of events motivated from 'outside' the participant herself . As with 
participant modality , circumstantial modality comes in two guises . 
The first I refer to as strong circumstantial modality : by this I mean the 
implication that there are circumstantial forces which act so as to strongly 
anticipate the occurrence of an event , so strongly that the event is understood to 
be fixed/arranged at the time of speaking : 
58. We're meeting Bill tomorrow at 5.00 
59. Jane's going to be meeting Bill tomorrow 
In both 58 and 59 the meeting with Bill is expressed as something which is already 
STRONG 
event is strongly determined by 
circumstances which may be 
external to participant agent 
examples : 58/59 
PARTICIPANT action which implicitly 
involves the volition of 
participant/agent, but which 
is not clearly anticipated 
or determined 	 examples: 52' 
action involving participant 
which is strongly either by the 
speaker (56) or by participant 
agent (55) 




event is weakly anticipated 
by circumstances which may 
be external to participant 
agent example : 60 
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determined and a matter of circumstantial fact , whether or not it is the agent's 
own intention which is the source of this determinacy . 
Weak circumstantial determinacy carries the implication that , although there are 
again circumstantial forces at work , they are not strongly determinate ; we do not 
imply this event will happen but only there are circumstantial forces which to some 
extent anticipate it : 
60. She needs to : meet with Bill tomorrow 
has to 
By way of summary : 
NODALITY 
accounting for the motivation behind people's actions 
This participant/circumstance distinction is not , ofcourse , an entirely new one 
since it is related to the established distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
modality . Quirk et al. define intrinsic modality as involving some kind of 
intrinsic human control over events" (1985:219) , and extrinsic modality as being 
essentially concerned with "human judgement of what is or is not likely to happen" 
(ibid.) . Others have made a similar distinction between deontic (intrinsic) and 
epistemic (extrinsic) modality (eg. Lyons 1977:823/796) . The participant element 
in intrinsic modality should be clear - human control necessarily implies the 
capacity to act on one's own volition , while absence of human control implies that 
actions may be motivated th,,ugh circumstances . 
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There is a form/meaning congruence here which is very similar to causal 
determinacy . There is a difference , though . With causal determinacy , 
inflectional restriction means that we reach a point where only one inflection is 
possible (as with I forced her to leave) . With modality it is more a matter of one 
inflection among a number of possible inflections being singled out as the 'marked' 
coding form for participant or circumstantial meaning . Thus with will/going to , 
it is particularly the infinitive form which implies participant modality (as with 
55) , but the gerund form which implies circumstantial modality (as with 58) . 
Opacity is involved with all these expressions , functioning as a marker of 
hypothetical meaning ; but it is inflectional and lexical restriction which serve 
to distinguish one category of modality from another : 
LOW PARTICIPANT MODALITY 	 HIGH PARTICIPANT NODALITY 
inflectional variation 	 coded by particular inflection 
lexical restriction on stative verbs 
increasing contextual 
c opaque verb phrases (for all categories) > 
distance 
:LOW CIRCUMSTANTIAL MOO. 	 HIGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL MOO. 
inflectional variation 	 coded by particular inflection 
no clear lexical restriction , but ipplied by statives 
Fig. 11 
In 5.2.1 I expand on figure 11 by referring to a variety of modal meanings . One 
cautionary point , though , needs to be made right at the start . With modality we 
are in an area of form/meaning congruence which is highly context dependent . Thus 
the framework outlined in figure 11 represents only a generalized picture - there 
are many exceptions , which I will point out in the course of the discussion . 
Modality is traditionally divided up into a number of semantic areas : obligation , 
future possibility etc. For lack of space , I will look only at future probability 
and compulsion . I will deal with permission in chapter five . 
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5.2.1 Coding Future Probability 
The framework I argue for here is summarized in figure 12 : 
HIGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL PROBABILITY 
	 HIGH PARTICIPANT PROBABILITY 
will/going to 4- -ing 
	 will/going to t inf. : *statives 
opaque present progressive (-ing) 
-+ 
no lexical restriction but implied by statives : lexical restriction on statives 
Fig. 12 
Here the participant/circumstance distinction is coded largely through particular , 
marked inflections . Thus the infinitive form specifically codes strong participant 
modality (as with 55/61a) , while the will/going to -ing form specifically codes 
strong circumstantial modality (as in 59/62b) : 
61a I've decided that I will/am going to return here soon (participant) 
61b 	 :?be returning here soon (?participant) 
62a According to my schedule I will/am going to return here soon (circumstance) 
62b 	 be returning here soon (circ.) 
In terms of lexis , statives imply high circumstantial modality , irrespective of 
the verbal inflection (63) as does a non animate subject (64) : 
63. Jane : is going to : hear from me very soon 
will 	 recognize Bill as soon as she sees him 
64. That wall is going to collapse 
In 63 the use of the stative verb codes circumstantial modality , implying that 
these things will happen irrespective of whether Jane consciously intends to bring 
them about . 
However , while circumstantial and participant meanings attach to particular 
inflections , any inflectional form may imply simply that a prediction is being 
made ; in this context , the infinitive and -ing forms are neutralized and do not 
signal any particular source of determinacy , either participant or circumstantial: 





very soon . I see it in the crystal ball 
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I believe that the present progressive (future) is equally relevant here , falling 
squarely into the category of strong circumstantial probability : it implies a 
present intention (though not necessarily of the agent/participant) to bring about 
a future event . Semantically , it is well established that the progressive 
(future) form carries a strong sense of a future event being currently anticipated. 
Leech , for example , talks of the expression of a "future event anticipated by 
virtue of a present plan , programme or arrangement" (1971:57) . Congruent with 
this , the progressive (future) form is conceptually opaque (as I argued in 3.3.3); 
that is , the 'definiteness' of the 'present' form is used to code the near 
certainty of a future event . The progressive (future) form is also conceptual on 
account of being more lexically restricted (67) than its transparent (literally 
present) counterpart (66) : 
hearing strange noises 	 67. I'm 
feeling sick 
seeing stars 





The statives in 67 are incongruous because an event which is determined through 
present and deliberate arrangement cannot involve states which are non volitional . 
However , both transparent and opaque forms are unacceptable with statives which 
imply innate states of affairs , such as 'be' or 'resemble' . 
5.2.2 Coding Compulsion 
The pattern I argue for here is outlined in figure 13 : 
WEAK CIRCUMSTANTIAL COMPULSION 
	
STRONG PARTICIPANT COMPULSION 
have / need to + variety of inflections 	 must + inf. (*statives) 
inflectionally variable (61) 
	
inflectionally restricted (59) 
limited lexical restriction (62) 
	
lexically restricted (60) 
increasing contextual distance 
Fig. 13 
The modal must switches between a participant (compulsion) and a non determinate 
(logical necessity) meaning depending on the inflection on the associated verb . 
Coding of participant modality here is lexically and inflectionally restricted ; 
coding of logical necessity is not . Expressions With the form must f infinitive , 
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the main verb is not independently inflected and there is a congruent implication 
of high participant modality ; thus in 68 the speaker seeks to determine/bring 
about Jane's action , and it is presupposed that Jane can act volitionally : 
68. Jane must finish her thesis ! 
This participant modality is inflectionally restricted , so that the inflections in 
69 , which resemble more the form of independent clauses , suggests that the 
participant meaning may be neutralized , and that instead a logical necessity 
meaning is intended : 
69. Jane must : have finished : her thesis (switch to logical necessity) 
be finishing 
Similarly the must/strong participant congruence is lexically restricted - statives 
neutralize the participant meaning , turning it into logical necessity , in the 
same way as the inflections did in 69 : 
70. Jane must have a lot of money 	 (switch to logical necessity) 
be in Lima 
The modals have/need to imply a kind of weak circumstantial imperative which is 
external to the participant involved ; thus wheras must implies speaker authority , 
have to implies that the authority comes from no particular source" (Leech 
1971:75) . So have to and need to express circumstantial modality . But there is 
also a difference in terms of determinacy . With must there is a strong 
implication of authority , a sense of a force which strongly anticipates the 
bringing about of a new state of affairs , as in 68 above . With need/have to , 
this sense of anticipation is intuitively weaker : Leech refers to the distinction 
between need and must in terms of an increasing "scale of intensity" (1971:95) . 
Since need/have to are circumstantial and signal weak determinacy wheras must is 
participant and signals strong determinacy , the former are both inflectionally and 
lexically less restricted than the latter : 
possible/unlikely 
with grounds 
coded through conceptual opacity or 









impossibility with belief 
or knowledge 
coded through conceptual 
opacity 
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71. Jane needs to : finish 	 1 her thesis (inflections passible within 
has to : be finishing : 	 category of obligation) 
have finished: 
72. Jane 	 needs to : be in Lima 
has to 	 : have a lot of money 
5.3 DEGREES OF HYPOTHETICAL DISTANCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE 
5.3.1 Introduction and overview 
In figure 14 I summarize the continuum of contextual distance as it relates to 
degrees of hypothetical distance : 
 
increasing 
	 * 	  
contextual distance > 
* 	  
     
      
Fig. 14 
What this continuum represents is degrees by which the probability or improbability 
of a state/event taking place , ie. becoming a matter of contextual reality , is 
held to be justified through the speaker having grounds to back up his assertion . 
Thus the least conceptual type of hypothetical meaning is coded when the speaker 
implies A' is probable , and I have grounds with which to back this up , as in 73 : 
73. Jane's going to leave tomorrow (participant mooality : knowledge of 
agent intention) 
Somewhat more hypothetical , yet adjacent on the continuum in figure 14 , is what I 
refer to as possible/unlikely with grounds . Here the speaker again implies he has 
grounds to back up the possible truth of his statement - and to this extent his 
meaning is not hypothetically remote - yet he also implies that Xis subject to 
greater indeterminacy than with 73 . Thus 74 implies 'quite possible to occur' , 
while 75 implies 'quite unlikely to occur' , where both meanings are implied to be 
equally justifiable : 
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74. If (it's true that) Jane's going to leave tomorrow , then .... 
75. If Jane left tomorrow , we'd be in trouble (conceptual opacity) 
So although the condition in 75 is held to be unlikely , the speaker remains 'in 
touch' with the 'real' world by virtue of implying grounds to justify such 
improbability ; as Quirk et al. point out , with such clauses it is clearly 
expected that the condition will not be fulfilled" (1973:325 , my highlighting) 
So in both 74 and 75 the speaker implies he has grounds for assessing the 
likelihood of the condition being fulfilled . 
More conceptual still , speaker may simply code a proposition as being possible , 
but without, the implication that he has grounds to back this up . In the absence of 
grounds , his meaning is all the more 'theoretical' or hypothetical than with 74/5: 
76. Jane could leave tomorrow (temporally opaque) 
At the conceptual and hypothetical extreme , the speaker 'creates a world' which he 
believes to be impossible , and thus to be completely unreal . Here , by 
definition , the speaker implies there is no possibility whatsoever of the 
state/event taking place , or having taken place : 
77. If Jane had left yesterday , she would've arrived by now (conceptual opacity,) 
Following on from figure 14 , I argue that when these degrees of hypothetical 
distance are grammatically coded in the language , there are form/meaning 
congruences involved . 
5.3.2 THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
5.3.2.1 The grammatical coding of grounds 
I look here at two ways in which grounds are grammatically coded in the language , 
which I first summarize in figure 15 : 
128 
THE GRAMMATICAL CODING OF GROUNDS 
coding of participant or 	 coding through conceptual opacity 
circumstantial modality  
1 	 1 1 	 1 
+ 	 + 	 + 	 unlikely 
1 	 1 	 examples 82-84 1 	 1 
probable 	 possible 
examples 78-80 	 examples 81/2 
Fig. 15 
I will start here with the coding of probability with grounds through participant 
or circumstantial modality . The coding of participant or circumstantial modality 
(cf. section 5.2) in itself implies grounds , either through speaker knowledge of 
the agent's intention (as with the infinitive form in 78) , or through knowledge of 
a present circumstantial cause (as with the -ing form in 78) : 
78. Jane : will 	 leave soon 	 (participant modality) 
is going to : be leaving soon (circumstantial modality) 
In other words , expressions of participant/circumstantial modality are expressions 
of grounds . 
Participant or circumstantial modality may also be implied through forms which are 
not just temporally opaque (as with 78) , but conceptually opaque (as I argued in 
3.3.3 and 5.2 ) : 
79. I meet Jane tomorrow 	 (circumstantial modality) 
80. I'm meeting Jane tomorrow 	 (circumstantial modality,) 
Like with 78 , these opaque forms imply speaker knowledge of a current plan or 
arrangement , conveying a sense of near certainty which is carried over from the 
transparent use of present and present progressive forms . 
As for the coding of possibility with grounds , some of the above forms can be 
modified so as to reduce the level of likelihood through cotext , as with their use 
with the subordinator if together with the consequence clause in 81 : 
 tomorrow , then we're in trouble 
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81. If Jane : is leaving 
is going to leave 
is going to be leaving 
 
  
But grounds are still coded here through participant/circumstantial modality ; so 
that it is only the level of probability which is altered . 
Alternatively , possibility with grounds can be coded through the modal may : 
82. Jane may leave 	 : soon (participant modality : possibility) 
be leaving : 	 (circumstantial mod3lity : possibility) 
I have not previously discussed the modal may ; but may functions here 
in a way very similar to will and going to : that is , it implies participant 
modality with the infinitive , or circumstantial modality with the -ing form . In 
contrast to the more hypothetical modal can , may is said to have a 'factual' 
orientation , as opposed to a 'theoretical' one (cf. Leech 1971:75) . 
A state/event may be coded as unlikely with grounds through conceptually opaque 
forms which do not signal participant or circumstantial modality : 
83. If Jane left tomorrow , we'd be in trouble 
84. If Jane were leaving now , things could get very difficult 
85. I wish Jane would leave 
Here the 'temporal distance' of 'past' forms is used to code the hypothetical 
distance of an event which is deemed unlikely to occur . But again there is the 
implication that speaker has grounds for so thinking , as I argued in 5.3.1 above . 
5.3.2.2 The grammatical coding of possibility without grounds 
GRANHATICAL COOING OF POSSIBILITY WITHOUT GROUNDS 
temporal opacity with 	 condition/consequence forms 
modals can/could/say/might 
with grounds 	 without grounds 
condition clause read 	 condition clause is 




Possibility without grounds is often coded through temporally opaque forms which 
co-refer to modal auxiliaries , from which they code mood (cf. 3.3) : 
86. Jane could leave tomorrow 
87. Jane may/might/could : have left yesterday 
be leaving now 
In contrast to the use of may in 82 , can/could do not code participant or 
circumstantial modality , and therefore they do not code grounds : while may has a 
'factual' orientation , can has a 'theoretical' orientation (Leech 1971:75) . That 
is , can/could merely imply that the speaker hypothesizes about the theoretical 
ability of the agent to perform a particular action (cf. Quirk et al. 1985:222/3) . 
The forms in 87 do not code grounds - there is no clear implication of participant 
or circumstantial modality - and consequently they are unlikely to be seen to 
suggest that the speaker has grounds unless there is further evidence of this 
through context . That is , the forms do not in themselves imply that grounds are 
available : they are essentially 'theoretical hypotheses' . 
With condition/consequence forms , it is not always clear whether or not grounds 
are implied : 
88. If (it's true that) 
 
she'll be here very soon Jane left yesterday 
is leaving now 
leaves tomorrow 
   
One interpretation , highlighted through the insertion of it's true that , is that 
the condition is supported by grounds . That is , [Jane leaves tomorrow] is read 
rather as an independent clause , introduced by that and thus to some extent both 
conceptually and linguistically distanced from the modifying if subordinator . In 
this case [Jane leaves tomorrow] is seen to code circumstantial modality , as it 
does as an independent clause which is conceptually opaque (present tense with 
future meaning) . 
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Alternatively , and particularly in the absence of the it's true that insertion , 
the condition clause is directly modified and conceptually circumscribed by the if 
subordinator , thereby no longer coding grounds , but instead implying an event 
which is merely theoretically possible . 
5.3.2.3 The grammatical coding of impossibility 
Impossibility is grammatically coded through conceptual opacity ie. through the use 
of 'past' forms whose temporal distance from the present is given a new , 
conceptual orientation , coding hypothetical distance : 
89. It's time you were in bed ("present reference : knowledge of impossibility,) 
90. I wish I were you 
	 ("present reference : knowledge of impassibility) 
91. Had Jane left yesterday , she'd have .. (oast ref.: belief in impossibility) 
92. It's not as though we were poor (present reference : knowledge) 
Wheras the conceptual opacity of unlikely with grounds often uses 'simple past' 
forms (as in 83-85) , the greater hypothetical distance of impassibility is often 
coded through 'past perfect' forms , where the greater temporal distance denotes 
greater hypothetical distance . The grammatical coding of impossibility has no 
clear future reference , because the future by definition must to some degree be 
uncertain . 
5.3.2.4 SUMMARY 
I have argued for a deep congruence between hypothetical meaning and the language 
we use to express it , a congruence which is summarized in figure 14 . Rather than 
explain this simply by using the traditional distinctions between degrees of 
probability in hypothetical meaning (eg. Leech 1989:188/9) , I have made a 
distinction between grounds and absence of grounds . I believe that these terms 
express quite accurately the congruence between form and meaning . If we have or 
imply we have grounds for making a hypothesis , then by definition our meaning is 
more contextually close than if we do not . 
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6. REFERENTIAL ABSTRACTION AND CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE : IDIOMS AND PROVERBS 
6.1 Overview 
In section 6 I argue that idioms and proverbs express a form of contextual distance 
whereby components of the ideational context (participants , objects , processes) 
are not separately coded or referred to in the language . Rather , idioms and 
proverbs express degrees of referential abstraction : proverbs are at the 
conceptual extreme here , so that expressions such as it takes two to tango cannot 
be segmented into discrete ideational referents (meaning) , and congruent with this 
there are degrees of lexical and inflectional restriction (form) . 
6.2 INTRODUCTION : DEFINING IDIOMS AND PROVERBS 
There has been much discussion in the literature about what exactly constitutes an 
idiom . Most definitions make reference to the way in which idioms lack the 'rule-
governed' systematicity of grammatical structures . According to Mitchell (1971) , 
for example , an idiom is : 
...immutable in the sense that its parts are unproductive in relation to 
the whole in terms of the normal operational processes of substitution , 
transposition , expansion etc. 
(1971:57) 
Thus idioms consist of parts which cannot be regularly substituted by alternatives. 
For example , in 93 the segment cook ---'s goose cannot be further broken down : 
93. This will cook Arthur's goose 
So that we cannot say this will cook Arthur's hen , for example . Cruise refers to 
this unproductive segment as a single semantic constituent (1986:37) , contrasting 
it with this , will and Arthur , which are substitutible and which are thus regular 
semantic constituents . 
Idioms and proverbs have a number of characteristic grammatical and lexical 
restrictions . Cruise points out that lexically , they behave like 'lexical 
complexes' (1986:37) . One test of this is that they resist interruption 
	 so that 
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we cannot say to pull someone's left leg . Another test is that they resist re-
ordering of parts : 
... What John pulled was his sister's leg has no idiomatic reading , 
wheras What john did was pull his sister's leg , which leaves the idiom 
'physically intact' , has . 
(1986:38) 
Grammatically , they are sometimes inflectionally restricted : we cannot say , for 
example , the bucket was kicked (Cowie 1981:230) , though we can sometimes inflect 
in other ways , as with he pulled his socks up / he must pull his socks up (Mathews 
1974) . 
But idioms are not all alike : some express meanings which have no clear 'literal' 
interpretation , others are still relatively transparent . This has led 
commentators to talk of degrees of idioaaticity . Cowie (1988) , for example , 
points out that some idioms , such as do a U-turn , has both a figurative sense and 
at the same time preserves a current literal interpretation , wheras blow the gaff 
or spill the beans have become less literal , more figurative .(1988:134/5) . 
Infact , there are two continua here . First there is the continuum of 
figurative/literal , a continuum which is essentially about meaning . Second , 
there is the continuum whereby idioms behave more or less like lexical items 
(resisting interruption and so on) , and more or less like fully productive 
structures (being inflectable etc.) . This second continuum is form oriented . 
Each of these separate continua have been extensively discussed in the literature . 
Cowie , for example , says that the accessibility of particular idioms to 
inflectional transformations remains largely a matter of the individual idiom , so 
that " there is a case for ... stating transformational restrictions in terms of 
individual composites" (1981:230) . But there has been relatively little discussion 
of how the two continua might be synthesized on a principled basis (but see 
discussion in Chafe 1970/Newmeyer 1974) . 
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In the following sections I propose that through the continuum of contextual 
distance it is possible to synthesize the two continua , so that we end up with a 
framework of analysis which helps to explain idioms and proverbs in terms of a 
form/meaning congruence . 
6.3 CONTEXTUAL COMPONENTS AND REFERENTIAL ABSTRACTION 
I referred above to Cruise's concept of semantic constituency , whereby those parts 
of an idiom which cannot be substituted by other linguistic items of similar rank 
are 'single semantic constituents' . So in 94 , [bury the hatchet] would form a 
single semantic constituent : 
94. Thank God Bill decided to [bury the hatchet] 
We could not , for example , substitute bury the hatchet with bury the axe or get 
rid of the hatchet . However , there is a very definite sense in which bury the 
hatchet' can be segmented into two components . Its meaning is something like forget 
an argument' or set aside a disagreement . Although an accurate paraphrase is 
context dependent , there is a definite sense in which both bury and hatchet have 
distinct referents in the ideational context : 
PROCESS 	 'OBJECT' 







So , while bury the hatchet is indeed a single semantic constituent (on the basis 
of Cruise's definition) , it has two contextual components ; that is , it refers 
separately to two specific features of a particular ideational context , a process 
and an 'object' or topic . This is not quite identical to Cowie's (1988) 
figurative/literal perspective . Bury the hatchet is more figurative than literal 
the hatchet is particularly opaque in this sense) ; yet it remains relatively 
'transparent' in terms of its two contextual references . 
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Other idioms have only one contextual component : 
95. Cecil [kicked the bucket] 
The paraphrase for kick the bucket is something like die or expire or snuff it ; 
whatever the choice , invariably we make reference to a single process in the 
ideational context . As Mitchell points out , the whole often corresponds to a 
cognitively similar single form" (1971:57) . 95 , then , has both one semantic and 
one contextual constituent . 
What , then , of proverbs ? It seems to me that the distinguishing feature of most 
proverbs is that they code no specific contextual features at all : 
96. It takes two to tango 
97. beggars can't be choosers 
Ofcourse there is a sense in which two in 96 and beggars/choosers in 97 refer to 
participants in the ideational context . However , even when these forms are used 
in specific situations , there is no specific reference to specific contextual 
components . Proverbs , that is , are essentially generic ; by their very nature 
they involve us in shifting out from the specifics of actual , concrete contextual 
referents into the world of generalization and abstraction . In this sense , 
proverbs are highly contextually distanced , because by virtue of their 
abstraction , they are remote from the specifics of definite contextual reference 
and contextual language . 
Indeed , I argue that just as proverbs so defined are more contextually distant 
than idiots , so idioms which code only one specific contextual component are more 
distanced than those which code two . There is , then , a continuum of contextual 
distance here ; a continuum in which we can observe a gradual shift from more to 
less coding of specific ideational components : 
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>increasing abstraction & contextual distance > 
CONTEXTUAL ---* 	  * 
	  * 	  -* 	  CONCEPTUAL 
contextual idioms : two idioms : one proverbs : no 
language contextual contextual specific 
components component contextual components 
Fig. 17 
6.4 THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
In 6.2 I mentioned a number of criteria - some lexical, some grammatical - which 
are used to describe idioms . Infect , all these criteria refer to ways in which 
language expressions are more or less fixed in terms of their component parts . 
Thus , while idioms and proverbs all involve a degree of lexical fixity by 
definition (and are all more contextually distanced than contextual language) , 
some are more fixed than others . That is , some have inflectable verb phrases , 
some do not ; some can be lexically interrupted , some cannot ; some can be 
reordered , some cannot . To maintain a form/meaning congruence in line with figure 
17 , it is necessary to argue that these various criteria can be predicted on the 
basis of their contextual components ; to argue , infact , that idioms with two 
clear contextual components are more variable (inflectable , accessible to re- 
ordering etc) than those with only one , and so on : 
+ 	  + 	  + + + 
: 	 CRITERIA FOR FIXITY :2 component idioms : 1 component idioms : proverbs 
+ 	  + 	  + + + 
Inflectable ? , 	 YES . . YES . . NO 
(coding past/present/future) : 1 
+ 	  + 	  + + + 
Passivizable ? , 
. 	
YES . 
. NO NO 
+ 	  
Can be re-ordered ? 





. NO 4: 
+ 
NO 
+ 	  + 	  + + + 
Can be interrupted ? YES . 
. (?)NO : (?)NO 
+ 	  + 	  + + 
Fig. 	 18 
Once again , then , degrees of contextual distance (in this case , degrees of 
abstraction) are congruent with degrees of conceptual lexico-grammar . The more 
linguistically 'fixed' , the less such expressions behave like transparent , 
independent clauses . 
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However , as with all components of contextual distance , we are dealing here not 
with stable demarcations but with the 'more or less' , with the 'shading' of one 
category into another which is implicit in the very concept of a continuum . Thus 
there are fuzzy boundaries , in terms of contextual reference , between 
proverbs/idioms , and between one and two component idioms ; I shall refer to this 
element of indeterminacy in the course of the following discussion . 
6.4.1 Proverbs : a form/meaning congruence 
Proverbs express meanings which are timeless , which are generic ; according to 
Seidl, they express "a general truth which relates to everyday experience" 
(Seidl/McMordie 1978:241) . They are highly abstracted from the concrete 
segmentation of ideational processes and participants . Congruent with this level 
of referential abstraction , proverbs show two features of highly conceptual 
language . Firstly , they are substantially lexically restricted , often resisting 
lexical interruption (98/99) or alteration (100) : 
?98. Necessity is the mother of [true] invention 
?99. A rolling stone gathers no [inconvenient] moss 
?100. The early riser catches the worm 
They are not , though , completely fixed in their lexical content . It is generally 
possible to interrupt a proverb where such an interruption emphasizes both literal 
and non literal meaning , and provided the lexical content of the original proverb 
remains unaltered : 
101. Beggars [simply] can't be choosers 
102. No news is [definitely] good news 
Furthermore , some proverbs appear more contextually abstracted than others . All 
that glitters is not gold is particularly abstract , while Too many cooks spoil the 
broth seems to suggest that some contextual , referential distinctions are being 
implied which may be identifiable and paraphrasable on particular occasions of use: 
103. Too many [cooks] 	 [spoil] 	 [the broth] 
Too many [decision makers] [confuse] [the operation] 
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In such cases there may be a congruent accessibility to increased lexical 
interruption: 
104. Too many [self appointed] cooks [may completely] spoil the broth 
Proverbs are generally subject to tight inflectional restriction , so that any 
shift of verbal inflection is unacceptable : 
?105. Better the devil you knew 
?106. A rolling stone will gather no moss 
What these inflections do , in effect , is suggest that there is a particular , 
definite referential framework , a specific context which is being built into the 
syntactic form of the proverb : reference to a past state in 105 , and perhaps to a 
future event in 106 . Such specificity is incongruous given the timeless quality 
intended by the proverb. 
6.4.2 One component idioms : the form/meaning congruence 
My concern here is only with idioms with atleast one verb phrase , so that 
expressions such as at peace with and in the face of are not my concern . Where 
such verbal idioms have only one contextual constituent , this constituent is 
invariably a specific process (state/event) in the ideational context . Ofcourse 
in expressions such as Bill kicked the bucket , there is also a participant 
(Bill) , but my interest is strictly in the idiom itself . 
I include most phrasal verbs within the category of one component idioms . 
Because such expressions make specific contextual reference to an ideational 
process , the language which carries this reference - the verb phrase - can be 
inflected to code past , present or future references : 
107. Bill kicked the bucket 	 108. Jim Pulled 	 : a fast one 
has kicked 
will 	 kick 
had pulled 
was pulling 
109. I gave Jane the slip 	 110. Bill reads between the lines 
have given was reading 
will give has read 
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Note how expressions such as 109 and 110 appear to code an object - the slip , the 
lines - as well as a process . However , in terms of the actual , non literal 
reference , these words are all part of the verb phrase . That is , a 'contextual' 
paraphrase of 109 does not attach a referent to slip ; rather , give the slip codes 
a single process which we might paraphrase as evade or escape from . 
But because these expressions code only one feature of the ideational context , 
they are still quite restricted in form . Thus they cannot be passivized (a process 
which involves re-ordering of parts (111/2) , nor can they be interrupted when such 
interruption is consistent only with the literal meaning (113) ; however , as with 
proverbs , lexical additions which enhance or emphasize the non literal meaning are 
sometimes acceptable (114/5) 
*111. The bucket was kicked by Bill *112. The slip was given to Jane by Bill 
?113. Bill read [very carefully] between [all] the lines 
114. Jim pulled a [very] fast one 	 115. He's fallen [completely] in love 
6.4.3 Two component idioms : the form/meaning congruence 
Two component idioms are those which make reference both to a process and to an 
'object' or other associated argument in the ideational context . Because they are, 
in this sense , more referential to the ideational context (ie. they refer to more 
contextual components) , they are less conceptual , and have more of the 
characteristics of independent clauses : 
















the house/Office etc. 
the upper hand 





Self evidently , each of these examples can be inflected to code 
past/present/future reference , as with one component idioms . They are , in 
addition , somewhat more accessible to passivization/reordering : 
120. The ice was broken by Jane 	 121. The fort was held by Bill 
122. The upper hand was gained by Liz 
	 123. The ball was set rolling by Jane 
Most often such two component idioms have a verb phrase (hold) and a noun phrase 
(the fort) which are associated by the same kind of logical role relationship which 
exists between their contextual paraphrases ('attend to - the [house]) . In other 
words , Sill held the fort represents an agent/process/patient frame in just the 
same way as its paraphrase does . In contrast , a one component idiom -such as Bill 
kicked the bucket - is only agent/process/patient in its non literal , idiomatic 
sense . I think that the kind of congruence between literal (contextual) and non 
literal (idiomatic) meaning helps in explaining the greater linguistic flexibility 
of two component idioms . That is , we can passivize 120-123 just as we can 
passivize their contextual paraphrases : the proceedings were started by Jane . 
Newmeyer (1974) makes a very similar point to this . According to Newmeyer , idioms 
which passivize - pcp the question , burn one's fingers , spill the beans - have 
two crucial features in common : 
First , the predicates in their literal senses ... allow passivization . 
One's leg can be pulled literally as well as idiomatically . Secondly , the 
actual meanings of these idioms ... contain Passive-governing predicates . 
Thus one can say that 'someone was teased' (someone's leg was pulled) , 
that 'peace was made' (the hatchet was buried) 
	
 We also find a host 
of idioms which do not passivize . Among them are the following : kick the 
bucket , shoot the bull , blow one's too .... These all contain semantic 
one-place predicates . These idioms may be paraphrased very roughly as die , 
talk ... and explode . 
(1974:329/30) 
With lexical interruption , the fact that it is not only the verb phrase but also 
the noun phrase which refers to a contextual component means that any interruption 
which modifies the NP is acceptable , provided it is semantically congruent with 
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both literal and non literal meanings : 
124. She [spilled] 	 [all the beans] this time ! 
[told (him)] [everything about Al 
125. He's finally agreed to [bury] 
	 [a very old hatchet] 
[forget.] [a very old argument] 
There is , then , a general tendency whereby two component idioms can be 
interrupted on a wider scale than one component idioms or proverbs . With the 
latter , most permissible interruptions perform an emphasizing function (114/5) . 
With two component idioms , more context specific lexical insertions are possible , 
as in 124 and 125 above . 
6.5 SUMMARY 
In figure 17 I outlined a continuum of contextual distance which extends from 
contextual/transparent language through to proverbs which are highly restricted 
both lexically and grammatically . Congruent with this is a semantic continuum 
which represents increasing degrees of referential abstraction from clear coding of 
ideational components . It is , I have emphasized , a matter of continuum rather 
than of discrete , self contained categories , and thus the form/meaning congruence 
needs to be appraised in these terms . It has been necessary , given limitations on 
space , to illustrate the hypothesis here only with respect to a small number of 
linguistic examples , but in Appendix B I provide a much fuller list of the 
expressions which fall into each of my three categories . 
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7. INTERPERSONAL MEANING AND CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE 
7.1 World to words : contextual distance and interpersonal meaning 
My concern here is largely with the category of suasive speech act expressions , 
and with the extent to which such expressions code conceptual meaning and show 
congruent features of conceptual lexico-grammar . In section 7 I simply provide an 
overview of interpersonal meaning , since all of chapter five is devoted to 
expanding on the interpersonal component . 
How is interpersonal meaning coded in language ? At the contextual end of the 
continuum of contextual distance , language codes only ideational meanings , 
expressing what Halliday refers to as "the observer function of language , language 
as a means of talking about the real world" (1970:143) . At the conceptual end , 
language specifically codes elements of the interpersonal context , thereby giving 
clear expression to what Halliday calls "the intruder function of language" 
(1975:17) . So in terms of the functional coding of language , the continuum of 
contextual distance represents a development from simply 
observing/reporting/describing at the contextual end , through to the specific 
lexico-grammatical coding of interpersonal engagement at the conceptual end . 
Searle (1979) provides a very clear way of distinguishing between these two 
orientations : 
Some illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words 
..to match the world , others to get the world to match the words. Assertions 
are in the former category , promises and requests are in the latter . 
(1979:3) 
Searle's words to world corresponds to Halliday's observer function , while world 
to words matches his intruder function . These concepts relate to the continuum of 
contextual distance in the following way 
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contextual : no interpersonal coding 
observing/describing : words to world 
conceptual : interpersonal coding 
 
intruding : world to words 
 
increasing contextual distance 
   
Fig. 19 
   
I identify three elements of conceptual meaning which are specifically relevant to 
the coding of suasion . The first I call interlocutor dependence ; that is , 
signalling that a future action , desired by one interlocutor , is subject to the 
willingness of another : 
126. Could you do the shopping ? 
127. Shall I give you a hand ? 
The more such interlocutor dependence is coded in the language , the more the 
speaker tends to use conceptual forms : forms which are opaque , and which are 
lexically and inflectionally restricted . 
My second meaning element I call speaker determinacy : the more clearly the speaker 
expresses his/her personal and authoritative commitment to the bringing about of an 
action , the more determinate is his or her meaning : 
128. I order you to do the shopping ! 
Speaker determinacy is closely related to participant determinacy (section 4) and 
participant modality (section 5) , which are its ideational counterparts . The more 
such determinacy is coded , the more likely it is that conceptual forms will be 
used -forms which are lexically and inflectionally restricted . 
The third element is circumstantial justification . This involves the implication 
that there are grounds within the ideational context to justify the hearer's 
performing action X , while the speaker holds back from signalling personal 
commitment : 
144 
129. Perhaps you ought to do the shopping 
Forms which clearly code this meaning are generally opaque , but are more open to 
lexical and inflectional variation . 
With interpersonal meaning , the continuum of contextual distance runs from the 
coding of ideational (but not of interpersonal) meaning at the contextual end , 
through to the clear lexico-grammatical coding of interpersonal meaning in any of 
the three ways I outlined above : 
contextual/ideational coding 
	 conceptual/interpersonal coding 
implicatures 	 interpersonal coding (examples 126-129) 
increasing contextual distance 
	  
Fig. 20 
7.2 CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE , INTERPERSONAL CODING AND THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
7.2.1 Coding the interpersonal context : want and willing 
Halliday's ideational component concerns the.participants , processes , objects and 
things which form the substance of what is being talked about (cf. 2.2.2) ; in 
contrast , the interpersonal component is the component through which the speaker 
adopts a role ... vis-a-vis the participants in the speech situation , and also 
assigns roles to the other participants ..." (1975:17) . 
When the speaker codes interlocutor dependence (as in 126/7) , s/he necessarily 
assigns a role both to speaker and to hearer : one role has to do with willingness 
that action X should be implemented , the other has to do with volition - coding 
the want that A'be brought about . These two roles can be briefly summarized as 
WILLING and WANT (Mitchell 1981) . Brown and Levinson talk about this same 
distinction in terms of the communicative parameters which they express . The WANT 
component keys in to the desire to be unimpeded in getting something done ; the 
WILLING component keys in to the desire to save face , to be approved of in 
certain respects (1978:63) . 
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When speaker codes speaker determinacy , it is the desire to remain unimpeded 
(want) which takes priority over the desire to save face (willing) , as in 128 . 
7.2.2 Conceptual lexico-grammar & the form/meaning congruence 
When interlocutor dependence or strong speaker determinacy are coded in the 
language , we tend to find that such language is lexically and inflectionally 
restricted . Strong speaker determinacy cannot occur with strong interlocutor 
dependence , because dependence by definition reduces the level of possible 
determinacy . Thus the inflectional and lexical restrictions of 134/5 are largely 
on account of speaker determinacy : 
134 I order you to : leave 	 135 I order you to : ?hear 	 :John 
*be leaving 	 : ?understand 
Here the conceptual constraints which the speaker's determinacy places on 
the hearer is paralleled by and congruent with the linguistic constraints 
on inflectional and lexical choice . 
Similarly , strong interlocutor dependence cannot occur with strong determinacy , 
so that the inflectional (136) and lexical (137) restrictions below are largely on 
account of the coding of interlocutor dependence : 
?136 Could you : help me ? 	 ?137 Could you 	 hear me ? 	 directive) 
*be helping me ? 	 : understand John ? 
Conceptually , the expression of interlocutor dependence implies that the 
action of one interlocutor is constrained by its dependence on the 
sanction of another . This conceptual constraint is again congruent with 
the linguistic constraints on inflectional and lexical choice . 
127-130 , then , occur at the conceptual extreme of the continuum in Fig. 19. Form: 
which code circumstantial justification (129) code neither interlocutor dependence 
nor strong (speaker) determinacy . Precisely because they imply justifying ground_ 
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within the ideational context , they are generally less contextually distant , 
conceptually closer to the ideational context and thus more accessible to lexical 
and grammatical variation : 
138 You ought to : go 	 to the convention 	 139 You ought to ;hear John ! 
be going : 	 ;understand John 
In 131 the speaker holds back from clearly constraining the hearer's 
freedom of action : he implies merely this action is in your interests . 
Congruent with this , the complement VP is less linguistically constrained 
being less inflectionally or lexically restricted . 
So the continuum of contextual distance , applied to the interpersonal context , 
looks as follows : 




	 coding of circumstantial justification 1 
increasing use of restricted conceptual forms 	 clear interloc.dependence 
Fig. 21 
7.3 SUMMARY 
I have argued that the clear lexico-grammatical coding of the interpersonal context 
involves coding of either interlocutor dependence or speaker determinacy or 
circumstantial justification . This can be represented on a continuum of contextual 
distance (fig 20/21) , whereby the strongest interpersonal coding (speaker 
determinacy and interlocutor dependence) is congruent with the greatest lexical and 
grammatical restriction . 
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8. GRAMMAR , SYSTEM AND RULE : THE NATURE OF LINGUISTIC KNOWLEDGE 
8.1 Introduction 
In this final section I step back from the detailed analysis of conceptual 
meanings , and consider some of the wider implications of the continuum of 
contextual distance . Grammarians are accustomed to talking of grammar and 
grammatical structures in terms of language which is rule based (cf. discussion of 
Chomsky and Halliday in chapter one) . Although the rigid , almost scientific 
framework of TG has undergone considerable criticism and modification (Brown 1982), 
there is still a definite trend towards equating grammar with rule , neglecting the 
role of context and lexis , and concentrating - by and large - only on superficial 
correspondences between form and meaning . The more we look at relationships 
between grammar and lexis and context , the more we are likely to find evidence of 
a deeper interdependency , an interdependency which shows that the coding of 
meaning is not a simple matter of grammatical rule and lexical exemplification . 
What the continuum of contextual distance demonstrates , I believe , is that there 
is no simple , categorical definition of grammatical structure in relation to the 
meaning it expresses . An exposition of grammatical rule is simply not enough ; 
conceptual meanings are dependent on particular combinations of grammatical and 
lexical and contextual factors . However , although such a view is hard to trace in 
the grammar books , it is grist to the mill for those linguists whose work is based 
within formulaic language . Pawley and Syder , as I mentioned in chapter one , look 
at aspects of this , talking in terms of lexicalization , and defining lexicalized 
expressions as units : 
... of clause length or longer whose grammatical form and lexical content 
is wholly or largely fixed ... 
(1983:191) 
This throws up a crucial question : since both formulaic language and 'fully 
grammatical' language (of the kind I have been looking at) have in common a degree 
of lexical and grammatical 'fixity' , are we justified in making a rigid 
distinction between the two ? . The difference is one of degree : formulaic units 
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may well be stored largely as lexicalized units , but many lexico-grammatical forms 
also have some of the features of lexicalized , formulaic expression. 
8.2 IDIOMS , SPEECH ACTS & GRAMMATICIZATION : THE GRAMMAR/LEXIS CONTINUUM 
I began this chapter with a discussion of Givon's concept of functional grammar and 
grammaticization . At this point it is worth adding a cautionary note . There is , 
I believe , a danger of interpreting the term grammaticization too narrowly , of 
implying that what counts is grammar but not lexis . But on Givon's own account , 
the logical extreme of grammaticization is lexicalization 
If language constantly "takes discourse structure and condenses it - via 
syntacticization - into syntactic structure," one would presumably expect 
human languages to become increasingly syntacticized over time . In fact 
this is not the case . Rather , syntactic structure in time ERODES via 
processes of ... LEXICALIZATION . 
(1979a:83) 
A full consideration of this point would be outside the scope of this enquiry . The 
point is worth making , though , that through the continuum of contextual distance, 
we can 'chart' the emergence of conceptual lexico-grammar : what this means , in 
most cases , is increasing lexical predictability (through lexical restriction) as 
well as increasing inflectional restriction and opacity . Conceptual forms , we 
might say , show evidence both of grammaticization and of lexicalization . There is 
no clear dividing line between the two . Two components of conceptual meaning which 
have this characteristic - referential abstraction (idioms/proverbs) and 
interpersonal coding (speech acts) - have been seen as so lexicalized , so 
unsystematic in their form/meaning relationship that they warrant separate 
treatment from the 'main body' of rule based structure . But how justified is such 
a view ? 
It has been argued that speech act expressions are not accessible to rule-governed, 
systematic description . Thus Brumfit (1979) argues that 'functions' and functional 
exponents , immune to systemization , should not form part of organised syllabus 
content . This view has recently been echoed by Crombie (1985a:13/1A) . What I 
have tried to demonstrate in section seven is that speech act expressions are 
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subject to very much the same kind of deep notional pressures as are other , 
explicitly ideational categories of language form . No doubt it is true that the 
former are generally more context dependent than the latter . Nevertheless in both 
cases there is a continuum at work : just as implicatures are context dependent 
because their illocutionary force remains uncoded in the language , so other , 
interpropositional values remain off record and context dependent where they are 
not lexico-grammatically coded : 
149. Jane walked in . Bill fainted ( sequence ? simultaneity ? causal ?) 
Similarly , both speech act expressions and expressions of (for example) causal 
determinacy can be lexically and inflectionally restricted , and in both cases such 
restrictions appear as linguistic reflections of common conceptual meanings . 
The other component of conceptual meaning which is frequently considered to be 
relatively unsystematic or unproductive in its linguistic form is referential 
abstraction : idioms and proverbs . As with formulaic language , there is no doubt 
that the lexical content of idioms is more predictable , more restricted than is 
the case , say , with expressions of causal determinacy or of participant modality. 
As I pointed out in section six , grammarians generally accept that idioms are 
'part grammatical , part lexical', and the shortcomings of a 'purely' grammatical 
or a 'purely' lexical account of idioms are well known (Weinreich 1969) . But , as 
with speech act expressions , what is missing from such accounts is any principled 
attempt to 'explain' the form/meaning congruence of idioms in terms which share 
common ground with other , more 'productive' areas of language form . 
In short , there is a danger of over-compartmentalizing , of saying in somewhat 
simplistic terms that speech act expressions and idioms (like formulaic language) 
fall into the relatively unsystematic , middle ground between grammar and lexis 
while what is left is essentially productive , explicable through grammatical rule. 
An alternative view , and the one which forms the basis of this thesis , is do away 
entirely with this either/or approach , to fully take on board the fundamental 
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interdependency of grammar , lexis and context , and to make central the concept of 
continua and the deep functional motivations for lexico-grammar which they help to 
represent and explain . 
8.3 THE MENTAL LEXICON AND DEGREES OF ANALYSABILITY 
Pawley and Syder's description of lexicalized units - in terms of their degrees of 
grammatical and lexical fixity - is not entirely distinct from the kind of 
inflectional and lexical restriction typical of the conceptual form/meaning 
congruence . They refer to this semi-fixed class of lexicalized forms as a "phrase 
book with grammatical notes" , which occupies an intermediate position between the 
general grammatical patterns (described in terms of productive rules ...) and the 
list of unitary lexical items" (1983:220) ; their conclusion is: 
any strict compartmentalization [between productive rules and unitary 
lexical items] would not truly reflect the native speaker's grammatical 
knowledge if the facts are ... that lexicalization and productivity are 
each matters of degree . 	 (1983:220) 
Clearly there is a distinction between restricted conceptual forms and fully 
lexicalized , formulaic expressions such as How are ,vou ? . But the difference , in 
language terms , is essentially one of degree . Pawley and Syder are largely 
concerned with the distinction between fixed expressions , such as how are ,vou , 
and semi-fixed expressions , such as lead up the garden path/be led up the garden 
path . But the applications of the above quote are more far reaching than this , as 
I have already suggested . 
What are the implications here for the mental storage of linguistic knowledge ? 
According to Peters (1983) , expressions may be stored in the mental lexicon , as 
single lexicalized units , or they may be constructed de novo from discrete 
morphemes : language users have access both to a mental lexicon and to linguistic 
knowledge actively processed utilizing the productive rules of syntax . Grammar and 
lexis are thus seen to be complementary in a -dynamic and redundant way (1983:90). 
I have argued that many conceptual form/meaning pairings are subject to lexical and 
inflectional restrictions , and that it would be difficult to account for these 
151 
restrictions purely in terms of productive syntactic rule . Consequently there must 
be a case for hypothesizing that the mental storage of conceptual forms may itself 
involve some form of interaction between analysed knowledge of productive 
grammatical rules on the one hand , and a more intuitive 'knowledge' about the 
grammar/lexis/context interdependence on the other . 
Bialystok (1978/81/82) identifies two 'knowledge sources' : analysability , which 
concerns the extent of our conscious , metalinguistic knowledge of language 
structure , and automaticity , dealing with the "relative access the learner has to 
the knowledge , irrespective of its degree of analysis" (1982:183) . According to 
Bialystok , if we have unanalysed knowledge of certain linguistic forms , then : 
We may , for example , distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences 
without being aware of the basis of judgement .... Although unanalysed 
knowledge is structured , the mental representation does not include access 
to that structure , and so transformations and operations on that knowledge 
are precluded . 
(1982:183) 
It seems to me intuitively likely that subtle interdependencies between grammar , 
lexis and context , and the kind of mutual modification between them which I 
described in section 7 , constitute knowledge which even for native speakers is 
likely to remain only partially analysed . That is not to say that there is no case 
for confronting these interdependencies explicitly in the language classroom ; but 
what needs to be borne in mind is that there are limits to the clear , rule based 
derivation of such form/meaning congruences . As Sharwood Smith (1988) has put it : 
A closer look at the issues ... reveals how simplistic such inferences 
are and how dubious the distinction is between two theoretically distinct 
types of knowledge where no allowance is made for different degrees of 
explicitness and the possibility of interaction between different types 
of competences . 
(1988:51) 
Yet for Bialystok , it is full analysability , which seems to presuppose a 
conscious , rule based ability to analyze language as system (1981:65) , which is 
the ultimate end-point : 
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development [of language proficiency] involves achieving an analysed 
understanding of 	
 information which was already known in less 
specialized forms . 
(1982:183) 
In short , different forms of language presuppose accessibility to different 
degrees of analysability . Generally speaking , the more lexically and 
grammatically restricted a particular form/meaning pairing is , and the more it is 
open to mutual modification between cotext and context , the less 'fully 
analysable' it is likely to be in Bialystok's sense . At the same time , such forms 
are , to a greater or lesser degree , both grammaticized and lexicalized , taking 
on some of the features of what Pawley and Syder refer to as lexicalized units . It 
is arguable , I think , that virtually all language forms and expressions may be 
best analyzed in terms of their place on one or more continua : continua which are 
based atleast in part on the notion that grammar and lexis , cotext and context are 
fundamentally interdependent . 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CAUSAL DETERMINACY : A FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
In chapter 3 (section 4) I introduced the idea of causal determinacy , and argued 
that using the continuum of contextual distance , we can observe how cause/effect 
relationships gradually get coded in the language . The type of cause/effect coding 
which is most lexically and inflectionally restricted is causal determinacy , which 
I defined in the following way : 
The degree to which a state or event is expressed as in itself 
anticipating or bringing about the occurrence of another state 
or event 
I suggested that there are two sources to which we can attribute causal 
determinacy: we can attribute it to the conscious intentional act of a participant 
(participant determinacy) , or to 'force of circumstances' (circumstantial 
determinacy) . I defined these two categories of determinacy as follows : 
PARTICIPANT DETERMINACY - where a participant is said to consciously 
anticipate or to bring about a new state of affairs . For example : 
1. Jane lied in order to embarrass me (Jane's action intentionally anticipates) 
2. Bill forced Fred to lie down (8111 intentionally brings about a result) 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETERMINACY - where a state/event is expressed as itself 
determining the occurrence of another state/event ,-irrespective of the 
volition of participants whose independence is constrained by force of 
circumstances . For example : 
3. Fred was murdered (Fred is viewed as the unaergoer , subject to force of 
circumstances beyond his control) 
4. Bill fell as a result of slipping on the ice (irrespective of Sill's wishes) 
What I want to do in chapter four is look in greater detail at some of the many 
ways in which participant and circumstantial determinacy become lexico- 
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grammatically coded . This coding involves the use of conceptual forms - forms 
which are lexically and grammatically restricted , and which are opaque . The 
stronger the degree of participant or circumstantial determinacy , the more 
restricted is the language which expresses it . 
The format of chapter four is as follows . In section two I will look at examples 
of participant determinacy 
	 and in section three at circumstantial determinacy . 
In both cases I begin with an overview , summarizing the relevant forms of 
conceptual lexico-grammar together with those aspects of conceptual meaning which 
with which they are congruent . This is followed , both in section two and in 
_ section three , by a more detailed analysis of a selection of lexico-grammatical 
forms 	 in which I seek to establish through detailed exemplification how it is 
that each linguistic configuration is functionally motivated , and codes one or 
other aspect of determinacy . 
2. PARTICIPANT DETERMINACY AND THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
2.1 DEGREES OF PARTICIPANT DETERMINACY ; ANTICIPATION AND CONTROL 
I have defined determinacy in terms of a cause expressed as 'either anticipating or 
bringing about' a certain effect . What we have here is a distinction between two 
types of determinacy . Firstly , there is anticipation , where the effect is not 
actually brought about the determinate cause ie. where the effect does not clearly 
take place , but remains a mental image : 
5. She hopes to win the competition 
6. Greg lied in order to save Jane's life 
By definition , anticipation is a relatively weak form of determinacy , since the 
effect does not necessarily take place . Thus winning the competition (5) and 
saving Jane's life (6) are effects which are perceived as mental images - effects 
which are intended or desired but which are not directly realized . But even within 
the category of anticipation . there are degrees of determinacy - we can anticipate 
the occurrence of a state/event more or less strongly 
	 The weakest form of 
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anticipation is expectation : where a participant believes X will occur , but does 
nothing consciously or actively to bring it about eg. I reckon she'll win . 
My second category , hope/wish , is stronger in the sense that the participant 
clearly has a personal stake : it is where a participant wishes for a state/event 
to take place , but again does nothing consciously to bring it about eg. she wants 
to win . Stronger still is the category of intention : here there is a strong 
implication of anticipated success (she intends to win) , and sometimes of 
preparatory action taken (she plotted to win) . 
If we move further along this continuum of increasing determinacy , we move out of 
anticipation and into the category of control - that is , expressing a cause which 
in itself implies the bringing about of a determined effect , as in 2 above . 
Within participant determinacy , I refer to this as preemption , where the 
participant unambiguously succeeds in bringing about (or preventing) a new 
state/event . Thus the conceptual end of the continuum of contextual distance looks 
as follows : 
ANTICIPATION 
expectation 
* 	 * 
hope/wish 	 intention 
CONTROL 
preemption 
increasing conceptual distance/Conceptual language 
Fig. 1 Continuum of contextual distance : coding of high causal determinacy 
What figure one shows is that segment of the continuum of contextual distance which 
represents lexico-grammatical coding of high determinacy : that is , it is only a 
part , and the most contextually distanced part , of the whole continuum which I 
presented in chapter 3 (4.2.3) . The continuum in figure one , then , is located on 




no grammatical grammatical 	 expectation wish/desire intention preemption 
coding of 	 coding of 
cause/effect 	 cause/effect 	 lexico-grammatical coding of high determinacy 
Fig. 2 Entire continuum of contextual distance relating to participant determinacy 
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2.2 THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE : OVERVIEW 
In this section I identify and define four features of conceptual lexico-grammar 
which are increasingly in evidence as we move from expectation through to 
preemption ie. as we move towards the conceptual extreme of the continuum in figure 
1/2 . 
2.2.1 Inflectional restriction : from less to more restricted 
Many forms which lexico-grammatically code expectation and here/wish (relatively 
'low' on the continuum) are inflectable : 
7a I expected her to leave by 4.00 (expectation) 
7b I hope to be leaving 
have left 
(wish/desire) 
In contrast , forms which code more contextually distanced (ie. more determinate) 
meanings - such as preemption - are rarely open to such inflectional change : 
8. Jane forced Bill to leave 	 9. Bill prevented Jane from ; leaving 
?have left 	 :?having left 
?be leaving 
 
It seems to me that there is a direct link here between the degree to which the 
agent of the complement clause is able to act independently (more freedom in 7 , 
less in 8/9) , and the congruent inflectability of the complement clause . In other 
words , the more conceptually constrained , the more inflectionally constrained . 
What we find is a gradual development from inflectional change which if fully 
acceptable (expressing relatively low determinacy) , through a range of forms 
whose inflectional change is only marginally acceptable , and ending up with 
inflections coding high determinacy which show , as with 8 , very tight 
inflectional restriction . 
However , it is important to recognize that these inflectional variations are 
dependent on the kind of verb used in the complement clause . For example , verbs 
which denote actions which are intrinsically punctual , or of short duration , 
cannot be given a be 	 -in g inflection 	 even if the degree of determinacy is such 
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that this kind of inflectional variation would otherwise be possible . Compare , 
then , 10 below with 7a above 
10. I expect her to slam 	 : the door in my face 
The slamming 
2.2.2 Opacity & that complementation : from independent to dependent clause 
Generally speaking , the distinction between temporal and conceptual opacity does 
not correspond clearly or systematically with distinctions between one form of 
participant determinacy and another . All categories of participant determinacy may 
be coded through opaque forms , wheras less conceptual forms which code a general 
cause/effect relation are rarely opaque : 
11. [Jane left] because [it was getting late] 
But there is one important distinction : expressions of relatively low participant 
determinacy (expectation etc.) do not generally require opaque coding , since they 
can very often be coded through that + independent clause . Expressions of high 
determinacy , on the other hand , are necessarily opaque - compare 12a with 12b 
below : 
12a I expected (that) [she was going to leave on Thursday] 
*12b I forced her (that) she was going to leave on Thursday 
Indeed , it is a feature of conceptual forms that they resemble independent clauses 
(ie. clauses which can stand alone) less and less as they become more determinate, 
contextually distant and grammaticized (cf. Givon 1980:337 and chapter 3:1.3.2) . 
So it is that forms coding expectation (relatively weak determinacy :12a) can 
generally take this kind of 'independent' complementation , while forms coding 
preemption (much stronger determinacy) do not (12b) . 
As with inflection , restrictions on the independent form of complement clauses are 
congruent with conceptual restrictions on effects which are constrained by 
	
determinate causes . The more strongly an effect is determined 	 the less it is 
likely to be coded as a independent clause . 
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Furthermore , there is a significant correspondence between inflectional 
restriction and the coding of aspect within opaque VP's . Forms which are 
inflectionally restricted are also forms whose opaque verb phrase does not 
independently code aspect , as with [leave] in example 8 and [leaving] in example 9 
above . So , whenever I refer to VP's which are subject to tight inflectional 
restriction , it is invariably the case that these VP's are also highly opaque , 
coding neither past/present/future nor aspect . 
2.2.3 Lexical restriction : from less to more restricted 
I pointed out in chapter 3 that stative verbs generally signal states which are not 
brought about through volitional action (see appendix A) . They are thus 
incongruous with forms which presuppose that a volitional action is being 
determined : 
?13. Jane forced Bill to : resemble 	 : Harry 
understand 
In very general terms , forms which code weak anticipation (expectation or 
wish/desire) are rather more acceptable with *statives than forms (such as 13) which 
code strong control , so that lexical restriction increases as more conceptual and 
determinate meaning is expressed : 
14. Jane : expected : Bill to : resemble 	 : Harry 
wanted : 	 understand 
In 14 , for example , the weakness of Jane's anticipation is such that it exerts no 
clear influence on Bill , who remains free to act independently . Since no 
intentional influence is involved , there is no constraint on the nature of Bill's 
expected action , which may or may not be volitional . This increasing 
unacceptability of statives along the continuum of contextual distance is , though, 
no more than a general trend (Givon 1975:62/3) . 
It is worth stressing that many forms which code participant determinacy involve 
not simply grammatical but clearly lexico-grammatical coding . Thus the 
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inflectability of the verb in the complement clause in 7-9 can be seen partly as a 
response to the degree of determinacy implicit in the main verb : force implies 
much greater determinacy than expect or hope . 
So the overall pattern is : 
  
opaque forms optional 
that + 'independent' clause 







opaque forms necessary 
that complementation unacceptable 
maximum lexical restriction 
minimum inflectability 
 
intention 	 preemption 
Fig. 2 : High determinacy (participant) : increasing conceptual form/Contextual 
distance 
There are a great many verbs and forms which code the various stages along this 
continuum , and with this substantial diversity of language comes an increase in 
the complexity of the form/meaning correspondences . Each of the 4 categories 
introduced above (expectation etc.) can be further broken down , so that each has a 
strong and a weak determinacy : by developing the semantic framework in this way , 
it is possible to account for many more form/meaning congruences . In the following 
sections I expand considerably on the above scheme . 
2.3. EXPECTATION : THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
Expectation is a relatively weak form of anticipation (cf. figure 1) , and as such 
it may be expressed through forms which are relatively inflectable , lexically 
unrestricted , and relatively 'independent' . . Dealing first with independence , 
many forms which code expectation can be used with the optional complementizer 
that , which introduces a clause which is independent ie. which can stand alone , 
and which is thus not necessarily opaque : 
15. I : expect 
reckon 
anticipate 
(that) [she's going to win] 
  
I will argue later that many of the more determinate form/meaning congruences 
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cannot take this kind of independent clause structure , so that the greater the 
level of determinacy , the less forms resemble relatively ungrammaticized 
independent clauses , as predicted by Givon (1980:337) and as discussed in chapter 
3 (1.3.2) . 
The absence of direct causal influence between the agent of the main clause and the 
agent of the complement clause leaves the latter relatively unconstrained (as I 
argued in 2.2 above) , so that even with opaque forms , there are no clear 
inflectional (16) or lexical (17) restrictions : 
16. I expect 
reckon 
to hear from her 
be hearing from her 
have heard from her 
soon 
17. I expect to see him soon 
reckon understand most of what they say 
recognize him even after 10 years 
2.4 HOPE/WISH : THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
The category of hove/Wish is a little more complex than expectation . In general 
terms , it implies a higher degree of determinacy , stronger anticipation than is 
the case with expectation , because the main clause agent has a clear personal 
stake in the occurrence or otherwise of the desired state/event . With 
expectation , there is no sense of personal involvement - I expect X to happen 
but I don't care whether it does or not - but when we use verbs such as hove or 
want or desire there is implicitly a clear element of such involvement . But there 
are degrees of personal commitment , even within the category of hove/Wish . Some 
verbs , such as want/prefer/hope , signal a degree of personal commitment which is 
less strong , less intense than forms such as long to or adjectival forms such as 
eager to . I therefore distinguish between two sub-categories here , low personal 
commitment and high personal commitment : 
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HOPE/WISH 
where the main clause agent has a personal 
commitment to the realization of a state/event 
but does nothing explicitly to bring it about 
Fig. 3 
Low Personal Commitment 
want to 
hope to 
would like to 








Givon (1980) also talks about 'emotional commitment' as a marker of the degree of 
'binding' between main and complement clauses : however , since his perspective is 
cross-linguistic , he looks only at a very few verbs in English , and his 'binding 
scale' (which I referred to in chapter 3/section 1.3.2) is somewhat different from 
the continuum presented here (1980:369) . 
What I would like to argue is that the distinction in figure 3 is effectively a 
distinction between two adjacent levels of determinacy , so that the stronger the 
implicit personal commitment , the more determinate , the more contextually 
distanced . Congruent with this , stronger commitment is expressed through forms 
which are more inflectionally restricted . Thus relatively low personal commitment 
is coded through forms which are somewhat more inflectable (18) than relatively 











her work by tomorrow 
       
longs to 
desires to 
is keen to 







      
With 19 the desired result (finishing her work) is subject to greater determinacy , 
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and is more explicitly constrained through Jane's stronger emotional commitment to 
bringing it about . 
However , I do not wish to argue that the distinction between 18 and 19 is 
unambiguous , nor that the inflections in 19 are completely unacceptable . What we 
have , rather , is a distinction between full acceptability (18) and cases of 
marginal acceptability , rather than a clear cut distinction between 
'acceptable/grammatical' on the one hand , and unacceptable/ungrammatical on the 
other . Furthermore , there is no clear congruence between low/high commitment and 
the use of relatively transparent clauses . 
As with expectation , forms which code wish/desire are not generally subject to 
lexical restriction , because the degree of determinacy between 'cause' and 
'effect' is limited : in neither case does the agent of the main clause actually 
attempt to bring about a new state/event , or impose his/her volition such that the 
agent of the complement clause is directly constrained . Thus the use of most 
stative verbs is perfectly acceptable : 
20. Bill wants to 
hopes to 
is keen to 
longs to 
hear from his son 
understand the poem 
enjoy himself 
  
2.5 INTENTION : THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
2.5.1 Intention : the semantic perspective 
With intention we have a category which is clearly more determinate than either 
expectation or wish/desire . Intention I define in terms of a clear intent to bring 
about a certain state/event . As with wish/desire , there are sub-categories here 
which have to do with degrees of determinacy within the overall category of 
intention , categories which each have their own particular form/meaning 




where participant has a clear intent to 






no clear direct 
pressure exerted 
eg. remind X to 
stronger 
determinacy 
direct pressure exerted; 
(sometimes) implication 
of agent power/authority 
eg. choose X to 
weaker 
determinacy 
no kind of 
action taken 






I distinguish firstly between self-action - that is , the intention of a 
participant to personally bring about a state/event - and other-action , where the 
causal participant intends to get someone else to act . Within each of these 
categories , there are degrees of determinacy : degrees by which the main clause 
agent constrains the freedom of action of the complement clause agent . With 
other-intention there are two distinct levels of determinacy . One , which implies 
relatively low determinacy , involves verbs such as remind or recommend , where the 
intended action is only indirectly and impersonally sought -that is , there is no 
clear sense in which the main clause agent exerts any kind of direct pressure on 
the agent of the complement clause in order to get X done : 
21. He ; reminded Jim to check the accounts 
advised 
When used interpersonally , such forms code what I have called circumstantial 
justification (cf. chapter 3/7.2) . But some forms expressing other-action may 
signal stronger determinacy than this , as with 22 and 23 : 
22. He chose Jim to check the accounts 
23. He challenged Jim to check the accounts 
In 22 the main clause agent is understood to have a degree of power/authority to 
bring about a change of circumstances 	 while in both 22 and 23 the implication is 
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that the agent exerts direct pressure to get )(done , in contrast to 19 . 
With self-action , some forms signal that action is or will be put into effect 
which may in itself realize the intended result ; such forms signal a relatively 
high level of determinacy , as in 24 and 25 below 




to defeat her enemy 	 25.She left in order to embarrass him 
:rather than waste her time 
   
Thus the very concept of plotting or battling indicates that action is taken in 
order to achieve a determined result . Stronger determinacy is also indicated 
through forms which imply that a kind of preparatory action is underway (in the 
sense that the desired result is actively put forward/argued for) , and that the 
agent has a strong personal commitment to bringing X about in the face of potential 
opposition from others , as in 26 : 
26. She : argued for 
insisted on 
proposed 
reducing the level of taxation 
 
In contrast , other forms signal merely that the agent has a certain objective in 
mind , but not that any action is necessarily taken , so that the intended 
objective remains no more than a mental image . Thus 27 signals a level of 
determinacy which is weaker than 24-26 
27. She decided 
planned 
aimed 
to embarrass him 
   
In the next section I take these semantic distinctions (summarized in fig. 4) and 
argue for a form/meaning congruence which is different from one category to 
another . 
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2.5.2 INTENTION : THE LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
2.5.2.1 Overview 
weaker determinacy (self/others) stronger determinacy (self/others) 
can take that + complement clause 




do not take that complementation 
more inflectional restriction 
necessarily opaque 
lexically restricted 
increasing contextual distance/use of conceptual forms 
Fig. 5 Participant determinacy : intention & the form/meaning congruence 
The distinctions sketched out in 2.5.1 above are congruent with degrees of 
conceptual lexico-grammar : those forms which signal a stronger level of 
determinacy are also those forms which show more inflectional restriction , so that 
the more an intended result is strongly constrained/determined to take place , the 
more its linguistic expression is similarly constrained by inflectional 
restriction . 
Weaker determinacy can generally be expressed through that complementation , where 
the complement clause resembles the form of independent clauses which can stand 
alone . 
Virtually all forms coding intention are lexically restricted because (unlike 
expectation and wish/desire) the very concept of intentional action is incongruous 
with stative verbs . 
2.5.2.2 Other action : the form/meaning congruence 
Following on from figure 4 , I distinguish here between lower determinacy (where 
the main clause agent stands back from exerting direct pressure on the agent of the 
complement clause , as in 21) , and higher determinacy (where there is a clear 
implication of direct pressure , as in 22/23) . Expressions of lower determinacy 
(28) are generally more inflectable than expressions of higher determinacy (29/30), 
though the distinction is not clear cut : 
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28.  She advised 	 : me to 
reminded 








?? be leaving 
? have left 
by 4.00 
Though this congruence is by no means systematic : for example , some forms signal 
higher determinacy but can be inflected without difficulty , though they are 
generally forms which imply less agent authority than order or command: 
30. She : told : me to 	 be leaving : by 4.00 
urged : 	 : have left 
The level of determinacy here reflects the degree to which the main clause agent 
constrains the freedom of action of the agent of the complement clause . When 
strongly determinate verbs are used - order , command etc. - this level of 
constraint is higher than with verbs such as advise or recommend . The incongruity 
of the forms in 29 can be explained , I think , in precisely these terms : she 
ordered me to be leaving (29) sounds 'odd' because the be leaving inflection (in 
particular) seems to imply that the leaving is something which is not constrained 
to occur at a precise time : that is , the agent of leaving has a degree of freedom 
which is not implied with the form she ordered me to leave . 
In terms of that complementation , forms coding lower determinacy (31) are 
generally more likely to take complement structures which resemble independent 
clauses , and vica versa , so that with expressions of higher determinacy (as in 
32) we are virtually committed to using opaque forms : 





that [I should check the accounts] 
   





that [1 should check the accounts] 
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Again the congruence is not exact , but even in cases where high determinate verbs 
can take that complementation , there is a semantic distinction between the opaque 
form (34) and the that form (33) : 
33. We told him that [he should hurry up] 
34. We told him to hurry up 
The more independent complement clause structure of 33 seems to imply less 
determinacy , less constraint imposed on the agent of the complement clause than 
the fully opaque VP in 34 . This point has been noted by Yule (1986) , from whom I 
have taken these examples . He comments : 
The conceptual distance between the 'telling' and the 'hurrying up' in [33] 
appears to involve a lessening of control exerted by the causing 'source' 
over the resulting ... action . 
(1986:280) 
A similar point is made by Givon (1980:357) . Such a distinction is consistent with 
the continuum of contextual distance , and the increasing levels of 
grammaticization which it represents . That is , as language form becomes 
increasingly grammaticized (and contextually distant) , so it resembles less and 
less the form of independent clauses (Givon 1980:337) . 34 , which implies greater 
determinacy/contextual distance , also involves a (complement) clause structure 
which is less independent than 33 : in other words , the complement clause in 33 
can stand alone - [he should hurry up] while the fully opaque clause in 34 clearly 
cannot . 
2.5.2.3 Self action : the form/meaning congruence 
With self action , weaker determinacy involves the coding of intended actions for 
which no preparatory action is taken (aim to , mean to) . Stronger determinacy is 
coded in one of two ways . Firstly , by verbs which imply that action is taken in 
order to produce a result (fight to , lobby to) ; secondly , by verbs which imply 
that preparatory action is taken so that the desired outcome is actively argued for 
in the face of potential opposition from others (cf. 5.1 above) ; thus the 
causative action is, as it were , already underway - hence the stronger element of 
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determinacy . 
Forms which code weaker determinacy (35) are again somewhat more inflectable than 
forms which code strong determinacy (36-38) : 








the campaign before September 
(weak: mental image/no action taken) 
the campaign before September 
(strong : action taken) 
      
36. Bill plotted to 
struggled to 






     






the campaign at once 
(strong: action taken) 
  






the campaign before September 
(strong : preparatory action taken) 
As for that + independent clause complementation , forms coding weaker determinacy 
are split : some take that complementation , some do not (38) . Stronger 
determinacy is similarly split , but here the congruence is more systematic , so 
that virtually none of the 'action taken' category can be complemented in this way 




that [the campaign should be won before Sgotember] 







that [the campaign should be won before September] 





that [the campaign should be won before September] 
(strong : action taken) 





tend to signal a semantic distinction between weaker determinacy (with 'that') and 
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stronger determinacy (without 'that') : 
42. Jane lied in order to save Bill's life 
43. Jane lied in order that she could save Bill's life (less control/less direct) 
So , just as with other action , there is a general congruence between weaker 
determinacy (less contextually distanced and grammaticized) where the complement 
clause may take a more independent form , and stronger determinacy (more 
grammaticized) where it cannot . The apparent exception to this (40) can be 
explained because there is a definite sense in which preliminary action taken with 
respect to others implies less control , less determinacy than action taken which 
in itself may realize the intended result (as with 41) . 
I have not yet mentioned lexical restriction within the category of intention . 
What we find is that , irrespective of the self/other distinction , most 
expressions of intention are , by and large , incongruous with most stative verbs : 
?44. She : argued for hearing the news / recognizing the problem 
proposed 
?45. She : set out to : resemble the president / understand their plans 
plotted to 
2.6. PREEMPTION : THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
2.6.1 Overview 
Verbs which signal preemption are invariably presuppositional verbs : that is , 
they presuppose that the state/event referred to in the complement clause takes 
place (as in he forced her to leave ) or , equally definitely , does not take place 
(as in she failed to leave) . With preemption we reach the point of highest 
determinacy within the category of participant determinacy ; it is impossible to 
conceive of a determinate cause stronger than one which is expressed as definitely 
bringing about a certain effect . Yet , as with intention and wish/desire , there 
are sub categories here , which I present in fig. 6 : 
PREEMPTION 
where a causal action in itself brings about 





strongly determinate 	 less determinate 	 more determinate 
outcome is directly 	 outcome is indirectly 	 outcome is directly 
achieved or prevented 	 achieved 	 achieved or prevented 
succeed infremember to/learn to 	 help/get to 	 bully/cajole/charm/fool 
put off/delay/postpone/avoid 	 teach/cause 	 talk/provoke/flatter into 
fail to/omit to/get out of 	 force/train/Coach/incite/ 
evade/avoid/by means of 	 collar/commit/induce/bribe 
disqualify/ban/Prohibit 
Fig. 6 
The less determinate/indirect category in figure 5 involves verbs which imply that 
the success of the causative action may be unintended in a way which is more 
strongly implied than by any of the strongly determinate verbs , as in : 
46. Prospero inadvertently : caused 1 Caliban to 
helped 




The semantics of this kind of indirect causality has been extensively discussed 
(eg. by Givon 1975:62-64) . 
As to the congruence with form , all these forms (virtually without exception) are 
more or less uninflectable , a linguistic reflection of the very high degree of 
determinacy which they express . In other words , with preemption the high degree 
of constraint exerted by the agent of the main clause over the occurrence of the 
state/event in the complement clause is reflected in the constraints on 
inflectability 
Furthermore , virtually all the resulting complement VP's are restricted to opaque 
forms (cf_ to curse in 46) , so that we find very little independent clause 
structure with that complementation ; exceptions here are persuade and teach , 
which I discuss below . 
The majority of such preemptive forms are lexically restricted , being largely 
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unacceptable with stative verbs in the complement clause . The reason for this is 
that direct preemptive action by one participant (the agent of the main clause) 
presupposes that the agent of the complement clause can act volitionally . The 
exceptions here are marked by those main clause verbs which may denote indirect 
causation (ie. less strong determinacy) , as with the acceptable stative 
complements in 46 above . So the congruence is as follows : 
less determinate (other) 
less lexically restricted  
more determinate (self/other 
more lexically restricted 
highly inflectionally restricted 
closed to that complementation (few exceptions) 
Fig. 7 Participant determinacy : preemption 
2.6.2 Preemption : the form/meaning congruence 
Being at the conceptual extreme of the continuum of contextual distance , these 
forms are by and large closed to inflectional variation in the complement clause , 
to a degree which is stronger - and generally less marginal - than with less 
conceptual categories (intention , wish/desire etc.) : 
47.  Jane forced 
bribed 
caused 




48.  I was : 	 flattered 	 : 	 into : 	 leaving by 4.00 
blackmailed 1 	 ?having left 




got out of 
50. John relaxed by means of : listening 	 : to the music 
?having listened 
In each case , the only acceptable complement clause verb phrase - the gerund form 
in 48-50 , the infinitive form in 47 - is opaque , because neither to leave in 47 
nor leaving in 48/9 codes either tense or aspect . The inflectional variations -be 
leaving (progressive coding) and having left (coding of completed aspect) - are 
effectively ruled out . 
In terms of lexical restriction , it is chiefly less determinate verbs of indirect 
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causation which are most open to collocation with statives , as with 46 above . 
Stative complementation is generally unacceptable with more determinate forms , 
where the implication is that the agent of the complement clause , although 
constrained , nevertheless acts consciously and volitionally : 
?51. I : compelled him to : realize his potential 
forced him to 	 : recognize his faults 
It is generally not possible to passivize the VP in preemptive complement clauses 
because , as with statives , this implies that the complement clause agent does not 
act consciously : 
?52. I forced him to be followed 
?53. She compelled me to be understood 
?54. Jane laughed by (means of) being tickled 
Very few preemptive forms can take that complementation ( that + clause which can 
stand alone) , a point which is consistent with the general hypothesis - that as 
language form becomes more grammaticized , so it resembles less and less an 
independent clause . Of those verbs which can take either that complementation or 
an opaque complementation , there is , as with 34/5 and 43/3 , a difference in 
terms of degree of determinacy between the two : 
55. I : persuaded : him that the should forgive and forget] 
taught 
56. I : persuaded : him to forgive and forget 
taught 
In 55 the implication is of only limited control between main and complement clause 
agent : persuade and teach are used in the sense of convince (Quirk et al. 
1985:1213) , but it is not at all clear whether any action is determined . In 56 , 
where the more conceptual form is used , there is a much stronger implication , 
bordering on a presupposition , that he did actually forgive and forget as a result 
of the main clause agent's influence . It is also possible to use the form of ".)5 
with a complement clause which is genuinely contextual 7.hd transparent (cf. 
chapter 3: 3.4.1) , in which case there is no r_4(=eptual paraphrase : 
57. I persuaded him that (Bill had already left) 
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2.7 SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 
In section 2 I have discussed the form/meaning congruence of participant 
determinacy , and I have focused in particular on lexico-grammatical forms which 
code high levels of participant determinacy , and thus on form/meaning congruences 
which are towards the conceptual extreme of the continuum of contextual distance 
represented in figure 2 . 
But even here there are degrees , degrees of participant determinacy , and I have 
argued that congruent with this there are clearly observable degrees of conceptual 
lexico-grammar . I identified four criteria by which to measure the extent of 
conceptual form : lexical restriction , inflectional restriction , opacity and that 
complementation . Put together , what all these criteria measure is degrees of 
grammaticization and degrees of lexicalization . That is , the most restricted and 
opaque forms (preemption) are also those forms which are both most grammaticized 
(in Givon's terms) and most lexicalized (because , rather like formulaic language , 
they are subject to a limited kind of lexico-grammatical 'fixity') . 
But this congruence is not mere coincidence . I have argued that inflectional 
constraint generally reflects a conceptual constraint : the more a certain effect 
is determined , the more inflectionally restricted is the VP which codes it . 
Similarly , the more determined is a certain effect in view of a specific cause , 
the more dependent is the VP which codes it on the tense and aspect markings of the 
VP in the main clause : so opacity is also a reflection of conceptual dependence . 
Finally , lexical restriction directly reflects participant determinacy , so that 
stative verbs , which code non volitional states , are incongruous where direct 
intention is implied . 
Implicit within the whole concept of conceptual lexico-grammar is the 
interdependence between grammar and lexis . A change of lexical item (main verb) in 
the main clause) has significant grammatical repercussions : with a verb like 
expect we can use statives and a variety of inflections in the complement clause , 
wheras with a verb like force we cannot . 
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3. CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETERMINACY 
3.1 Introduction 
In section 3 I look in some depth at the form/meaning congruence as it pertains to 
circumstantial determinacy , which I have defined in general terms as : 
where a state/event is implied to determine the occurrence of another 
state/event , irrespective of the volition of participants whose independence 
is constrained by force of circumstances . For example : 
3. Fred was murdered (Fred is viewed as the undergcer , subject to force of 
circumstances beyond his control) 
4. Bill fell as a result of slipping on the ice (irrespective of Bill's wishes) 
I am concerned here with the coding of high circumstantial determinacy , so that 
the forms which I look at are all located toward the conceptual extreme of the 
continuum of contextual distance , and are 'parallel' with those forms expressing 
participant determinacy : 
C 	 PARTICIPANT DETERMINACY 	 PREEMPTION 	 C 
O expectation hope intention indirect 	 direct 0 
N +- -* 	 * 	 >- 	 * 	 * 	 * 	  N 
T 	 C 
E * 	 * 	 >- +lexico-grammatical coding of high determinacy 	 E 
X coding of 	 1 	 P 
T general 	 1 . 	 indirect 	 direct 	 T 
U cause/effect 	 + 	 > 	 * 	 * 	  U 
A 	 CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETERMINACY 	 A 
L L 
Fig. 8 continuum of contextual distance : the place of high circumstantial coding 
As with participant determinacy , I will argue that circumstantial determinacy can 
be divided between a less and a more determinate version ; the less determinate 
forms may be expressed through lexico-grammar which is less conceptual , and vice 
versa . 
In terms of a correspondence between participant and circumstantial determinacy , 
the whole area of high circumstantial determinacy is parallel with the preemptive 
component of high participant determinacy : both , that 	 , deal with the actual 
realization of effects. The other categories of participant determinacy - 
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expectation , hope/Wish , intention - are concerned with the anticipatory mental 
states , which by definition have no equivalent within the circumstantial category. 
The parallel between circumstantial determinacy and preemption is striking : both 
involve a distinction between more and less strong determinacy , and in both cases 
this distinction concerns direct determinacy (more determinate) and indirect 
determinacy (less determinate) (cf. figure 6) . In Appendix C I present an overview 
of the entire continuum of contextual distance , in which this kind of 'vertical' 
relation between one category and another can be appraised . 
3.2 THE SEMANTIC PERSPECTIVE : OVERVIEW 
There are a great many forms which code circumstantial determinacy , and it is 
useful to group them along two parameters . The first has to do with modes of 
conceptualization ie. the various different ways in which circumstantial 
determinacy can be conceptualized and expressed . The second has to do with degrees 
of circumstantial determinacy (cf. figure 8) . I will take each in turn . 
I identify 3 modes of conceptualization , as follows : 
a) CAUSE AS CONTROL (CAUSE BASED) : where one state/event is expressed as 
determining the occurrence of another state/event , irrespective of the 
intentions of any participants who may be involved , as in 3 and 4 above . 
Sometimes the causal state/event is not fully coded , as with the subjectless 
passive form in 3 , but the sense of circumstantial determinacy is the same . 
b) EFFECT AS PARTICIPANT REACTION : where the focus is on the (more or less) non 
volitional reaction of a participant in the ideational context to circumstances 
which are external to him/her : 
58. Janet was delighted to hear that her application had been accepted 
58 expresses Janet's immediate , unconsidered reaction to circumstances (hearing 
about her application) over which she has no direct control . 
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c) EFFECT AS CONTRA-EXPECTATION : where a participant experiences an event 
which is unexpected , and thus undergoes the effect of circumstances which are 
beyond his or her control : 
59. Bill opened the door , only to fall flat on his face 
Cutting across these different modes of conceptualization are different degrees of 
circumstantial determinacy (cf. fig. 8) . The most fundamental distinction here is 
between indirect determinacy , which is less determinate , and direct determinacy , 
which is more determinate : 
LESS STRONG DETERMINACY 
	 STRONGER DETERMINACY 
	 > 	  
INDIRECT 	 DIRECT 
Fig. 9 increasing contextual distance : degrees of high circumstantial determinacy 
Indirect determinacy is expressed when we imply that the cause does not 
lead unavoidably and conclusively to a particular result , as in 60 : 
60. Jane went to Tenerif e as a result of winning the pools (cause as control) 
Here there is no sense in which winning the pools necessarily and in itself 
determined Jane's trip to Tenerif e . Given this element of indirectness , how is 
it that such forms nevertheless signal a relatively high level of determinacy (cf. 
fig. 8) ? The answer depends on the mode of conceptualization . In the case of 
cause as control (60) , the level of determinacy from cause to effect is still 
relatively high : compare 60 to 61 , which implies less determinacy and which 
sounds distinctly uncomfortable with the as a result of construction : 
?61. Jane regularly went to Tenerif e as a result of liking the place 
We can hardly say that liking somewhere in itself predisposes one to go there : 
there is no great level of determinacy here at all ; this level of low determinacy 
(cf. fig. 8) is better expressed using because together with contextual grammar , 
ie. the linking of two independent clauses which can stand alone : 
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62. [Jane regularly went to Teneriffe] because [she likes the place] 
Direct (and thus stronger) determinacy expresses the implication that the 
effect was virtually inevitable given the cause , as in 63 : 
63. Jane fell 20 feet as a result of letting go of the rope 
Unlike with 60 , here the implication is indeed that the cause led directly to the 
determined effect (though context may , ofcourse , rule this out) . 
There are a great many lexico-grammatical forms which express circumstantial 
determinacy , involving all three modes of conceptualization and divided between 
direct and indirect categories . In figure 10 I present an overview of this 
framework , and I will go on to examine some of the forms mentioned in subsequent 
sections : 
HIGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETERMINACY 
where one state/event is understood to bring about the occurrence 
of another , irrespective of the volition of any participant involved 
INDIRECT/LESS STRONG 	 DIRECT/STRONGER 
cause not inevitably determining effect 	 effect implied as inevitable given cause 
cause based 
 
reaction contra expectation 
despite * -ing 
without + -ing 
cause based 
the passive 
as a result of 
by + -ing 
too (weak) to .. 
   
reaction 
enjoy + -ing 
like * -ing 
etc. 
as a result of 
-ing adv.clauses 
   
            
             
               
to internal cause 	 to external cause 	 contra expectation 
confess to 	 surprised to hear 	 (only) to + inf. 
own up to 	 amazed at X's -ing 
admit to etc. 	 etc. 
Fig. 10 Semantic framework for high circumstantial determinacy : overview 
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3.3 THE LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE : OVERVIEW 
The form/meaning congruence here is a reflection of the basic distinction between 
lower/indirect determinacy and higher/direct determinacy . In other words , 
indirect determinacy is , by definition , less determinate , and therefore less 
contextually distanced , with the consequence that it can be expressed through 
forms which are less conceptual . The linguistic responses to circumstantial 
determinacy are the same as those I looked at with participant determinacy , and 
their distribution is presented in figure 11 : 
INDIRECT DETERMINACY 	 DIRECT DETERMINACY 
increasing contextual distance > 
less inflectionally restricted 	 more inflectionally restricted 
may take that + 'independent' clause 	 don't take that + independent clause 
Fig. 11 increasing degrees of conceptual lexico-grammar 
With lexical restriction the pattern is somewhat different . While virtually all 
coding of high circumstantial determinacy (direct and indirect) is subject to a 
degree of lexical restriction , it is only where the mental state of a participant 
is crucially involved that we find clear restriction on stative verbs . 
The reason for this is that , across all the components of conceptual meaning (with 
the exception of referential abstraction) , lexical restriction - restrictions on 
the acceptability of stative verbs - reflects a participant perspective . So it is 
with expressions of participant reaction , which is the most 'participant oriented' 
of the three modes of conceptualizing circumstantial determinacy . Thus , for 
example , expressions such as confess to strongly imply that the state/event which 
is being confessed to is something which the participant did volitionally - so that 
stative (non volitional) verbs in the complement clause are incongruous : 




However , it needs to be emphasized that the distinction between less 
strong/indirect and stronger/direct determinacy , and its congruent linguistic 
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expression , is not hard and fast : the two are adjacent on the continuum of 
contextual distance (cf. figure 11) , so that the one gradually merges with the 
other . So the congruence outlined in figure 11 is something of an idealization . 
In the following sections I examine some of the forms from each of the categories 
outlined in figure 10 , beginning with expressions of indirect determinacy . 
3.4 INDIRECT CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETERMINACY : THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
3.4.1 Introduction and overview 
In 3.4 I look at a selection of lexico-grammatical forms which code indirect (and 
hence weaker) circumstantial determinacy : adverbial clauses with to expressing 
participant reaction , clauses with despite/without * -ing expressing contra - 
expectation , and clauses with as a result of * -ing expressing cause as control . 
Because these forms express indirect (less strong) determinacy , they generally 
involve conceptual forms which are less restricted than with expressions of direct 
determinacy . The distribution of conceptual features is as follows : 
+ 	 + 	 + 	 + 	 + 
MODE OF 
	 ;INFLECTIONAL ; 	 THAT+ INDEPENDENT 	 : 	 LEXICALLY 
	
CONCEPTUALIZATION 	 ;RESTRICTION 
	 : CLAUSE 	 : RESTRICTED; 
+ 	 + 	 + 	 + 	 + 
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eg. 	 without * -ing 	 : . 	 . 
. 	
i 	 i 
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:CAUSE AS CONTROL 	 I 	 NO 	 . 
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3.4.2 INDIRECT PARTICIPANT REACTION 
Here I look at participant reaction (cf. figure 10) . Participant reaction has to 
do with the non volitional reaction of a participant to circumstances : 
65. Tom confessed to robbing the bank (internal reaction) 
66. Tom was appalled at Bill's saying such things 	 (external reaction) 
By internal reaction , I mean a participant reaction to forces/feelings which are 
internal to his/her own consciousness . Thus in 65 it is not the external event of 
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bank robbing which determines the act of confessing , but some kind of internal 
pressure , which may or may not be influenced through the actions of others . All 
the verbs which signal this kind of internal reaction - own up to/admit 
to/apologise for etc. - imply this kind of determinacy . It is , however , indirect 
determinacy , because we cannot say that acts of confessing or apologising are 
directly and inevitably brought about through such forces . We can make this level 
of indirect , weaker determinacy explicit with expressions such as 67 : 
67. He decided to confess to robbing the bank , after some careful thought 
By external reaction I mean a participant reaction to a state/event which in itself 
is external to the participant's consciousness , as in 66 . Here , in contrast to 
65 , the cause is directly coded in the language through the complement clause , so 
that Bill's saying such things is said to be the causal event . There is a clear 
element of determinacy here , because such lexico-grammatical forms consistently 
implies a reaction which is to some extent unconsidered , emotive rather than 
arrived at intellectually , and thus to some extent determined by the causal event. 
In other words , the determinacy here is an expression of a reaction which is 
largely brought about through force of circumstances , irrespective of the 
participant's considered volition . Expressions of a more considered state of mind, 
implying a less determined response - such as critical or cynical - sound somewhat 
less acceptable with the conceptual form of 66 : 
?68. He was : critical : at Bill's saying such things 
cynical 
Yet expressions of participant external reaction are only indirectly determined . 
In 60 , for example , Tom remains conceptually independent of the cause which 
prompts his response ; in other words, this is indirect determinacy because Tom's 
reaction is not implied to inevitably follow on from its cause , or to be 
inseparable from it . 
Because expressions of external and internal reaction code indirect determinacy , 
they are generally inflectable (69/70) , where the inflectional variability is a 
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robbing 	 the bank (internal reaction) 
having robbed 
69. Bill confessed to 
owned up to 
apologised for 
pleaded guilty to 
  
70. Tom was appalled 
amazed 
perplexed 
at Bill's : saying 
	
such things (external) 
having said 
  
Similarly , these indirect/less determinate forms can be expressed through that t 
independent clause complementation , so that the opaque VP's of 65-68 are not 
obligatory : 
71. Bill : confessed : that [he had robbed the bank] 
: owned up 
72. Tom was : appalled : that [Bill had said such things] 
amazed 
As for lexical restriction , I have said that the most systematic lexical 
restriction occurs with expressions of participant mental states , and so it is 
with these forms : 
?73. Bill apologised for : seeing his father 
: resembling his sister 
?74. Tom was appalled at Jane's : feeling sick 
resembling her twin sister 
3.4.3 INDIRECT CONTRA EXPECTATION 
By contra expectation I mean reference to a state/event which is unexpected , and 
which therefore is brought about through circumstances which take us 'by surprise', 
and which are thus contrary to expectation . I look in particular at subordinate 
clauses with the conjuncts despite and without , both of which generally imply that 
it is the speaker's expectation which is confounded : 
75. Bill lost the match despite playing as well as he could 
76. Jane walked 25 miles without once pausing for refreshment 
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Thus in 75 and 76 there is an event , such as Bill's playing as well as he could, 
which was expected to lead to another event , Bill's winning the match . But this 
element of cause/effect , although implied , remains unrealized , because other 
circumstantial forces intervene and determine a quite different outcome , Bill's 
defeat in 75 , for example . But there is no sense of inevitability about this 
outcome ; that is , 75 does not imply that Bill's defeat was inevitable , nor does 
76 imply that Jane's uninterrupted walk was pre-determined . Thus the determinacy 
here is indirect : the implication with 76 , for example , is that although Jane 
did not pause for refreshment , she might well have , and indeed there were good 
grounds for expecting her to do so . 
If we take away this implication of contra expectation , then what we are left with 
is a general contrast relation in which there is no longer any sense of 
determinacy : 
77. Jane adores jazz , but she doesn't like classical music 
There is no sense here of Jane's adoring jazz being something which is determined 
through circumstances contrary to expectation . But the conceptual -ing form used 
with despite and without necessarily codes unexpected and indirect determinacy , so 
that used with the propositions in 77 , the effect is one of an uncomfortable 
juxtaposition : 
?78. Jane adores jazz without liking classical music 
?79. Jane doesn't like classical music , despite adoring jazz 
78 and 79 sound slightly incongruous . We use without and despite to imply contra 
expectation , but where is the contra-expectation here ? Certainly there is a 
contrast , between jazz and classical music , but there is no evident reason to 
suppose that a love of jazz would in itself predispose anyone to like classical 
music . We would need a very particular discourse context to substantiate 78/79 , 
one which provides a sense of expected determinacy : 
80. a) It's perfectly obvious that everyone who loves jazz also likes 
classical music 
b) What rubbish ! Jane adores jazz without liking classical music 
Since despite/without clauses code indirect determinacy , they are relatively 
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inflectable : 
81. Bill lost the match despite 





once : pausing 	 for refreshment 
having paused 
Again , then , there is a correspondence between the acceptability of inflection 
(having t -ed) and weaker determinacy ie. less contextually distant form/meaning 
congruences . 
There is no clear pattern of lexical restriction here , since this kind of 
determinacy is not strongly participant oriented . Nevertheless , it is clear from 
78 and 79 above that particular lexical choices within each proposition may make 
the form as a whole more or less acceptable , depending on whether unrealized 
determinacy is or is not implied . 
3.4.4 CAUSE AS CONTROL : AS A RESULT OF 
As I suggested in 3.2 , the conjunct as a result of necessarily implies a 
relatively high degree of determinacy ; so the propositions in 61 , which imply a 
low level of determinacy , are better expressed using because (together with the 
contextual grammar of two independent clauses) as in 62 : 
?61. Jane regularly went to Teneriffe as a result of liking the place 
62. [Jane regularly went to Teneriffe] because [she liked the place] 
But as a result of may imply either indirect (60) or direct (63) determinacy , 
depending on the lexical content of the propositions involved : 
60. Jane went to Teneriffe as a result of winning the pools (indirect) 
63. Jane fell 20 feet as a result of letting go of the rope (direct) 
Thus in 60 there is no clear implication that winning the pools would in itself 
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lead directly to a trip to Teneriffe , but in 63 there is a strong implication of 
direct determinacy . 
So as a result of , which implies a level of determinacy which is relatively high 
(hence the 'marked' quality to 61) , requires that conceptual forms are used in the 
dependent clause : the gerund form (letting go) is opaque and does not signal that 
a progressive sense is intended . This element of opacity is clear enough , since 
the -ing form can be used with punctual verbs : 
83. The waiter made a real mess as a result of dropping the plate 
But as a result of does not show quite the kind of inflectional restriction which I 
have argued is typical of direct determinacy . Rather , both the opaque -ing (which 
codes neither tense nor aspect) and the inflected having # -eofform are sometimes 
acceptable with propositions which clearly imply direct determinacy : 
84. He has malaria as a result of : having lived : so long in the jungle 
living 
As with contra expectation , there is no clear pattern of lexical restriction here. 
However , it is clear from 61 above that particular lexical choices within each 
proposition may make the form as a whole more or less acceptable . 
3.5. DIRECT CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETERMINACY : THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
3.5.1 Introduction and overview 
In this section I look at some lexico-grammatical forms which specifically code 
direct (and thus stronger) determinacy : the passive form (cause as control) , 
lexico-grammatical forms expressing participant reaction (like/enjoy etc. t -ing) , 
and (only) to - infinitive clauses expressing contra expectation . Following on 
from figure 11 , I argue that congruent with this higher level of direct 
determinacy , these forms are more inflectionally restricted . Complement clauses 
expressing direct determinacy do not take that-complementation , and so are 
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NO 	 1 1 	 YES 
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NO 1 	 YES 
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;PARTICIPANT REACTION; 
eg. like f -ing 
;CONTRA EXPECTATION : 
eg. (only) to IL inf 
;CAUSE AS CONTROL 
eg. passive form 
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MODE OF 	 :INFLECTIONAL : ONLY OPAQUE : rmr+ INDEPENDENT : LEXICALLY 
CONCEPTUALIZATION :RESTRICTION : VP POSSIBLE?: CLAUSE 	 : RESTRICTED: 
3.5.2 DIRECT CAUSE AS CONTROL : THE PASSIVE 
3.5.2.1 Conceptual independence : the semantic perspective 
Cause as control is coded when one state/event is expressed as determining the 
occurrence of another state/event , irrespective of the intentions of any 
participants who may be involved , as I outlined in 3.2 above . It seems to me that 
the passive is a clear example of cause as control , coding in the vast majority of 
cases a high degree of direct circumstantial determinacy : 
85. Bill was murdered (by Tom) 
In 85 , for example , Bill is seen as a non volitional undergoer of a process over 
which he has no control . Ofcourse 85 presupposes the involvement of another 
participant , Tom , the agent of the whole process whose action is volitional and 
decisive , but the passive places the focus squarely on the patient , on the 
undergoer who is at the mercy of external circumstantial forces . 
It might be objected that there is only one event referred to here , so that the 
definition of circumstantial determinacy as one state/event determining another 
state/event is disregarded . Yet what we have in 85 is an expression of 
circumstantial determinacy of the strongest possible kind , so strong that cause 
and effect are no longer entirely separable . Thus what the passive expresses is a 
cause of such direct determinacy that in itself it determines an effect . There is 
a direct parallel here with expressions of direct participant determinacy 
86. Tom made Bill die 
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Like in 85 , the expression of preemptive participant determinacy in 86 implies a 
causal force of such magnitude that cause and effect are difficult to separate out; 
but whereas in 85 the focus is on the undergoer's perspective , with 86 it is on 
the agent's perspective . I have referred to Givon's concept of the strength of 
influence of the main clause agent (1980:335) ; the stronger the expression of this 
influence , the more constrained is the patient/undergoer . In 85 and 86 the 
patient role is at its most constrained . This calls to mind Haiman's principle of 
conceptual and linguistic independence (cf. chapter 3:1.3.2) : 
The linguistic separateness of an expression corresponds to the 
conceptual independence of the object or event which it represents. 
(1983:783) 
With the passive , we conceptualize the patient/undergoer as being so constrained 
that it is no longer conceptually independent ; congruent with this , there is very 
little in the way of linguistic separateness between cause/agent and 
effect/undergoer : agent and patient may be separately referred to (as in 85) , but 
they are linked through a single verb phrase . Haiman's principle is , ofcourse , 
equally relevant to expressions of direct participant determinacy , as in 86 . 
However , I am not arguing that each and every passive form clearly denotes 
circumstantial determinacy : 
87. It was thought that the meeting had ended 
The anticipatory pronoun it in 87 cannot be said to represent any kind of object 
which is circumstantially constrained . 
3.5.2.2 The passive & conceptual lexico-grammar : the linguistic perspective 
In this section I argue that the vast majority of passive constructions code high 
circumstantial determinacy , and that this semantic perspective bears a direct 
congruence with features of the language which expresses it . For example , since 
the passive expresses a participant (or object) subject to external circumstantial 
forces , we cannot use this form to express events over which the participant has 
volitional control . Hence the unacceptability of coreference between subject and 
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noun phrase object in 89 (cf. Quirk et al. 1985:164) : 
88 Jane shook her head 
*89 Her head was shaken by Jane 
The passive , like other expressions of determinacy , shows a degree of lexical 
restriction . For example , Quirk et al (1985:162) point out that there are 
"greater restrictions on verbs occurring in the passive than on verbs occurring in 
the active" , and they list a number of 'active only' verbs forms (ibid.) : 
90a They have a nice house 90b *A nice house is had by them 
91a John resembles his father 91b *His father is resembled by John 
92a He lacks confidence 92b *Confidence is lacked by him 
Quirk et al. point out that all these [verbs] belong to the stative class of verbs 
of 'being' or 'having'" (ibid.) . This kind of lexical restriction can be explained 
in terms of circumstantial determinacy . The stative verbs which are unacceptable 
with the passive are those verbs which already and intrinsically signify non 
volitional states which are innate , which are simply experienced or undergone by 
virtue of circumstances . There is , then already a passive sense of being 
subject to force of circumstances with these verbs , so that to formally passivize 
them would be to give them a meaning which they already have . So passivization 
with such statives would be redundant ; hence its unacceptability . 
But some statives are acceptable with the passive form : 





These statives signal emotive (desire,) or sensory (hear/see) states which do 
involve some active involvement on the part of the experiencer (Bill in 93) ; hence 
the innate/passive sense implicit in the statives of 90-92 is absent , and the 
subject of the passive clause (Jane in 93) is thus conceived as undergoer of 
processes which are external to her . 
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More generally , passive forms cannot take intransitive verbs , because 
intransitives have no object which can be made the subject of a passive 
construction . There may well be a semantic explanation for this which keys in 
directly with the notion of circumstantial determinacy , though here I can only 
suggest a possible line of enquiry . We can divide (atleast a great many) 
intransitive verbs into two categories . The first group intrinsically imply a 
reaction to force of external circumstance : 
stumble fall collapse die expire itch sneeze ache 
These verbs have no direct object precisely because they already and in themselves 
imply a re-action determined through circumstances beyond the control of the 
patient . When used to express an intentional action , it is necessary to re-
code them as expressions of participant determinacy , before they can be given 
'transitive' status : 
94. Bill made himself sneeze 
collapse 
But with their standard intransitive use - Sill collapseoVidiedetc. - they already 
imply circumstantial determinacy , so that as with innate statives , their further 
passivization is redundant : hence the unacceptability of 95 : 
*95. Bill was : died 
collapsed 
My second group of intransitive verbs express volitional actions which , as in 96 , 
are performed by a single participant who is implied to have direct and independent 
control over his/her action : 








   
The expressions in 96b are unacceptable not simply because their verbs have no 
direct object , but because they signal actions which are implicitly volitional, so 
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that Jane cannot logically be perceived as the undergoer of an action which she has 
herself intentionally implemented . 
The passive has other features of conceptual language - it is inflectionally 
restricted , and conceptually opaque . However , in order to demonstrate this , I 
first need to qualify the definition of inflectional restriction which I gave in 
chapter three (3.1) . There I said that verb phrases which are opaque or 
inflectionally restricted are defined as consisting of main verb together with the 
primary auxiliaries be/do/have . With the passive , we need to separate out main 
verb , which is opaque and restricted , from the auxiliaries (which are not) in 
order to establish its conceptual orientation . Thus whatever the temporal or 
aspectual context of the passive form , the main verb remains inflectionally fixed: 







   
Furthermore , the 'past participle' verb form in 97 is conceptually opaque . That 
is , the 'past' form of murdered in 97 does not simply code a past meaning -it is 
the primary auxiliaries which perform this function . Instead , the sense of 
'completed action' which is implicit in the past form is 'read into' the passive 
meaning , coding a sense of an event which is so definite and determinate as to be 
effectively seen as 'already done' . In other words , the sense of 'pastness' 
implicit in the past participle is carried over into the passive form , where the 
participle has a new , conceptual function as a device for coding strong 
circumstantial determinacy . This is a feature of conceptual opacity which , as I 
have argued , finds expression in other areas of conceptual form/meaning 
congruence ; for example , the use of 'past' forms to signal 'hypothetical 
distance' with conditional forms (cf. chapter 3) . Similarly , and in just the same 
way as with the passive , the definiteness of the present progressive , which 
implies an event which is definitely occurring at the time of speaking , is carried 
over into expressions of future events which are circumstantially determined at the 
time of speaking (cf. chapter 3 : 5.2.1) : 
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98. We're apparently meeting Bill for lunch tomorrow 
So in terms of meaning , the passive codes a high level of direct circumstantial 
determinacy . Congruent with this , the passive is inflectionally restricted , and 
its inflectional constraints reflect the conceptual (and circumstantial) 
constraints to which the undergoer is subject . Similarly , the lexical 
restrictions and full opacity of the passive form reflect its expression of 
direct circumstantial determinacy . 
3.5.3 DIRECT PARTICIPANT REACTION : LIKE/ENJOY + GERUND 
I have defined participant reaction as the non volitional reaction of a participant 
to external circumstances . In 3.4.2 I looked at examples of participant reaction , 
where the level of determinacy between cause and effect/reaction is high , but 
limited on account of being indirect . Thus in 66 , Tom's reaction is immediate and 
unconsidered , and to this extent it is strongly determined . Yet Tom remains 
conceptually independent of the cause which prompts his response ; in other words, 
this is indirect determinacy because Tom's reaction is not implied to inevitably 
follow on from its cause , or to be inseparable from it 
66. Tom was appalled at Bill's saying such things 
As I argued in 3.4.2 , there are congruent linguistic features here : 66 is 
inflectable , for example , and this lack of tight inflectional restriction 
reflects the relative independence which effect/reaction has from its indirectly 
determining cause . 
But there is another class of lexico-grammatical form which codes stronger , direct 
determinacy , where the conceptual independence between cause and participant 
reaction is further reduced : 
99. Bill liked 
hated 
loved 
talking : to Jane 
to talk : 
   
In 99 Bill's reaction - his liking/hating etc. - is expressed as something which is 
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not entirely separate from its cause (talking to Jane) , so that cause and reaction 
are perceived almost as a single state . 
This perception is reflected through the language . For example , unlike 66 
(indirect determinacy) , 99 does not require the infinitive to which in 66 
functions as a marker of the conceptual independence of the complement clause from 
the main clause (cf. Givon 1980:357) . Similarly expressions of direct participant 
reaction are inflectionally restricted , where the linguistic constraints on 
inflection reflect, as with the passive , conceptual constraints on the 
participant's independence from the determining cause : 
100a Bill liked 	 : talking 	 1 to Jane 
hated 	 : ?having talked 
enjoyed 




?to be talking 
?to have talked 
to Jane 
To maintain a direct and systematic form/meaning congruence here , it is necessary 
to demonstrate that , as with other expressions of direct determinacy , the 
complement VP in 99/100 is fully'opaque (cf. figure 11) . In other words , the -ing 
form in 90 should code neither tense nor aspect . Infect it does seem possible to 
use the -ing form here with verbs which denote punctual (ie. non 
durative/progressive) actions , suggesting that the -ing form is not intrinsically 
a marker of progressive aspect , though the acceptability of punctual verbs may 
be held to vary somewhat depending on the choice of main verb : 
101. Bill enjoyed 
hated 
liked 
breaking Mrs. Smith's front window 
letting go of the rope 
shooting his injured dog 
  
As with inflectional restriction , this kind of temporal opacity , where the 
dependent VP has no clear coding function independent of the main VP , is an 
example of the high degree of linguistic dependence between main and complement 
clause which reflects the conceptual bonding between them . 
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As for lexical restriction , expressions of direct participant reaction are 
more or less unacceptable with stative verbs which code innate and unaffecting 
intellectual states (cf. Appendix A ) : 




believing in God 
understanding Shakespeare's sonnets 
realizing where he'd gone wrong 
   
3.5.4 DIRECT CONTRA EXPECTATION : ONLY TO 
Finally , I will very briefly look at one example of contra expectation expressing 
direct determinacy . Contra expectation , I have said , involves reference to a 
state/event which is unexpected , and which therefore is brought about through 
circumstances which take us 'by surprise'. In 3.4.3 I looked at examples of 
indirect contra expectation : 
75. Bill lost the match despite playing as well as he could 
The determinacy here is indirect because , as I argued in 3.4.1 , Bill's losing the 
match is not implied to be inevitable" ; rather , the use of despite in itself 
implies that there were grounds for expecting a quite different outcome . However , 
some forms code direct contra expectation . Here , the implication is that 
circumstances conspire to confound the expectations of a participant in the 
ideational context , who is thus taken by surprise and is directly at the mercy of 
circumstantial forces external to him/her : 




on his face 
front garden had been removed 
slip and hit his head 
Whereas with 75 (indirect) , the outcome is conceived as unexpected but not 
inevitably determined , with 103 the outcome is conceived as being virtually 
unavoidable . Congruent with this higher level of determinacy , 103 is 
inflectionally restricted : 





The subordinate VP is temporally opaque , so that the infinitive to fall in 104 in 
itself codes neither tense nor aspect . Both this opacity , and the inflectional 
restriction , function as markers of direct determinacy . In other words , the 
participant is not conceived as being conceptually independent of the outcome which 
takes him by surprise - he is unable to act independently of it - and this 
conceptual constraint is matched by inflectional constraints , and by the 
dependence of the subordinate VP on the main VP in terms of opacity . 
Such forms are also lexically restricted . Because the participant is seen as an 
undergoer of forces beyond his control , the subordinate VP generally takes only 
verbs which code non volitional states (see , hear , discover etc.) or intransitive 
verbs which code reaction (fall , die etc.) ; this latter class was discussed in 
3.5.2.2 in reference to the passive . Hence strongly dynamic verbs are generally 
unacceptable : 
105. Jane arrived home , only to : ?chat to her neighbour 
?watch T.V. 
3.6 SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 
In this chapter I have discussed the form/meaning congruence of participant and 
circumstantial determinacy . Through reference to the continuum of contextual 
distance , I have argued that cause/effect , rather than being a black and white , 
present or absent concept , is a complex conceptual framework which can be 
notionally sub-divided in terms of degrees of causal determinacy . At the 
contextual extreme of the continuum , there are juxtaposed propositions which 
involve no clear grammatical coding of cause/effect (Bill arrived . Jane left) ; 
but as we proceed along the continuum , cause/effect gradually becomes more clearly 
coded in the language , so that finally we reach the area of lexico-grammatical 
coding of high causal determinacy : 
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As language becomes more contextually distant , so the conceptualization of 
cause/effect becomes increasingly marked for specific and high levels of causal 
determinacy . At the same time , the lexico-grammatical forms which code such 
determinacy become increasingly conceptual . I identified four criteria by which to 
measure the extent of conceptual form : lexical restriction , inflectional 
restriction , opacity and that complementation . Put together , what all these 
criteria measure is degrees of grammaticization and degrees of lexicalization 
That is , the most restricted and opaque forms (expressing preemption with 
participant determinacy , and direct circumstantial determinacy) are also those 
forms which are both most grammaticized (in Givon's terms) and most lexicalized 
(because , rather like formulaic language , they are subject to a limited kind of 
lexico-grammatical 'fixity') . 
I have argued that inflectional constraint generally reflects a conceptual 
constraint : the more a certain effect is determined , the more inflectionally 
restricted is the VP which codes it . Similarly , the more determined is a certain 
effect in view of a specific cause , the more dependent is the VP which codes it on 
the tense and aspect markings of the VP in the main clause : so opacity is also a 
reflection of conceptual dependence . Finally , most categories of participant 
determinacy and some of circumstantial determinacy are lexically restricted . This 
lexical restriction reflects an outcome/effect viewed as either non volitional , in 
which case it is only statives which are clearly acceptable (as with direct contra 
expectation) , or as necessarily volitional (in which case statives are generally 
unacceptable) . 
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Implicit within the whole concept of conceptual lexico-grammar is the 
interdependence between grammar and lexis . A change of lexical item (main verb) in 
the main clause) has significant grammatical repercussions : with a verb like 
expect we can use statives and a variety of inflections in the complement clause , 
wheras with a verb like force we cannot . 
In section 8 of chapter 3 I discussed the mental storage of linguistic knowledge 
and Bialystok's notion of analysability (1978/81/82) . It seems clear to me that 
the complex grammar/lexis interdependencies which I have outlined here are simply 
too complex , too sensitive to subtle form/meaning variation to be open to clear 
grammatical rule . It is most unlikely that native speakers , let alone language 
learners , are able to hold this kind of knowledge in analysed form . What we have 
here , I believe , is a fundamental area of form/meaning congruence which is 
essentially unanalysed or at best partially analysed . That is , we can say 'yes , 
this form sounds rather less acceptable than that form , this inflection works 
better than that one' , but in most cases we cannot say why . 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTERPERSONAL MEANING : A FORK/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 WORLD TO WORDS : CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE & INTERPERSONAL MEANING 
In chapter three (section 7) I argued that through reference to the continuum of 
contextual distance we can observe how interpersonal meaning gets coded in the 
language . At the contextual end , language codes only ideational meanings , 
expressing what Halliday refers to as the observer function of language , language 
as a means of talking about the real world" (1970:143) . At the conceptual end , 
language specifically codes elements of the interpersonal context , thereby giving 
clear expression to what Halliday calls the intruder function of language" 
(1975:17) . So in terms of the functional coding of language , the continuum of 
contextual distance effectively represents a development from simply 
ctserving/reporting/describing at the contextual end , through to the coding of 
interpersonal engagement (which by definition is conceptually abstracted) at the 
conceptual end . 
Searle (1979) provides a very clear way of distinguishing between these two 
orientations : 
Some illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words 
..to match the world , others to get the world to match the words. Assertions 
are in the former category , promises and requests are in the latter . 
(1979:3) 
Searle's words to world corresponds to Halliday's observer function , while world 
to words matches his intruder function . These concepts relate to the continuum of 
contextual distance in the following way : 
contextual : no interpersonal coding 	 conceptual : interpersonal coding 
observing/describing : words to world 	 intruding : world to words 
increasing contextual distance. 
Fig. 1 
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1.2 CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE & THE COOING OF SUASION 
But how exactly does interpersonal meaning get coded into the lexico-grammar of the 
language ? In chapter three I identified three distinct components of interpersonal 
meaning (suasion) which are relevant to linguistic coding : 
a) Interlocutor dependence : Signalling that a future action , desired by one 
interlocutor , is subject to the willingness of another : 
1. Could you do the shopping ? 
2. Shall I give you a hand ? 
b) Speaker determinacy : The more clearly speaker expresses an authoritative 
personal commitment to the bringing about of an action , the more determinate 
is his or her meaning : 
3. I order you to do the shopping ! 
c) Circumstantial justification : Where speaker clearly implies that there 
are grounds within the ideational context to justify the hearer's performing 
a specified action , but holds back from signalling any personal commitment: 
4. Perhaps you ought to do the shopping 
Language which lexico-grammatically codes one or more of these meanings is language 
which 'codes interpersonal (suasive) meaning' . But there are a great many forms 
which - though they do not clearly code interpersonal meaning , and though they may 
have the form of 'words to world' observation - may nevertheless perform an variety 
of interpersonal functions on certain occasions of use : 
5. The fridge is empty ! 
5 has the form of a straight description - through its lexico-grammar it codes 
components of the ideational context (an object , a state) but not elements of 
interpersonal meaning : there is , for example , no coding of speaker determinacy 
here , nor of interlocutor dependence . As such 5 is an example of language which , 
in Givon's terms , is pragmatic , relatively unorammaticized : it is , then 
	 at 
the contextual end of the continuum in figure 1 . Examples 1 to 4 , however , 
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clearly code interpersonal meaning and are thus located toward the conceptual end . 
But they are not all alike in this respect . Circumstantial justification is more 
contextual , speaker determinacy and interlocutor dependence are more conceptual . 
Infact the continuum of contextual distance , presented in greater detail than in 
figure 1 , looks like this : 




	 coding of circumstantial justification 
+- 	  
Fig. 2 	 clear int. dependence 
The reason for this distribution is that in coding circumstantial justification 
(eg. 4 above) , there is no clear coding of the two crucial interpersonal roles 
which I mentioned in chapter three (7.2.1) : WANT (the desire to be unimpeded) and 
WILLING (the desire to save face) . In other words , the speaker appears to 'hang 
back' from explicitly intruding into the interpersonal context . Yet with speaker 
determinacy the WANT role is clearly coded , while with interlocutor dependence 
both WANT and WILLING are coded . So how do we distinguish between implicatures and 
coding of circumstantial justification , since with neither do we find clear coding 
of either WANT or WILLING ? What distinguishes the latter is the relatively clear 
coding of suasion ; in other words , the use of modal expressions such as you ought 
to or ,vou shouldsignals that an action is predicated of the hearer , wheras with 
implicatures like 5 above , this kind of coding is completely absent . So 
interpersonal coding can be broken down in the following way : 
+ 	  + + + + 
Types of interpersonal coding : SUASION CODED : WANT CODED : WILLING CODED 
+ 	  + + + + 
IMPLICATURES 




NO , , 
+ 





+ 	  
: 
+ 
YES , , 
+ 






















Fig. 	 3 
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1.3 CODING SUASION : THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
I have suggested that language which codes interpersonal meaning is language which 
is more conceptual than language , such as implicatures , which codes only 
ideational meaning . 
If the form/meaning congruence is to hold here , it needs to be 
demonstrated that 'the more conceptual , the more inflectionally and 
lexically restricted'. 
Figure 4 summarizes this form/meaning congruence : 
clear speaker determinacy 
contextual/ideational 
clear int. dependence 
tight inflectional & lexical 
restriction ; restriction on 
independent coding of aspect 
implicatures 	 coding of circum. justification 
unrestricted inflectional change may be acceptable 
transparent 	 opacity : some coding of aspect 
stative verbs sometimes acceptable 
increasing contextual distance 
Fig. 4 	 increasing grammaticization use of conceptual forms 
1.3.1 Lexical and inflectional restriction 
Following on from figure 4 , then , I shall briefly illustrate the way in which 
coded expressions of speaker determinacy/interlocutor dependence are generally more 
conceptual and hence more restricted than coded expressions of circumstantial 
justification : In the table below , 6a codes interlocutor dependence , 7a codes 
speaker determinacy , and 8 codes circumstantial justification : 
+ + 	 + 	 + 
BASE FORM 	 , 	 INFLECTIONAL CHANGE 	 ; LEXICAL CHANGE TO STATIVE , 
+ + 	 + 	 + 
6a Could you leave ? : ?6b Could you be leaving ? : ?6c Could you hear him ? 
+ + 	 + 	 + 
7a You must leave ! : ?7b You must be leaving ! : ?7c You must hear him 1 
+ + 	
 + 	 + 
8a You should leave : 8b You should be leaving 	 Bc you should hear him !  , 
+ + 	 + 	 + 
So , while 6a is suasive , coding interlocutor dependence , ob and 6c are probably 
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not . Similarly , 7a is suasive , coding speaker determinacy , while 7b and 7c are 
not . In contrast , 8 (which codes circumstantial justification) is less 
conceptual , and the inflectional and lexical changes of 8b and 8c are acceptable 
and consistent with a suasive meaning . This form/meaning congruence is not 
accidental : 
The expression of interlocutor dependence (6a) implies that the action of 
one interlocutor is constrained by its dependence on the sanction of another: 
it codes the desire to save face . This conceptual constraint is congruent 
with the linguistic constraint on inflectional choice and lexical choice . 
Similarly , the conceptual constraints which speaker determinacy (7a) 
places on the hearer emphasizes the desire to be unimpeded , and is 
congruent with the linguistic constraints on inflectional and lexical 
choice . 
However , in coding circumstantial justification (8) speaker holds back 
from explicitly constraining the hearer's freedom of action . Congruent 
with this , there is less lexical and inflectional constraint/restriction. 
But I am not arguing here that the restricted forms in , for example , 6b and 6c 
above are 'ungrammatical' or in any way unacceptable . What happens in the shift 
from 6a to 6b/c is that there is a change of illocutionary force , from coding of 
interlocutor dependence - the request for action in 6a - to the coding of a reque,L,z 
for information in 6b and 6c . So when I say that interpersonal/conceptual forms 
are lexically and inflectionally restricted , I do not mean that in every case they 
become unacceptable under lexical or inflectional change . Nor do I wish to suggest 
that a request for information does not itself perform an interpersonal function ; 
my focus of attention , though , is on the coding of suasive meaning . 
1.3.2 Opacity 
What , then , of opacity 	 . Of the forms which code interpersonal meaning a great 
many involve the use of opaque verb phrases , including examples 1-4 and 6-8 above 
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Significantly , the most conceptual expressions - those which clearly code 
interlocutor dependence or speaker determinacy - involve opaque VP's which do not 
independently code aspect in any clear way . The opaque VP [leave] in 6a and 7a is 
an example of this ; but once the VP is inflected to code progressive aspect (as in 
6b and 7b) , the suasive meaning is (in all probability) neutralized . However , 
with the less conceptual expression of circumstantial justification (8) , the 
progressive inflection is acceptable . Thus , as with expressions of participant 
and circumstantial determinacy (chapter four) , there is a congruence between 
inflectional restriction , opacity and contextual distance : the more 
inflectionally restricted , the more contextually distanced and the less 
independent coding of aspect . 
Furthermore , when interlocutor dependence is grammatically signalled through modal 
stems , these stems code a kind of conceptual opacity . But wheras in other cases 
of opacity the opaque VP consists of a main verb , with interpersonal meaning it is 
the modal form itself which is conceptually opaque . I have defined conceptual 
opacity as the way in which verbs or verb phrases code a conceptual meaning through 
co-reference to cotext or to context : 
9. Could you 
Can you 
Would you 
do the shopping ? 
 
If we understand 9 to signal request forms , the stem could you does not signal a 
question about the hearer's ability to do something in the past (as it would do in 
could you see him 7) , nor does can you signal merely a question about the hearer's 
present ability . Similarly , the would you stem does not code simply a 
hypothetical question about what the hearer might or might not do (as in would you 
leave if you had the chance ?) . But these meanings are not entirely lost when an 
interpersonal meaning is coded : rather they are 'carried over' and given a 'new' , 
conceptual/interpersonal meaning . Thus appeals to ability are used to convey a 
sense of interpersonal deference , so that 'questioning ability' is 
'reconceptualized' as 'appealing to willingness' 
	 and the 'hypothetical distance' 
202 
of the would you stem is reconceptualized as 'social distance' , again indicating 
deference to the hearer's willingness . At the same time the temporal distance of 
the 'past' forms would and could is given a new meaning , further emphasizing the 
social distance between interlocutors and thus , again , signalling dependence on 
the hearer's willingness. As with all opaque forms , the coding of these stems are 
not in any way independent , since these interpersonal meanings are dependent on 
co-reference both to cotext (the inflection and lexical content of the predicate) 
and context . Thus with could you have done the shopping ? (inflectional change) or 
would you hear Tom ? (change to stative verb) , interpersonal coding is 
neutralized . 
Searle refers to this distinction , between the coding of ability and the coding of 
a request , as a distinction between the 'literal meaning' (ability) and the 
'idiomatic meaning' (request) . According to Searle , both meanings are 
simultaneously present when an interpersonal meaning is intended : the 'literal' 
meaning is the primary illocutionary act and the 'idiomatic' meaning is the 
secondary act (1979:33/34) . 
What figure 4 represents , then , is increasing grammaticization as meaning becomes 
more conceptual . Thus while implicatures may be expressed through independent 
clauses , coding interpersonal meaning generally involves dependent and 
grammaticized forms which are restricted and opaque . 
1.4 THE ON/OFF RECORD CONTINUUM : INFLECTIONAL & LEXICAL CHANGE 
In chapter three (7.3) I outlined Brown and Levinson's on/off record continuum , 
which has to do with the degree to which expressions of interpersonal meaning make 
clear the speaker's communicative intent (1978:73/4) . In short , when a speaker 
goes off record his communicative intention is relatively ambiguous , and when a 
speaker goes on record it is relatively unambiguous . I outlined this continuum in 
terms of the linguistic coding of interpersonal meaning : the more off record , the 
more language expression is open to mutual modification between cotext and context: 
Where the lexico-grammatical coding of interpersonal meaning is unclear or 
absent , such meaning is highly sensitive to particular configurations of 
cotextual and contextual features , so that a change in any one of these 
may substantially alter our interpretation of the whole : 
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F no clear coding 
F 	  
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C illocutionary force 
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DECREASING ACCESSIBILITY TO MUTUAL MODIFICATION 
Fig. 5 
What we find is that when expressions of interpersonal meaning (suasion) 
are lexico-grammatically coded , they are less open to mutual modification 
than when they are grammatically coded , so that in Givon's terms they 
are , in effect , more grammaticired . Thus they code meanings which are 
more 'on record' , less 'context sensitive' : in such cases , lexical 
changes (switching to a stative verb) or inflectional changes do not 
change the illocutionary force of an expression in any clear way . Rather, 
such changes lead to form/weaning incongruences , where there is a clash 
between the lexicalized stem (which implies a suasive meaning) and the 
inflectional and/or lexical content of the predicate (which implies a non 
suasive meaning) . 
Notice , then , how in 10 (which is grammatically coded) both inflectional change 
and lexical change (switching to a stative) lead not to incongruity but to a change 
in illocutionary force : 
10. Could you : have left ? (Questioning hearer ability , not suasive) 
; understand ? 
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In contrast 11 , which is lexico-grammatically coded , using a specific lexical 
and 'performative' verb , has more 'independent meaning' than the modal stem . 
Consequently changes in the cotext do not shift the likely illocutionary force as 
they did in 10 . Instead , what we find is that lexical and inflectional changes 
are in many cases semantically incongruous with a performative stem : 
11. I request you : ?to have left (inflectional change) 
?to understand (lexical change : stative verb) 
Alternatively , lexico-grammatical coding may be achieved through lexical 
insertion , whereby a lexical item is 'inserted' into a modal stem which otherwise 
remains unchanged . Here again , as with performative prefixes , a suasive meaning 
is placed more 'on record' and inflectional and lexical changes in the predicate 
may become incongruous : 
12. Would you please : ?have left 
?understand 
I refer to the modal form in 10 as 'grammatical coding' because modal stems do not 
in themselves and on their own h.;ve a clear or relatively specific range of 
reference . I suggested in chapter three (1.5) that specificity of reference helps 
us to distinguish between 'more grammatical' (less specific reference) and 'more 
lexical' (more specific reference) (cf. Widdowson 1983:93/4) . In other words , 
the modal stem (could you) does not in itself code any specific kind of meaning : 
rather , it may signal a variety of meanings depending on context and cotext 
The kind of grammatical (modal) coding which occurs in 10 is often referred to as 
conventional indirectness (Searle 1979:chapter 2) . That is , forms are used which 
in particular contexts have conventionally unambiguous and suasive meanings , but 
which do not explicitly code suasion , so that the modal stem could you 	 ? may 
signal a request for information or a request for action . It is sometimes said 
that there is a functional motivation for this indirectness . According to Brown 
and Levinson , being conventionally indirect is itself an interpersonal strategy 
for face saving . They argue that with this strategy : 
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.... a speaker is faced with opposing tensions : the desire to give 
[hearer] an 'out' by being indirect , and the desire to go on record. In 
this case it is solved by the compromise of conventional indirectness .. 
(1978:137) 
It is on account of this indirectness that such forms are more open to mutual 
modification than their 'on record' , lexicalized counterparts . 
With implicatures , which involve no clear grammatical coding of interpersonal 
meaning , it should be quite clear that both lexical and inflectional changes can 
very easily change illocutionary force , and that the illocutionary force of a 
single implicative expression is wide open to variation as we shift from one 
context to another . 
As with the other components of contextual distance , what I am after here is a 
general semantic congruence between form and meaning , but I am not suggesting that 
the interpersonal meanings which I have defined (speaker determinacy and so on) are 
necessarily implied each time a congruent conceptual form is used . 
2. THE CODING OF INTERLOCUTOR DEPENDENCE & THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
2.1 Overview 
In section two I will argue that the more clearly interlocutor dependence is coded 
through the language , the more conceptual lexico-grammar is used ; that is , clear-
coding of interlocutor dependence is expressed through forms which are 
inflectionally and lexically restricted , and which involve temporally opaque VP's 
which are unmarked for distinctions of aspect . These linguistic restrictions and 
constraints are congruent with the conceptual constraint implicit within the very 
notion of interlocutor dependence : that the action of one interlocutor is 
constrained by its dependence on the willingness of another . I will present this 
argument in the wider context of the on/off record continuum (figure 5) , arguing 
that it is only where interlocutor dependence is coded lexico-grammatically that 
its suasive meaning is clearly 'on record' . 
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2.2 Interlocutor dependent speech acts and the want/willing distribution 
I do not suggest here that different speech acts - request , promise etc. - are 
categorically distinct one from another : indeed , the on/off record continuum 
demonstrates that in a great many cases , the form/speech act congruence is only 
approximate , so that (depending on coding and context) one 'act' may be virtually 
indistinguishable from another . Nevertheless , in cases where the speech act 
expression is clearly 'on record' , the following speech acts are implicitly 
interlocutor dependent : 
+ 	  
SPEECH ACT 
+ 	  
REQUEST ACTION 
+ 	  
REQUEST PERMISSION 
+ 	  
GIVE PERMISSION 
+ 	  
OFFER 
+ 	  
PROMISE 



















































The first two speech act categories here are directives , the second three are 
commissives (Austin 1962) : hence the difference in distribution between the want 
and willing roles . The want role keys in to Brown and Levinson's desire to be 
unimpeded , while the willing role relates to the desire to save face (1978:63) . 
With expressions of interlocutor dependence , there is what Brown and Levinson 
refer to as a multiple motivation (1978:150) : the motivation to get something done 
(want) combined with the motivation to save face or be approved of (willing) . By 
deferring to the hearer's perspective , the speaker - particularly with directives 
-provides the hearer with 'a line of escape' , a 'way out' from having his freedom 
of action directly constrained . 
I argue that both with the grammatical coding of indirect forms , and with the 
lexico-grammatical coding of performatives 	 interlocutor dependence is clearly 
implied . So if either the want or the will inc component is explicitly cancelled 
out through additional cotext , the effect is often an incongruous juxtaposition of 
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senses : 
?13. Could you give me a hand , even though I don't want you to ? 
(request stem : S want cancelled through cotext) 
?14. Would you like me to give you a hand ? I'm not really prepared to , though 
(offer stem : S willing cancelled through cotext) 
With interlocutor dependent directives , only the hearer willing role need be 
explicitly coded , since this in itself generally implies speaker want : 
15. Are you prepared to ; do the shopping ? 
	 (coding request) 
Are you willing to 
With interlocutor dependent commissives , only the speaker willing role need be 
explicitly coded , since this in itself is likely to imply hearer want : 
16. I'm happy to 
	 : do the shopping 
	 (coding offer) 
I'm willing to 
And similarly , if the hearer want role is questioned , then speaker willing is 
implied without the need for further coding : 
17. Do you want me to do the shopping ? 
	 (coding offer) 
2.3 INTERLOCUTOR DEPENDENT SPEECH ACTS & THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
In this section I will go through each of the speech acts outlined in figure 6 
arguing that in each case there is a form/meaning congruence consistent both with 
the continuum of contextual distance (figure 4) , and with its mode of expression 
in terms of on/off record (figure 5) . 
2.3.1 Requests for hearer action 
Requests for hearer action are subject to lexical and inflectional restriction , 
involving opaque verb phrases which do not code aspect , as in 18/19 below : 
18.  Could you do the shopping ? (inflectional restriction) 
Would you The doing the shopping ? 
Can you ?have done the shopping 
19.  Could you 
Would you 
hear me ? 
recognize Tom ? 
(lexical restriction) 
Can you understand what he's saying ? 
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These restrictions reflect the place of interlocutor dependence on the continuum of 
contextual distance : being conceptual , expressions of this kind of dependence are 
expressed through conceptual forms , and the linguistic restrictions - lexical and 
inflectional - reflect the conceptual constraint of the action being dependent on 
the hearer's sanction . In terms of the on/off record continuum , 18 and 19 are 
indirect , grammatically coded through the modal stem . Hence they are open to 
mutual modification , so that the have done inflection in 18 codes not a directive 
but a hypothetical question about past ability : could/would ,vou have done the 
showing ? 
Similarly it is a question about the hearer's ability/capacity which is coded when 
statives are used : could ,vou hear me ? meaning something like were you able to 
hear me ? . Interlocutor dependent forms are (more or less) unacceptable with 
statives because it is a logical contradiction to imply the desire or willingness 
of someone to do something which they cannot do as a matter of conscious volition . 
Another familiar way in which requests may get grammatically coded is through a 
conditional clause structure : 
20. I'll be very grateful if you : do the shopping 
?are doing the shopping/ ?understand Tom 
Here again , there are inflectional and lexical restrictions , as 20 illustrates . 
I refer to 20 as grammatical coding because it is clearly not the 
condition/consequence form which codes interlocutor dependence , but its use with 
the lexical item grateful and its 'first conditional' form . Thus a change of 
inflection can lead to a very substantial shift in meaning : 
21. I'd have been very grateful if you'd done the shopping (not suasive) 
When interlocutor dependence is coded lexico-grammatically it is more 'on record' 
and , consequently , less open to this kind of mutual modification . Lexico- 
grammatical coding may be achieved through the use of performative stems (221 	 or 
through the lexical insertion of please (23) : 
24. Could I 
Can 
May 






by 4.00 	 (inflectional restriction) 
believe in God 
understand what he's saying 
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22.  I request you to : The doing/?have done the shopping (?inflections) 
?hear/ ?recognize/ ?understand him (?statives) 
23.  Could you please : ?be doing/ ?have done the shopping (?inflections) 
Would ?hear/ ?recognize/ ?understand him (?statives) 
Can 
The inflectional and lexical changes in 22/23 cannot shift the illocutionary force 
in the way they did with 18/19/21 , because the coding of interlocutor dependence 
is too 'strong' for this to happen . On actual occasions of use , the hearer might 
work very hard to 'read in' a suasive meaning with these forms , following the 
cooperative principle (trice 1975) . In many cases , though , the juxtaposition of 
suasive and interlocutor dependent stem with a 'non suasive' predicate is likely to 
lead to a semantic 'clash' sufficient to render the utterance incalculable (as in 
22/23) . 
2.3.2 Requests for permission 
Requests for permission work in very much the same way as requests for hearer 
action . Thus they too are lexically and inflectionally restricted 
As with requests for hearer action , most of the lexical and inflectional changes 
in 24 and 25 express a change to a non suasive illocutionary force . In other 
words , interlocutor dependence is only clearly coded where there is an opaque VP 
unmarked for aspect , or where the main verb is dynamic . With stative and with 
VP's which are both inflected and marked for aspect , it is hypothetical meaning 
which is most probably coded . 
When coded lexico-grammatically , requests for permission are more 'on record' and 
less open to mutual modification , as with the performative stem in 26 : 
26. Do you permit me to : ?be leaving/have left by 4.00 	 (?inflection) 
?understand what he's saying 	 (?.. ,;tative verb) 
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Again , these linguistic restrictions are congruent with the conceptual constraints 
implicit within the concept of interlocutor dependence . 
2.3.3 Giving permission 
The pattern here is similar to that with request forms . Grammatically coded forms 
are restricted (27) , so that statives and inflected/opaque VP's coding aspect tend 
to signal a shift to hypothetical meaning : 
27. You may 	 leave at any time 
can : The leaving/have left at any time (inflectional restriction) 
?believe in God/ ?understand Tom (lexical restriction) 
When coded lexico-grammatically , as with the performative stem in 28 , the 
interlocutor dependence of permission is more strongly coded , more 'on record' : 
in such cases the result is an odd juxtaposition : 
28. I permit you to leave at any time 
?be leaving/have left at any time (inflectional restriction) 
?believe in God/ ?understand Tom (lexical restriction) 
 
2.3.4 Offers of action 
The general pattern here is identical to that I have already argued for with 
respect to requests and giving permission . Again grammatical coding is 
inflectionally and lexically restricted (29) : 
29. May I 
Shall I 
give you a hand ? 
?be giving/have given you a hand ? 
?recognize her/ ?understand him ? 
 
Being indirect and 'hedged' between on and off record , the expressions in 29 are 
open to mutual modification , so that shall I recognize her ? may on occasion be 
understood to mean will I be able to recognize her ? . Alternatively , other types 
of lexical choice in the predicate (aside from statives) may lead to ambiguity 
between one speech act orientation and another . In 30 , for example , the 
predicate itself does not clearly indicate where the direction of interest lies . 
If it is understood to be in the speaker's interests , then a 'request for 
permission' interpretation is most likely . If it is understood to be in the 
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hearer's interest , then an 'offer' interpretation will be favoured : 
30. Can I open the window ? 
Such mutual modification is almost ruled out where performatives are used : 
31. I'm offering to open the window 	 (clearly coded as offer) 
This distinction , between the mutual modification of grammatical coding and the 
more 'on record' stance of lexico-grammatical coding , is consistent with the 
on/off record continuum (figure 5) . 
2.3.5 Promising 
In the case of promisingthe situation is a little different . Here we cannot say 
that the -ing or the have # 	 inflections are inconsistent with a suasive 
meaning . Instead , there seems to be a gradient of inflection . The -ing 
inflection used with will or going to codes circumstantial modality (cf. chapter 
three : 5.2) , implying that a future action is the product of a current 
arrangement which may be external to the speaker as participant : 
32. I'll be leaving around 4.00 
32 is a rather 'weak' form of promise , because the coding of circumstantial 
modality suggests that the speaker may be promising something which s/he is not 
personally in control of , so that the speaker's personal commitment to performing 
the action may be in some doubt . If 32 is lexicalized through the use of a 
performative stem , there is a slight 'mismatch' between stem (coding a promise) 
and predicate (coding circumstantial modality) : 
33. I promise that I'll be leaving around 4.00 
34 is more on record and so more clearly a promise 	 because the inflections here 
do not imply any absence of speaker control over the action being promised : 
34. I will 	 leave 	 by 4.00 , (I promise) 
have left 
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There are clear lexical restrictions here . Stative verbs , like the -ing 
inflection but more strongly , imply that the speaker not directly in control of 
the action predicated : 
35. I'll ?hear from her 	 , (I promise) 
?recognize him 
?feel much better soon 
  
The main distinguishing feature between promises and threats is that with the 
former the predicated action is in the hearer's interests , while with the latter 
it is not . This potential ambiguity is highly context sensitive , so that even an 
utterance such as the performative 34 could , in certain circumstances , be 
construed as a threat . 
3. THE CODING OF SPEAKER DETERHINACY & THE FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
3.1 Introduction 
I have argued that with expressions of interlocutor dependence , linguistic 
constraints on inflectional and lexical choice are congruent with a conceptual 
constraint whereby the action of one interlocutor is constrained by its dependence 
on the sanction of another . A very similar congruence exists with expressions of 
speaker determinacy . Speaker determinacy , I have said , has to do with the degree 
of authoritative personal commitment which the speaker expresses to the bringing 
about of an action : 
3. I order you to do the shopping 
The conceptual constraint which the speaker's determinacy (potentially) places on 
the hearer is congruent with linguistic constraints on inflectional and lexical 
choice : 
35. I order you to : ?be doing/?have done the shopping by 4.00 
?recognize Bill/ ?understand the problem 
When a speaker is clearly determinate in this way 	 s/he gives primacy to the want 
to be unimpeded over the desire to be approved of (Brown & Levinson 1978:63) . Thus 
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while expressions of interlocutor dependence imply an allocation of both want and 
willing roles between interlocutors , with speaker determinacy it is the want (to 
be unimpeded) which is paramount . 
3.2 SPEAKER DETERMINACY & CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE : A FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
In chapter four (2.5.2) I discussed the form/meaning congruence of participant 
determinacy within the category of intention , suggesting that the strength of 
determinacy depends on the authority and commitment attributed to the 
participant agent . With speaker determinacy we have the interpersonal counterpart 
of participant determinacy , so that it is the degree of the speaker's implied 
authority and commitment which helps to distinguish between 'less' and 'more 
determinate' meanings : 
SPEAKER DETERMINACY 
where speaker attempts to get hearer to perform action A'through 
expressing his/her personal and authoritative commitment 
weaker determinacy stronger determinacy 
speaker expresses personal commitment 






command order demand insist 
commitment 	 authority 	 you mus t 
you have (got) to 	 beg urge entreat 
you need to 
conditional forms 
Fig. 7 
What we find here is that the degree of linguistic restriction is congruent with 
the degree of implied speaker authority , so that the form/meaning congruence is 
distributed in the following way : 
weaker determinacy 
less inflectional restriction 
lexically restricted 
opaque VP's may code aspect 
stronger determinacy 
more inflectional restriction 
lexically restricted 
opaque VP's rarely code aspect 
increasing contextual distance/use of conceptuai forms 
Fig. 8 
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3.2.1 Weak speaker determinacy 
So expressions of weaker speaker determinacy are generally coded through forms 
which are less conceptual than expressions of stronger speaker determinacy . Thus 
the expressions of weaker determinacy in 36 are accessible to inflectional change 
in the complement clause , and hence to the coding of aspect within the opaque VP : 
36. 	 I beg 
urge 
entreat 




Weaker speaker determinacy may also be expressed through conditional forms . In 
such cases , the speaker explicitly considers the possibility that the hearer will 
not comply with his wishes , through the condition clause . Such forms consequently 
code weaker determinacy by implying a reduced level of speaker authority : 
37. If you don't leave 
haven't left 
aren't leaving 
by 4.00 , I'll : punish you 
reward you 
  
Note that in 37 the element of weak speaker determinacy may cut across a number of 
'different' speech acts , so that 37 may function in certain contexts as a promise 
(I '11 remsrd,vou) or as a threat (I '11 punish you) . 
In 36 and 37 the element of weak speaker determinacy is carried through the 
implication that the speaker knows that his/her authority is limited . But weak 
determinacy may also be expressed where the speaker's personal commitment is 
implied to be limited , as in 38 : 





With 38 the implication is that the element of authority comes from a source which 
may well be external to the speaker (cf. Leech 1971:75) , so that the speaker's own 
personal authority is limited . What we have here is the interpersonal counterpart 
to the expression of circumstantial modality , which I discussed in chapter three 
(section 5.2.2) . Again , this weaker determinacy can be expressed through form' 
which are less inflectionally restricted , as in 38 . 
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3.2.2 Strong speaker determinacy 
Strong speaker determinacy is coded through such verbs as order and command . These 
verbs clearly imply that the speaker has (or wishes to create the impression that 
s/he has) considerable personal authority . Congruent with this , such expressions 
are inflectionally restricted to opaque VP's which do not code aspect , although 
some forms may be considered less unacceptable than others 











As with many such complement taking verbs , what is demonstrated here is a high and 
direct level of interdependency between grammar (the inflectional form of 
complement VP) and lexis (the main clause verb which signals the level of 
determinacy) . 
All such expressions of speaker determinacy are lexically restricted - whether they 
code weak or strong determinacy - because one cannot directly 'tell' someone to do 
something which they cannot do volitionally . Hence the unacceptability of many 
statives in the complement clause : 
40. I beg 
urge 
order 
you to : ?hear me 
?resemble Tom 
   
3.3 SPEAKER DETERMINACY AND THE ON/OFF RECORD CONTINUUM 
I have argued that with the on/off record continuum , grammatical coding is less 
'on record' than lexico-grammatical coding (figure 5) . Speaker determinacy can be 
grammatically coded through modal operators (41) , where there is considerable 
potential for mutual modification : 
41. You must : have left by 4.00 
resemble Tom 
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In 41 the inflectional and lexical change leads to semantic ambiguity : does 41 
code speaker determinacy , or a kind of logical necessity ? (you must have left by 
4.00 because I 'phoned then and nobody answered) . Grammatical coding through 
conditional forms is similarly open to mutual modification (cf. example 37 above) . 
Another example of the grammatical coding of speaker determinacy is the imperative 
form : 
42. Get here by six o'clock 
The imperative form is open to considerable modification through context , so that 
in appropriate circumstances 42 might function simply as a request for information 
(as in do you reckon you'll get here by 600 ?) rather than as an expression of 
speaker determinacy . 
However , when weak speaker determinacy is grammatically coded through modal 
operators , lexical and inflectional changes do not lead to a clear change of 
illocutionary force , because weak determinacy can be expressed across a wider 
range of inflectional and lexical choice (cf. 38 above) . 
When speaker determinacy is lexico-grammatically coded through 'performative' verbs 
such as beg/Urge/Order , such mutual modification is rarely possible , so that 
inflectional or lexical change leads to incongruity rather than a change in 
illocutionary force , as in 39 and 40 above . I am using the term 'performative' 
here in a somewhat looser sense than that intended by Austin (1962) , since 
strictly speaking terms such as 'urge' or 'beg' do not actually 'name' distinct 
speech acts . What these terms do do , however , is explicitly code an 'act' of 
speaker determinacy , in a way which is a great deal less context-sensitive than in 
the case of grammatical coding . 
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4. THE CODING OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION : DEFINING CIRCUMSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION 
In coding circumstantial justification the speaker implies that there are grounds 
within the ideational context to justify the hearer's performing an action, while 
the speaker holds back from explicitly signalling personal commitment to the 
performing of the action , as in 4 : 
4. Perhaps you ought to do the shopping 
In 4 the speaker's implied justification is not directly interpersonal , in that 
there is no clear coding here of willing or of want : speaker is not , that is , 
implying 'do this because I want you to' (as would be the case with speaker 
determinacy) . Rather , the implication is that there is some good reason for doing 
the shopping which may have nothing to do with whether the speaker personally wants 
the action performed . 
When want or willing are coded in speaker determinacy or interlocutor dependence , 
it is one or both of these roles which furnishes part of the interpersonal 
justification for the predicated action . Thus with requests , the implication is 
'do this (if you are willing) because I want you to' ; with offers , the 
implication is 'I am willing to do this on the assumption that you want me to' , 
and so on . But with 4 above , this pattern of interpersonal justification is not 
repeated . It may well be that on particular occasions of use the speaker of 4 is 
held to be personally committed to the action predicated , but such a commitment is 
not coded within the language form . Instead of an interpersonal justification , 4 
codes a circumstantial justification , a justification which appears to be 
'external' to the wishes or desires of the interlocutors involved : the speaker 
appears to 'hold back' from clearly indicating any personal or interpersonal 
involvement . 
The notion that expressions of circumstantial juctification do not commit the 
speaker to going 'on record' as personally wanting the action performed is not 
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entirely uncontroversial . According to Searle (1979) , for example , it is a 
defining feature of all directives that the speaker has this kind of commitment : 
The illocutionary point of [directives] consists in the fact that they 
are attempts .... by the speaker to get the hearer to do something ... 
The direction of fit is world-to-words and the sincerity condition is 
want (or wish or desire) . 
(1979:13/14 My italics) 
I think that this kind of blanket equation between directive and the want role is 
misleading . We can , as I have already suggested , highlight the want and willing 
elements of speaker determinacy and interlocutor dependence by observing the 
incongruity of expressions which both code want or willing and -through additional 
cotext -appear to cancel them out : 
?13. Could you give me a hand , even though I don't want you to ? 
(request stem : S want cancelled through cotext) 
?14. Would you like me to give you a hand ? I'm not really prepared to , though 
(offer stem : S willing cancelled through cotext) 
But with expressions of circumstantial determinacy , this kind of cotextual 
modification is quite in order :. 
43. You ought to do the shopping , whether or not you want to ; and 
it doesn't matter to me personally whether you do or not , but you know 
how ratty Jane gets if there's no food when she comes home from work 
There is no uncomfortable juxtaposition in 43 because the explicit denial of 
speaker want and hearer willing is perfectly consistent with the circumstantial 
justification implicit in the modal stem . 
4.2 CIRCUMSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION AND SPEECH ACTS 
There are a number of 'speech acts' or 'functions' which typically express 
circumstantial justification , including giving advice , asserting hearer 
obligation , warnings and threats . 
In the case of advice there is no presumption that the speaker is personally 
committed in any obvious way , and this somewhat 'impersonal' element is consistent 
with our everyday understanding of the term . As the Concise Oxford Dictionary puts 
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it , advice has to do simply with an "opinion given or offered as to action" 
(1964:20) . In addition , though , advice implies that an action is predicated in 
the interests of the hearer . 
Example 4 might well function as a piece of advice . But in a slightly different 
context it could as easily be an expression of obligation , meaning something like 
it is your duty in these circumstances to do the showing . But here , too , there 
is an implication of a justification which may well be external to the 
interpersonal relationship between interlocutors : the justification for this 
obligation may , for example , have to do with the hearer's relationship to a third 
party , as might be the implication in 44 
44. You should do what your father tells you 
Here again , there is no clear implication that the speaker personally wants the 
hearer to do this . What is relatively clear is that a certain course of action is 
deemed appropriate in the light of circumstances which have to do with a 
relationship involving the hearer . 
Similarly , if the speaker gives a warning to the hearer , the justification has 
its source in a particular configuration of circumstances , rather than in the 
wants or desires of the speaker , so that again there is no clear implication that 
the speaker is personally commited to the performance of the action : 
45. Unless you get home by 12.00 , Tom will be very angry with you ! 
So in 45 the speaker is not saying do this because I want you to , but do this 
because there are circumstances which in themselves justify it - circumstances 
which have to do with Tom's precipitate anger . 
With threats the situation is slightly different . In making a threat the speaker 
is invariably understood to personally want the hearer to undertake a particular 
action , or to refrain from doing so . So a threat may be expressed through a form 
which codes speaker determinacy , as in 46 : 
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46. Don't under any circumstances contact the police , OK ? 
But a threat presupposes that if the hearer does (or does not) perform action A', 
an action which speaker wants hearer (not) to perform , then the speaker will 
respond with a reprisal action which is contrary to the hearer's interests . So 
while speaker determinacy need only imply that the speaker wants an action 
undertaken , a threat necessarily implies both speaker want and (from the hearer's 
perspective) a circumstantial justification : do action A'._t-c- pi,,d_r_h4ppening 
The kind of circumstantial justification of 45 , then , might well express a 
threat : 
47. Unless you get home by 12.00 , I'll get very angry ! 
4.3 CIRCUMSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION & CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE : A FORM/MEANING CONGRUENCE 
4.3.1 Introduction and overview 
In section one of this chapter I outlined the continuum of contextual distance in 
so far as it pertains to interpersonal meaning : 
0 
B clear speaker determinacy N 
S + 	
 T 
E contextual/ideational 	 1 
	 +conceptual/interpersonal U 
3 implicatures COOING OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION : 
I 	 + 	 I 
N clear int. dependence 
G Fig. 9 
On this continuum circumstantial justification is marked as being less contextually 
distanced , less conceptual and less interpersonal than speaker determinacy or 
interlocutor dependence . This is because with circumstantial justification the 
speaker does not code either of the two interpersonal roles , want or willing . In 
'holding back' from clearly coding such an interpersonal involvement with the 
predicated action , the speaker does not intrude into the interpersonal context of 
the speaker/hearer relationship as clearly or as explicitly as s/he does with 
determinacy or interlocutor dependence . Rather than imply want or willing , the 
speaker implies a justification within the ideational context ie_ in the context 
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which is external to the immediate , interpersonal relationship between addressor 
and addressee . There is an element of Halliday's ideational observer function 
here . The speaker , as it were , observes the ideational context and draws out 
implications from it which have relevance to the hearer . 
If the form/meaning congruence of contextual distance is to hold here , it needs to 
be shown that expressions of circumstantial justification are coded through forms 
which are less conceptual : that is , forms which are less restricted . What I 
argue for here is that forms which code circumstantial justification have the 
following features : 
a) Inflectional and lexical restriction - forms coding circumstantial 
justification are less restricted than forms coding determinacy or interlocutor 
dependence . 
b) Opacity - forms which code circumstantial justification are therefore not 
restricted to opaque VP's which do not code aspect 
The form/meaning congruence of circumstantial determinacy fits into the wider 
framework in the following way : 





clear int. dependence 
tight inflectional & lexical 
restriction ; restriction on 
independent coding of aspect 
implicatures 	 COOING OF CIRCUM. JUSTIFICATION 
unrestricted inflectional change may be acceptable 
transparent 	 opacity : some coding of aspect 
stative verbs : sometimes acceptable 
increasing contextual distance 
Fig. 10 	 increasing grammaticization : use of conceptual forms 
As I suggested earlier , this relative lack of lexical and inflectional constraints 
is a linguistic reflection of the relative lack of conceptual constraint which the 
speaker imposes on the hearer . 
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As for the on/off record continuum , the distinction between grammatical coding 
(less on record) and lexico-grammatical coding (more on record) does not clearly 
apply here. The reason for this is that circumstantial justification , precisely 
because it may be expressed through inflectional and lexical change , does not 
undergo the same kind of illocutionary changes which such changes produce with 
determinacy or with interlocutor dependence . Even with 'performative' stems , this 
kind of variability is sometimes acceptable : 
48. I'm warning you that you should : be leaving : by 4.00 
I advise you to 	 : have left : 
Instead of being open to this relatively systematic distinction between grammatical 
and lexico-grammatical coding , expressions of circumstantial justification are 
more intrinsically ambiguous , and this ambiguity - which has something in common 
with the contextual dependence of implicatures - is a reflection of their place on 
the continuum of contextual distance . In other words , being located between 
implicatures (more contextual) and determinacy/interlocutor dependence (more 
conceptual) , expressions of circumstantial justification have features in common 
with both . It is certainly true that on some occasions expressions of 
circumstantial justification appear open to relatively systematic mutual 
modification , in common with more conceptual forms . So a lexical change may , 
with grammatical coding , shift the illocutionary force from 'suasion' through to 
logical necessity , as in 49 : 
49. You ought to recognize him when you see him (use of stative verb) 
And it is also true that this kind of illocutionary change may create incongruity 
when colligated with a performative stem , as in 50 : 
?50. I advise you to recognize him when you see him 
49 and 50 , then , show that expressions of circumstantial determinacy may , on 
occasion , be open to mutual modification in a way which is consistent with the 
on/off record continuum (fig. 5) . But they also have much in common with their 
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more contextual neighbours , implicatures . Thus 4 is in itself ambiguous , and 
only through knowledge of a particular context could we begin to decide whether it 
is functioning as a warning , or a threat , or an admonition of obligation , or 
simply a piece of advice : 
4. Perhaps you ought to do the shopping 
In 4.3.2 I will enlarge on the point that expressions of circumstantial 
justification are open to considerable inflectional and lexical variation . Then , 
in 4.3.3 , I will develop the point about mutual modification . 
4.3.2 Circumstantial determinacy and conceptual form 
I have said that expressions of circumstantial justification are less restricted 
than expressions of speaker determinacy or interlocutor dependence . In terms of 
lexical restriction , there are some stative verbs which are (more or less) 
incongruous with a suasive meaning . These include those statives which signal 
unaffecting intellectual states (cf. Appendix A) , for example the verb recognize 
in example 49 above . 
But there are other statives which are acceptable with expressions of 
circumstantial justification : 
51. You really ought to hear Jane talk about Bill 
see Bill when he's playing tennis 
feel better within a few days 
experience living overseas 
 
In 51 there is a suasive meaning which is consistent with the notion of 
circumstantial justification : the implication is not 1 want you to hear Jane , for 
example , but there is some quality attaching to Jane's talking about Bill which in 
itself justifies hearing her . 
As for inflectional restriction , almost all forms expressing circumstantial 
justification are accessible to inflectional variation , whether or not they 
involve lexico-grammatical coding : 
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52.  You should 	 leave 
ought to 	 : have left 
by 4.00 
would be well advised to : be leaving 
53.  (I warn you that) If you don't leave 	 : by 4.00 , there'll be trouble 
aren't leaving 
haven't left 
54.  I advise you to leave by 4.00 
warn have left 
recommend be leaving 
In contrast to expressions of interlocutor dependence and (strong) speaker 
determinacy , all these opaque VP's can be inflected to code aspectual 
distinctions , through coding perfective aspect (as with the have # edform) or 
progressive aspect (as with the be # -ing form) . 
4.3.3 Circumstantial justification and ambiguity : advise , warnings & threats 
Expressions of circumstantial justification are more ambiguous (between one suasive 
speech act and another) than coded expressions of speaker determinacy or 
interlocutor dependence . This is because they are less conceptual/interpersonal, 
lacking any clear coding of want/willing and bearing a more direct , justifying 
relationship with the ideational context . 
As I argued above , there are many cases where it is quite unclear from the cotext 
whether advice , a warning or a threat is intended , as with example 4 : 
4. You ought to do the shopping 
4 is particularly ambiguous because there is no explicit statement of why the 
speaker considers such an action to be justifiable : whenever the justification is 
left implicit in this way , ambiguity will be particularly strong . But when the 
justification is made explicit , then we begin to get a clearer idea of the 
speaker's illocutionary intent : 
55. You ought to do the shopping . You'll feel much better if you do 
In 55 the speaker 'spells out' a justification in terms of a consequence which is 
perceived as being positive : you'll feel better. . We might therefore conclude (in 
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the absence of further contextual information) that 55 is intended as advice , but 
not as a warning or a threat . But notice how this perception shifts somewhat if 
the consequence is expressed differently : 
56. You ought to do the shopping , unless you want your father to punish you 
In 56 the consequence (of not performing the action) is expressed as negative to 
the hearer , and as coming from a source which is external to speaker , from a 
'third party' . In this case we are likely to think that 56 is intended as some 
kind• of warning . But if the consequence were phrased slightly differently , this 
perception shifts once again : 
57. You ought to do the shopping , unless you want me to punish you 
Here the source of the 'consequent action' is the speaker rather than a third 
party , and in such cases we are likely to read 57 not as a warning , but as a 
threat . 
I do not suggest that these distinctions are concrete or in any way independent of 
context . Indeed , my main point here is that expressions of circumstantial 
justification tend to be particularly ambiguous . Nevertheless they do illustrate , 
once again , how context and cotext are open to all kinds of mutual modification . 
By way of summary : 
CONSEQUENCE OF NON PERFORMANCE 
IMPLICIT 	 EXPLICITLY CODED 
highly ambiguous 
eg. 4 
'positive' 	 'clearly negative' 	 'clearly negative' 
source is not speaker 	 source is speaker 
'advice' 	 'warning' 	 'threat' 




Implicatures provide perhaps the best example of what Givon calls 'language in the 
pragmatic mode'. Although implicatures such as 58 are grammaticized in terms of the 
ideational context (so that the relationship between agents , patients and so forth 
are grammatically clarified) , they ungrammaticized in that there is no coding of 
interpersonal meaning . 58 , in short , observes but does not intrude , its 
direction of fit (in Searle's terms) is categorically words to world : 
58. The policeman's crossing the road 
In terms of the continuum of contextual distance , implicatures are thus at the 
contextual extreme : they make direct reference only to features of the ideational 
context , and there is , in principle , no restriction on inflection or on lexical 
content . 
In terms of the on/off record continuum , implicatures are 'off record' . What 
this means is that an utterance such as 58 may express any number of 'different' 
speech acts depending on the context in which it is spoken . It may function as a 
threat , or a warning , or even a request . In a particular context , ofcourse , an 
implicative expression may well be 'on record' , so that if 59 is uttered by a 
customer in a chemists's there will be virtually no difficulty whatsoever in 
interpreting it as a directive : 
59. I need something for my cold 
I have already suggested that expressions of circumstantial justification are more 
ideational , less contextually distanced than expressions of , say , interlocutor 
dependence . With implicatures we reach the logical end-point of this process . 
Like circumstantial justification , implicatures imply that there are grounds 
within the ideational context to justify the performing of a predicated action . 
But wheras the coding of circumstantial justification involves going 'on record' 
and making clear that a suasive meaning is intended , with implicatures there is no 
such coding of suasion . Thus implicatures are all the more accessible to mutual 
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modification between cotext and context . 
So implicatures may implicate an interpersonal meaning through referring to and 
coding components of the ideational context . There is , presumably , an enormously 
wide range of ways in which this can be done , and it would be a fruitless task to 
attempt a detailed categorization of how these ideational references may 
be expressed . In very broad terms , though , Brown and Levinson (1978:220) refer 
to the way in which implicatures (or viable hints , as they put it) often involve 
reference to the motives for performing an action (as in 60) : 
60. It's cold in here (=.) so shut the window) 
Brown and Levinson's reference to motives can , I think , be expanded . What 
implicatures often do is refer to features of the ideational context which (by 
implication) function as motivations for action . Thus although implicatures do not 
code interpersonal meaning , they can be (very loosely) grouped according to which 
'motivating' components of the ideational context they refer to . Thus they may 
refer to the setting (as in 60) , or to objects and processes in the ideational 
context , as in 61 : 
61. Kettle's boiling ! 
Alternatively they may refer to participants in the ideational context . They may 
be speaker-oriented (62) or hearer-oriented (63) or oriented to a third party (64): 
62.  I want that window 
	 closed 0:-) shut the window,) 
63.  Do you want to eat something ? I'm offering you some fond?) 
64.  Bill needs a hand Os. > give 8111 a hand) 
What makes these participant references ideational is the fact that there is no 
explicit expression of how the state of one individual participant bears on the 
desired action of another : that is to say , these are references to the individual 
state of participants conceived as independent entities - but there is no clear 
indication of inter-personal relevance of these states . With 62-64 , this inter-
personal relevance may be 'read in' to the language through context , so that 
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through context the illocutionary force may become 'further focussed'. But the more 
this kind of relevance is directly expressed , the more on record and the less 
implicative the expression becomes . Note how 62-64 can be altered so as to 
include this kind of inter-personal perspective : 
65. I want you to close that window (coding of speaker determinacy) 
66. Do you want me to get you something to eat ? (coding of int. dependence) 
67. You ought to give Bill a hand (coding of circumstantial justification) 
6. EXPRESSION AND MEANING : SPEECH ACT CONDITIONS 
6.1 Overview 
In chapter one I referred to Searle's work on speech act conditions (1969/1979) . 
Searle 	 defines those conditions (preparatory , sincerity etc.) which , he claims, 
need to be 'in place' if a particular language expression is to validly constitute 
a request , or an offer , or whatever . I argue that such conditions are not 
designed to take much account of the kinds of form/meaning congruences I have been 
investigating , and particularly the distinction between on record and off record . 
Consequently there is a tendency to assign a specific speech act label -such as 
'request' - to language expressions which do not always merit it . I suggest that 
a more illuminative approach might be to work towards 'expression conditions' , in 
which such factors as the coding of want or willing in language form is used as a 
means of distinguishing - however imprecisely - between one category of speech act 
expression and another . 
6.2 Want , willing and speech act expression/meaning congruences 
I have argued that with implicatures , there is no interpersonal coding : no clear 
indication of how the state of ideational objects or the ideational setting have a 
bearing on the potential action of either interlocutor ; no clear expression of how 
the state of participants bears on the wish or willingness for an action to be 
performed . With implicatures , it is perfectly possible for such ideational coding 
to implicate , through Gricean maxims , that a suasive meaning is intended , but it 
requires a further and additional process to work out not only that a directive is 
intended , but also that a 'request' or an 'offer' is being implicated . 
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In short , there is a conceptual distinction between , for example , 'directive' 
and 'request' , and between 'commissive' and 'offer/promise' . 68 , for example , 
might easily be taken as a directive (to answer the 'phone) , but it would require 
a particularly supportive context to justify its interpretation as a request ie. as 
an implicit appeal to the hearer's willingness : 
68. I'm in the bath 
I have argued that a request , being interlocutor dependent , is only clearly 
signalled where went and willing are clearly implied : 
69. Could you answer the 'phone ? 
So there are two categories here : implicated directives (no interpersonal coding) 
and requests (coding of interlocutor dependence) . The interpretation of 69 as not 
simply a directive but also a request is (atleast in principle) less dependent on a 
supportive context than is 68 . The relationship between cotext and context has 
shifted somewhat from 68 to 69 : while with 68 a request will only be understood 
given a highly supportive context , 69 is likely to be regarded as a request in the 
absence of contextual information which would rule out such an interpretation . 
The same distinction applies to commissives . 70 may well be interpreted as a 
commissive , in that the speaker clearly indicates his intention of performing an 
action for the hearer : 
70. I intend to give you a hand 
But only in rather particular contexts will 70 be seen as a clear offer . Offers , 
I have argued , are only clearly indicated when want and willing are clearly 
implied : 
71.  Would 
Do you 
Could 
you like me to 
want me to 
I 
give you a hand ? 
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What I would like to suggest is a framework of speech act expression/meaning 
congruence . This is not a framework of speech act conditions , but a set of 
statements designed to emphasize the congruence between expression and meaning : 
CATEGORY ONE : IMPLICATED DIRECTIVES AND IMPLICATED CONMISSIVES 
1) No clear expression of how components of the ideational context 
(setting/objects/participants) bear on the possible action of an interlocutor. 
2) No interpersonal coding of suasion : no coding of interlocutor dependence , 
speaker determinacy or circumstantial justification . 
3) May be read not only as directive/commissive but also as 'request' or 'offer' 
but only where context is highly supportive to such interpretations . 
CATEGORY TWO : COOED INTERLOCUTOR DEPENDENCE 
1) Clear expression of how the mental state (want/willing) of one participant 
bears on the possible action of another . Coding of willing generally implies 
want. 
2) Coding of interlocutor dependence through clear reference to the willingness 
of one participant to perform or sanction a predicated action . 
3) More likely to be read not only as directive/commissive but also as 'request', 
'offer' etc. , especially when coded lexico-grammatically , except in cases 
where context cancels out such an interpretation . 
CATEGORY THREE : COOED SPEAKER DETERMINACY 
1) Clear expression of how the state of the speaker bears on the action of 
the hearer . 
2) Coding of speaker determinacy through clear reference to the (more or less 
authoritative) wish of the speaker that the hearer should perform the action . 
No coding of the willingness of either participant to perform the action . 
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3) More likely to be read not only as 'directive' but as an action to which the 
speaker has a personal commitment , particularly when coded lexico-
grammatically . Where speaker authority is clearly coded , may be taken as 
'order' , except in cases where context cancels out such interpretations . 
CATEGORY FOUR : COOED CIRCUMSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION 
1) Clear implication of how circumstances in the ideational context bear on the 
potential action of the hearer . 
2) Coding of circumstantial justification through clear indication that hearer 
action is in some way considered 'advisable' by the speaker ; no coding of 
either want or willing . 
3) More likely than implicatures to be read not just as directives but as 
'advise' or 'threat' or 'warning' , but which or these is intended depends on 
context . 
6.3 Speech act conditions 
The kind of distinctions I have been arguing for in 5.2 are not at all clearly in 
evidence with the speech act conditions devised by Searle (1969/1979) , or by Labov 
and Fanshel (1977) or by Gordon and Lakoff (1975) . This is not a direct criticism 
of such conditions , but simply a reflection of a difference in perspective . 
Speech act conditions are oriented to providing a highly generalized framework 
through which a wide range of language expressions can be assigned an illocutionary 
force . The kind of 'expression conditions' I suggested above involve a different 
approach , working out from lexico-grammatical form and using this as the basis for 
making generalizations about interpersonal meaning . With speech act conditions , 
the 'direction of flow' seems to be the other way round from this : it becomes a 
matter of determining that expressions have the force of a request or an offer by 
virtue of postulates or conditions which are held to be all embracing . 
For example , Searle's preparatory and sincerity conditions for 'request/directive' 
are 
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Preparatory condition : H is able to do A 
Sincerity condition : 	 S wants H to do A 	 (1979:44) 
Using these conditions we cannot distinguish in any way between a 'directive' (eg 
68) and a request (eg. 69) , or between an expression of interlocutor dependence 
and an expression of speaker determinacy . One reason for this is that there is no 
mention of the willing role here . Without this crucial distinction , the 
abstraction of Searle's conditions is such that an enormously wide range of 
expressions tend to fall under the label 'request' , including : 
72. Aren't you going to eat your cereal ? 
73. I intend to do it for you 
72 is clearly not coded as , or on record as being a request , though it is easily 
interpreted as a directive . Similarly 73 is more easily recognized as a commissive 
than as an offer or a promise . Yet 72 is provided by Searle as an example of a 
'request'(1979:36) , and 73 as an 'offer' (1979:55) . 
Similarly , Labov and Fanshel argue that 74 is an 'indirect request' , because it 
involves an 'appeal to the need for action' (1977:83) : 
74. Are you planning to dust the room ? 
There is no clear coding here either of speaker want or hearer willing . Again , 74 
may on occasion be taken as a request ; but why , in the absence of such 
interpersonal coding , should 74 be referred to as a 'request' at all ? It seems to 
me that 74 is more accurately described as an implicative directive . 
Gordon and Lakoff (1975) have a slightly different perspective , since they talk of 
both want and willing as being crucial elements of their 'conversational 
postulates' . They refer to a sincerity condition whereby if speaker (a) requests 
an action (r) of the hearer (b) , then : 
a wants b to do r , a assumes b can do r , a assumes that b would be 
willing to do r 
(1975:85 my italics) 
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Here we have two central elements in interpersonal meaning - want and willing - 
clearly stated . Yet Gordon and Lakoff go on to separate them out , saying that 
requests can be made by stating a 'speaker based sincerity condition' which 
focuses only on the want role . Thus 75 is said to be a request : 
75. I want you to take out the garbage 	 (ibid.) 
75 , it seems to me , is much more likely to be taken at face value , as a 
statement of speaker determinacy , given that the willing role is uncoded 
Ofcource Gordon and Lakoff assume that 75 can only be a request if we understand 
that speaker is assuming hearer willingness . But there is no evidence for this in 
the language of 75 . 
In other words , there is no obvious reason why directive expressions should 
necessarily be given the more specific label of 'request' , or why commissive 
expressions should always be further categorized as 'promise' or 'offer'. 
I think that there is something to be said for distinguishing between language 
which clearly codes interlocutor dependence , and language which does 
not ; between language which clearly codes speaker determinacy , and language which 
does not , and so on . It is perfectly plausible for an expression such as 75 to 
be taken as a directive , as an expression of speaker determinacy which (lacking 
clear indication of speaker authority) is not explicitly an order , and to leave it 
at that . To regard it not only as a directive but also as a request for action is 
to go a step further , and to 'assume' an intention to be interlocutor dependent 
for which there is no formal justification . 
So , where interlocutor dependence is not coded , language expression is less 'on 
record' and increasingly open to contextual modification . The more off record , 
the less clear it is that interlocutor dependence (or speaker determinacy or 
circumstantial justification) is actually intended - ofcourse it may be intended , 
but such an intention is less clear , less on record . 
234 
7. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 
I have argued in this chapter that the coding of interpersonal meaning , and 
specifically of suasives , involves a deep congruence between form and meaning . 
Thus I have suggested that when suasion is clearly coded , either grammatically or 
lexico-grammatically , there are predictable and quite systematic congruences in 
the language which expresses it . Thus it is that with interlocutor dependence and 
speaker determinacy , there are constraints on inflectional and lexical choice 
which are congruent with the conceptual constraints which these meanings involve . 
Circumstantial justification , which is less contextually distant , is coded 
through forms which are less linguistically constrained , and again this relative 
lack of linguistic constraint reflects a congruent absence of conceptual 
constraint . Almost invariably , the clear coding of suasion involves the use of 
opaque VP's , and the grammatical coding of interlocutor dependence further 
involves the use of conceptually opaque forms . 
All these congruences are consistent with the continuum of contextual distance : 
just as with other components of conceptual meaning , there is a predictable 
and pervasive association between the clear coding of conceptual meaning on the one 
hand , and the use of conceptual , highly grammaticized forms on the other . In all 
these congruences , the tight interdependence between grammar , lexis and context 
is undeniable . This is particularly clear from the perspective of the on/off 
record continuum , through which we can observe how inflectional and lexical change 
effect a shift of illocutionary force , though less and less easily as 
interpersonal coding is placed more 'on record' and coded not just 'grammatically' 
but 'lexico-grammatically' . 
These congruences are sufficiently strong to cast doubt on those who argue that the 
expression of interpersonal meaning is so unsystematic , so completely dependent or 
context that it has no place in an organized pedagogic syllabus (eg. Crombie 
1985b:13/14) . Indeed . It may well prove the case that the on/off record continuum 
has almost as much validity with the expression of ideational meaning as it does 
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with the expression of interpersonal meaning . Thus in 68 the ideational 
relationship between the propositions is uncoded , so that the interpropositional 
value of 76 is as off record as the illocutionary force of implicatures : 
76. Jane arrived . Bill left 
Finally , I would like to suggest that Wilkins' (1976) distinction between notions 
and functions , between semantico-grammatical categories and categories of 
communicative function , is not merely superficial but misleading . As soon as we 
start looking for relationships between form and meaning which are not restricted 
to surface correspondences , we find that notional categories - and particularly 
cause/effect - create deep form/meaning congruences which are as pervasive within 
expressions of communicative function as they are in expressions of 
ideational/notional meaning . This is particularly true of causal determinacy 
which , I have argued , is clearly at work where speaker determinacy and 
interlocutor dependence are coded , and which accounts in large part for the 
lexical and inflectional restrictions which are typical of so many such 
expressions . 
There is a strong case for dispensing with many of the idealized polarities which 
have for some time characterized views of language form and the form/meaning 
relationship . There is no black and white distinction between notion and function, 
nor between grammar and lexis . Similarly , the distinction between 'system' and 
'non system' , between 'analysed' and 'unanalysed' is not a distinction between one 
extreme and another : there are degrees of systematicity , and degrees of 
analysability , and one suspects that the concept of 'fully analysed' or 
'completely systematic' is a fiction . It is with this perspective in mind that I 
have tried to represent language/meaning relationships in terms of continua . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
APPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY: TOWARDS A METHODOLOGY 
1. THE CASE FOR A REVISED METHODOLOGY : OUTLINE 
1.1 Grammar , lexis and context : a pedagogic framework 
I suggested in chapter two that the concept of a balanced , mutually informing 
relationship between grammar and lexis has not been taken on board by language 
pedagogy . The majority of coursebooks present grammar and lexis in the form of 
'lexis-in-grammar' . That is , lexis is effectively subsumed by grammar , so that 
its primary function is to illustrate or exemplify grammatical forms . Even the 
most recent approaches to the pedagogical description of language , such as 
Crombie's 'relational' approach (1985b) , or Sinclair and Renouf's 'lexical' 
approach (1988) are not founded on any clear conception of a grammar/lexis 
relationship ; the emphasis is thus either on grammar , with limited attention to 
lexis (as with the relational approach) , or on lexis , with next to no attention 
to grammar (as with the 'lexical syllabus') . 
In this chapter I suggest an alternative approach to methodology based on the 
concept of grammaticization , and on the notion that grammar and lexis interact in 
the creation of meanings . This involves stepping back from the detailed analysis 
of chapters 3 to 5 , and re-formulating a basic relationship between grammar, lexis 
and context which is sufficiently accessible to stand as a framework for pedagogic 
exploitation , and sufficiently broad-based to facilitate exploitation of the 
form/meaning congruences which I have been arguing for in the last three chapters . 
This relationship , proposed by Widdowson (1990) and referred to in chapters 1 and 
3 , is one in which grammar and lexis are separated out . At the lexical level , 
says Widdowson , associations between lexical items are often sufficient to imply a 
kind of 'unfocussed proposition' : 
1. duckling - farmer - kill 
In 1 , the basic components of the ideational context - a process (kill) , and two 
participants , one acting as agent (farmer) and the other as patient (duckling) - 
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are already clear enough . In order to give this AGENT/PROCESS/PATIENT association 
greater specificity in relation to the ideational context , we call on grammar - 
through word order , the addition of articles and the temporal markings of tense 
and aspect - so that the final grammaticized version might be as in 2 : 
2. The farmer killed the duckling 
Even a simple example such as this , says Widdowson , serves to demonstrate how : 
... the arrangements and alterations of grammar provide additional 
specification to lexical associations so that the words can relate more 
precisely to features of context .... 
(1990:86) 
Widdowson , then , is arguing for a reciprocal relationship between grammar and 
lexis which is congruent with the whole notion of grammaticization . The 
ungrammaticized lexical association in 1 is an example of Givon's 'pragmatic mode' 
(1979b) , in which lexical items suggest a basic , unfocussed meaning which is more 
context dependent and less 'on record' than its grammaticized counterpart in 2 . 
In terms of pedagogic exploitation , Widdowson has this to say : 
.... one might consider presenting language as lexical units , both as 
single words and as complex packages , and then creating contexts which 
constrain the gradual elaboration of the first , the gradual analysis of the 
second . In this way grammar would not be presented as primary but as a 
consequence of the achievement of meaning through the modification of 
lexical items . ... Such an approach ... means that contexts have to be 
contrived to motivate this lexical modification and to guide the learner in 
the discriminating and differential use of grammatical analysis . A 
pedagogy which aimed at teaching the functional potential of grammar .... 
would have to get learners to engage in problem solving tasks which required 
a gradual elaboration of grammar to service an increasing precision in the 
identification of features of context. 
(1990:96) 
It is precisely this approach which I take as the starting point in this and the 
following chapter . What I propose is a methodology in which learners work with 
lexical associations selected and loosely related by the material.s, writer so that 
it is the learner's own lexical choice which is guided towards the specification of 
particular meanings . With any particular activity , the learner starts out with a 
context which is deliberately only partial , out of focus , open to modification ; 
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it is this context which the learner then fashions and refines in her own way , 
through the combination and recombination of lexical items , and through the 
selection of specific forms of grammaticization . Crucial here is the initial 
selection and juxtaposition of lexical items by the materials writer , for it is at 
this stage that the grammatical consequences of the learner's lexical choice may be 
predicted , with more or less covert 'direction' depending on the activity in 
question . By making grammar and grammaticization a function of the learner's 
lexical choice , the communicative function of grammar - as the means whereby 
meanings are given greater focus - is made central , to the extent that learners 
perceive the functional role of grammar in the very act of creating meanings . 
With this approach , then , the notion that grammar is functionally motivated 
through its origins in discourse (Givon) , and the form/meaning congruences I have 
argued for in chapters 3-5 , can be directly exploited . I will suggest , for 
example , that through careful lexical selection we can guide the learner towards 
the framing of conceptual meanings , so that the semantic parameters of 
determinacy , interpersonal meaning and so on can be perceived and expressed by the 
learner through the processes of lexical choice and grammaticization 
In the rest of this chapter I describe and illustrate in greater detail 
methodological approach I have outlined above , and then in chapter 7 I will look 
at the kind of syllabus design which might most effectively support and facilitate 
it . 
1.2 Theoretical justifications for a revised pedagogy 
One of the most favoured types of analysis for specifying a product arising out of 
language teaching is what Brumfit calls the linguist-formal analyses of syntax and 
morphology ... (1984b:77) 	 Brumfit argues that a grammatical basis to language 
programmes has the great advantage that ... the syntactic system is generative , 
and therefore economical (1984b:78) 	 Eirumfit's appeal to the generativity of 
grammar is based on the belief that approaches to syllabus design and language 
teaching should be answerable to a view of language learning , so that 
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... a syllabus presupposes a design which specifically facilitates 
learning .... whatever else we may not know about learning , we do know 
that what can be made systematic by the learner is more likely to be 
learned than random elements , so .... we should not discard , without 
strong reasons , what can be made systematic for what cannot . At the 
present state of our understanding , ... there is little possibility of 
systematizing situational or functional categories. 
(1984b:98) 
However , it is clearly not just grammar which is required if we are to draw on the 
relevance of language generativity for language learning . Generativity has to do 
with the perception of regularities of all kinds in the way language is put 
together . As Breen puts it , in mastering one rule , we can see that rule 
operating in other instances" (1987:86) . In other words , when a student 'learns' 
the generative potential of the 'present simple' form , she is able to put it to 
use 'in a variety of instances' by manipulating its lexical content according to 
the requirements of particular contexts . This ability is at the heart of what we 
mean by generativity . So , underlying the notion of generativity is a web of 
interrelations , including interrelations between grammar, lexis and context , 
together with the meaning modifications which are a product of such interrelations. 
Narrowly conceived , a grammar based pedagogy does not exploit generativity in this 
sense . On the contrary , it is the formal properties of grammar which are 
displayed most prominently . But as I suggested in chapter 3 (section 8) , we can 
only go so far in talking of the systematicity of grammatical rule per se , because 
there are limits to the 'analysability' of language form conceived in these 
abstracted terms (cf. Bialystok 1978/81/83) . We should not , perhaps , encourage 
learners to think in terms of a grammar/rule correspondence , on the basis of a 
rather crude equation between analysability and generativity ; rather , we should 
demonstrate that grammar is embedded in lexical and contextual constraints . A 
methodology which takes as its principled basis the kind of alliance between 
grammar , lexis and context outlined in section 1 above is likely to be more keyed 
in to the processes of language learning than one which is based simply on a 
grammatical organization , and to reflect more precisely the communicative function 
of grammar . 
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Widdowson's (1990) conception of a relationship between grammar , lexis and 
context is consistent with Givon's notion of grammaticization . Lexical 
associations (pragmatic mode) are grammaticized (syntactic mode) , and in this 
process of grammaticization contextual meanings - both ideational and interpersonal 
- are developed and given further focus . As Givon (1979a) notes , and as I 
mentioned in chapter three (section 1.1), grammaticization has an ontogenetic 
basis . In other words , the idea that we start out with words and gradually learn 
how to fashion them grammatically keys in directly with concepts of language 
acquisition . Although mush research on language acquisition has concentrated on 
the learning of the syntactic system (cf. Ellis 1985) , there is little doubt that 
children learning a first or second language proceed in precisely this 'lexis 
first , grammar later' way (cf. , for example , Brown 1972/Peters 1983) . 
Furthermore , both Givon (1979b) and Hatch (1978) have argued that there is a 
crucial discourse element here , as I outlined in chapter three (section 1) . That 
is , language learners 'play around' with lexical items and lexicalized holophrases 
not in introspective monologue , but in the context of verbal interaction with 
interlocutors , and it is argued that out of this interaction , syntactic 
structures are developed" (Hatch 1978:404) . Following this same line of argument , 
Devitt (1989) suggests that the kind of early 'lexical competence' exhibited by 
language learners is an illustration of the fact that 
"meaning (in all senses) can be transmitted without having all the 
linguistic means of the target language at one's disposal ; that both 
first and subsequent languages are effectively learned only within a 
framework of meaningful use ; in other words , that we are actually 
blocking the language learning mechanism if learners are not encouraged 
to use language from the very beginning to transmit meaning" 
(1989:2) 
The methodology proposed in this chapter has as its basis precisely this notion , 
that the genesis of discourse and the onset of grammaticization lie partly in the 
manipulation of lexical items in relation to context . This relationship , between 
grammar , lexis and context represents a view of the process of language learning 
and underpins a proposal for the methodological exploitation of language 
generativity . 
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1.3 Framework for a revised methodology : towards a process approach 
Since it is precisely these factors (grammar/lexis/context) whose variable 
combinations define the systematicity and generativity of language , this process 
of combination and recombination gives learners simultaneous access to language 
both as a system and as a means of self expression . In this way , grammar is used 
from the outset as a communicative device ; we are not dealing here with grammar 
conceived essentially as product , but as a process of grammaticization (Givon) . 
As Rutherford puts it : 
.... the nature of grammatical consciousness raising within a 
grammatical- process model can derive only from the nature of 
the processes themselves . 
(Rutherford 1987:58) 
The basis of the methodology is that since grammar 'firms up' the unfocussed 
meanings of lexical associations , we should give learners certain contextual 
parameters together with certain lexical items , and allow them to relate the two , 
expressing meaninas which require more or less reference to grammar as a means of 
clarification . Thus , wheras the 'traditional' approach deals with grammatical 
rule and lexical exemplification , I am suggesting an approach in which lexis is 
actually prior to grammar . Grammar , that is , constitutes the end product of a 
process of association between lexis and contexts in which the learners themselves 
are directly engaged , as in figure 1 : 
lexis ----+ 
> grammar 
Fig. 1 	 context --+ 
I argue that such a methodology incorporates the requisite generativity of 
communicative competence . From the start learners work with language as a tool for 
the creation of meaning in discourse : 
.... communicative competence is not a conoilation of items in memory , 
but a set of strategies or creative proceaures fo! reali zing the value 
of linguistic elements in contexts of use , an ability to mdAe sense .. 
(Widdowson 1979:248) 
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Let me now give an illustration of the kind of approach I have in mind . If , for 
example , we wanted to guide learners towards the perception and formulation of 
cause/effect relationships , with the ultimate aim of expressing such relationships 
through a variety of clarifying grammatical forms , then we might begin by 
presenting them with lexical associations such as those in 1-8 below 
Example activity 1 : skeletal teaching unit on cause/effect relationships 
Look at these words . Choose an order to put them in 
1 [Bill - open - door] 
2 [Bill - feel - sick] 
3 [Bill - hear - doorbell] 
4 [Jane - look - hungry] 
5 [Jane - decide - leave] 
6 [Bill - see - Jane] 
7 [Bill - make - snack] 
8 [Bill - take - aspirin] 
The skeletal propositions in 1 to 8 are selected by the materials writer so that 
certain cause/effect pairings are likely to be perceived in the course of 
sequencing and grammaticizing . But the important point is that there is no tightly 
prescribed 'target language' here ; rather , a number of possible arrangement are 
possible . Below I list two possible orders , with cause/effect relations marked by 
sequence A : [2->8] - [3->1] - [6] - [4->7] - [5] 
sequence B 	 [3->1] - [6] - [4->7] - [2->8->5] 
Carefully chosen lexical associations such as this enable learners to fashion their 
own meanings ; the degree of available linguistic choice means that there is also a 
degree of contextual variability . In choosing particular lexical configurations 
and proposition orders , learners are also selecting their own contextual 
configurations . What of grammar ? We could , for example , provide further cues 
which indicate that the whole sequence of events occurred in the past , leading to 
subsequent more 'focussed' tasks where learners select appropriate inflections in 
order to establish a clear temporal context . 
The main point is that in such a methodology 
	 learners use language to develop 
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their own meanings ; separating out lexis , grammar and context in this way 
encourages learners to illypst in the meaning potential of language from the very 
outset . Widdowson (1984) has argued that in mainstream pedagogy , learners are 
presented with 'language dependent' contexts , in which form , function and context 
are already correlated one with another by the materials designer . This kind of 
contextualization is commonplace , and occurs whenever units of target language are 
prespecified , and 'given' to the learner through , say , an introductory dialogue. 
As a result , says Widdowson : 
the language is represented as having self contained meaning and language 
learning as being a matter of putting expressions in store ready to be 
issued when situations arise which will correlate with them . 
(1984:99) 
A more natural approach , says Widdowson , would involve the devising of situations 
"which need to be resolved in some way by the use of language ... by exploiting 
language to clarify and change the situation" (ibid.) . With the methodology 
suggested in this chapter , we can go some considerable way towards achieving this 
kind of exploitation . 
Ideally , what should be achieved is a kind of synthesis of the so-called 
'polarity' between accuracy and fluency (cf. Brumfit 1984b:37) . The kind of 
activity I outlined above (example activity 1) - within which the element of 
implicit learner guidance may be more or less directive depending on the type and 
extent of lexical 'cueing' - is neither purely accuracy nor purely fluency . 
Rather , it has elements of both . According to Brumfit , accuracy : 
simply refers to a focus by the user , because of the pedagogical 
context created or allowed by the teacher , on formal factors or 
issues of appropriacy . 
(1984b:52) 
There is certainly an element of accuracy here . The learner is called upon to 
develop meanings using lexical items whose ultimate combination and potential for 
grammaticization has been pre-planned by the teacher/materials writer 	 and 
ofcourse the learner may be more or less consciou ot tris element of contrivane 
But there are also clear elements of fluency here . As 1 argued above , it is on 
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the basis of learner choice that particular meanings and forms of grammaticization 
are finally decided upon , so that the learners' own procedures for making sense 
are directly utilized . This process keys in to Brumfit's concept of fluency as 
"language .. processed by the speaker .. without being received verbatim from an 
intermediary" (1984b:56) 
2. EXPLOITING THE MEANING POTENTIAL OF LEXIS AND CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
In this section I aim to demonstrate how it is that lexical associations contain 
their own meaning potential . I argue that through careful selection of lexical 
associations and additional contextual information , the materials writer can guide 
the learner towards the formulation of a wide range of intra and inter 
propositional meanings , both ideationally and interpersonally . Depending on the 
initial lexical selection , the learner can be implicitly directed more or less 
strongly . In order to present the arguments here as tidily as possible , I am 
delaying full discussion of grammar , and of ways in which learners can be 
encouraged to grammaticize lexical associations , until section 3 . It is important 
to note , though , that much of the discussion in section two is directly relevant 
to the pedagogic exploitation of grammaticization . It is through the perception 
and expression of basic intra and inter-propositional relationships that learners 
can be guided to a realization of the usefulness of grammar as a device for further 
clarifying meanings . 
2.2 LEXIS , CONTEXT AND SCHEMA : VARYING THE DEGREE OF GUIDANCE 
2.2.1 Schematic lexical associations and knowledge of the world 
There are atleast two kinds of lexical association which can be exploited in order 
to give the learner a degree of controlled guidance in the formulation of meaning . 
The first are lexical associations which key in to the learner's schematic 
knowledge of the world - 'schematic associations' for short . These are lexical 
items whose possible combination should be intuitively evident : Widdowson's (1990) 
association between FARMER , DUCKLING and KILL is one such example . Given these 
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lexical items , the learner is able to recognize that the farmer (in all 
probability) plays the role of agent in relation to the duckling as patient . Thus 
the intra-propositional meaning is to some extent transparent without the need for 
explicit grammatical cues . Similarly , schematic lexical associations may exist 
across propositional boundaries , so that the inter-propositional meaning 
(cause/effect) in 3 is also likely to be intuitively evident: 
3. [Fred - feel - tired] 	 (cause) 
[Fred - go - bed] 	 (effect) 
What we have here is a lexically indicated schema of a cause/effect relationship ; 
that is , it is through cultural convention and experience that we are able to 
recognize the association in 3 as constituting - in all probability - a schematic 
frame of cause/effect . This kind of frame , according to Van Dijk : 
is an ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLE relating a number of concepts which by 
CONVENTION and EXPERIENCE somehow form a 'unit' which can be actualized 
in various cognitive tasks , such as language production and comprehension 
	
 a frame organizes knowledge about certain properties of objects , 
courses of event and action , which TYPICALLY belong together . 
(1977:159) 
The pedagogic value of such schematic associations is that it is possible to 
directly GUIDE learners towards the recognition and expression of particular 
schematic frames , realized as intra and inter-propositional relations . Instead of 
providing them with additional linguistic (eg. grammatical) and extra-linguistic 
(contextual) resources , they can call upon these resources for themselves , 
working out from the recognition of lexical schemas towards the final expression of 
fully grammaticized and contextualized expression . Thus , although it is clear 
that contextual information is invariably distributed between lexis and grammar 
there are occasions when it is not necessary to provide learners with contextual 
information other than that which is already implicit within the lexis . In the 
example exercise on cause/effect which I gave in section 1.3 , it is this kind of 
lexical schema , calling on the learner's e>istinQ FrIc)wiedcle of the world , which 
is exploited . 
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2.2.2 Situational associations 
My second kind of lexical association is one in which there is no such intuitively 
self evident schema . Rather , there is an element of ambiguity ; the relationship 
between propositions in 4 , for example , may or may not be cause/effect : 
4. [Bill - arrive] [Jane - leave] 
Presented with this kind of lexical association , the learner would be required to 
to formulate a context of her own in order to determine a cause/effect 
relationship . Alternatively , the materials writer could provide additional 
contextual information , for example by making it clear in relation to 4 that Jane 
has a strong dislike for Bill , so that learners then share a contingent knowledge 
of a particular situation which might lead them to the perception that Jane's 
leaving was prompted by Bill's arrival (cause/effect) . 
In terms of pedagogy , then , what we have here is a way in which the learner can 
be guided more or less directly toward the perception of intra and inter 
propositional relationships . Presented with schematic lexical associations , or 
with situational associations supplemented by additional contextual information , 
the learner's subsequent choices can be clearly directed . Presented only with 
ambiguous lexical associations , the learner is given greater freedom to exercise 
his/her own capacity to make sense : 
MORE GUIDANCE (GUIDED ACTIVITIES) 	 LESS GUIDANCE (SEMI-GUIDED ACTIVITIES) 
SCHEMATIC LEXICAL ASSOCIATIONS  SITUATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS WITHOUT 
FURTHER CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION 
SITUATIONAL LEXICAL ASSOCIATIONS 
TOGETHER WITH CLARIFYING CONTEXTUAL 
INFORMATION 
Fig. 2 
In the next two sections I will look at this distinction - between schematic and 
situationally contingent lexical associations - in greater detail , in order to 
illustrate how a large variety of intra and inter-propositional relationships can 
thereby be 'lexically cued' with more or less implicit direction . In section 2.2.3 
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I focus on the ideational context , and in section 2.2.4 on the interpersonal 
context . 
2.2.3 THE LEXICAL SIGNALLING OF IDEATIONAL MEANINGS AND PEDAGOGIC EXPLOITATION 
As I suggested above , intra propositional relations such as agent/process/patient 
can be readily inferred from schematic lexical associations ; that is , from 
lexical associations which key in to the learner's existing knowledge of the world. 
Thus in 4-7 , the various role relations contracted between one component part of 
the ideational context and another are relatively transparent : 
4. Bill - window - open 
5. letter - post - Jane 
6. collapse - building 
7. man - garden - look 
But in 8 and 9 	 these semantic roles remain ambiguous , so that unless 'cued' by 
further contextual information , a learner would have to work that much harder in 
order to create contextual parameters of his/her own : 
8. Paul - Jane - see 
9. bite - man - dog 
A wide diversity of case roles can be included in this way , and there is a 
similarly wide range of interpropositional relations . For example , temporal 
relations may be strongly suggested through schematic associations such as 10 (for 
sequence) or 11 (for simultaneity) : 
10. Bill - wake up 	 (making up logically preceoes eating breakfast) 
Bill - eat - breakfast 
11. Bill - lie - bed 	 (both states are likely to occur simultaneously) 
Bill - sleep 
Alternatively , we could devise situational associations which do not in themselves 
signal either a clear sequence or a relationship of simultaneity : 
12. Jane - post - letter 
Jane - listen - radio 
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Contrast relationships can be similarly exploited . In 14 the lexical antonym 
between jazz and classical music suggests a general contrast relation , while in 15 
the more specific relationship of contra expectation is implied : 
14. Freda - love - jazz 
Freda - hate - classical music 
15. Jim - live - New York 
Jim - hate - city life 
Similarly with cause/effect relationships , schematic lexical associations can be 
devised which suggest a determinate reason/result relationship (as in 13) : 
13. sun - rise 
flower - open 
Particular types of participant determinacy can be cued through schematic 
associations such as those in 14-17 , which exploit the lexical coding of dual 
proposition verbs and which lead naturally to further work on the grammaticization 
of complement structures : 
14. Bill - want - leave 
15. Anne - expect - book - arrive 
16. Fred - plan - leave - early 
17. Janet - force - open - door 
By using combinations of different kinds of interpropositional relationship , quite 
complex patterns of connected discourse can be suggested through schematic 
associations . One objective here , ofcourse , is that through identifying and 
expressing such relationships for themselves , learners will be guided towards 
appropriate clarifying forms of grammaticization . This process , whereby grammar 
is used as a communicative tool whose value and purpose is perceived through the 
development of discourse patterns , is consistent with the kind of language 
development out-of-discourse observed by Hatch (1978) and Givon (1979b) which I 
referred to in section 1.2 . In the following example , learners are encouraged to 
develop coherent discourse through lexical association : 
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Example exercise 2 : skeletal teaching unit on discourse relations (sequence & 
causation) : 
Look at these words . Choose an order to put them in . 
[go - flower shop] 
[Bill - want - Jane - impress] 
[buy - bunch - roses] 
[Jane - decide - flowers - send - Bill] 
The kind of output we might expect would look something like : 
Bill wanted to impress Jane 
	 purpose--+ (topic sentence) 
so he decided to send her flowers means ---+ reason -+ 
sequence 
he went to a flower shop 	 means ---+ result -+ 
to buy a bunch of roses 
	 purpose--+ 
It is sometimes suggested that the absence of overt linkers (such as 'so' and 'to' 
above) may lead to ambiguities , and therefore we should start by focussing on 
explicit conjuncts (Crombie 1985b:17/Nation 1984:65) . However , such an approach 
denies learners access to the kind of procedural activity which we should be 
encouraging , namely using lexical items to infer and create all kinds of inter-
propositional relationships by exploiting the variability of the lexis/context 
relationship 
This kind of approach does not depend on the materials writer developing each 
activity 'from scratch' . It is perfectly possible to adapt existing tasks so that 
in cases where grammar , lexis and context are effectively fused , the materials 
writer can separate them out and guide the learner towards his/her own synthesis . 
For example , in the task reproduced below (J. and L. Soars 1986) , the target 
language focus is the distinction between past simple (used to describe sequences 
of past events) , and past progressive (used to describe events which occurred 
simultaneously in the past) . The problem is that the learner should be quite 
capable of matching up text to pictorial cue without necessarily understanding 
these distinctions , simply by matching up pictures with the appropriate lexical 
items . For example , provided the learner knows the meaning of the verb KILL . 
then picture 8 is self evidently the 'right' picture to select at this point , and 
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thus 'killed' comes last in the sequence . Because grammar and lexis have already 
been appropriately interrelated by the materials writer , learners do not need to 
recognize either the appropriate temporal/interpropositional relations , nor the 
significance of the coding inflections . This task , then , has clear elements of 
Widdowson's language dependence : 
Past Simple and Past Continuous 
Narrating past events 
PRESENTATION 
Unfortunately this is a true story. 
In January 1978 the firemen were on 
strike. and the army took over the 
job of answering emergency calls. 
I Here is a list of verbs in the Past 
Simple which tell the events of the 
story. 
Look at the pictures and put the 
verbs in the right order. 







q couldn't get down 
q ran over 
q put up (the ladder 1 
q offered 
2 Here is a list of verbs in the Past 
Continuous which describe the 
scene of the narrative. 
Look at the pictures and put the 
verbs in the right order.  
Letter them a-d. 
q was waiting 
q were leaving 
q was working 
q was playing 
3 Now complete the story about 
Mrs Brewin by putting a number 
or a letter into each gap 
On 14 January 1978 Mrs Brew in 
in her garden. Her cat. 
Henry. 	 around her. It 
atweinthegardol:md 	 . si  
she 	 the Fire Brigade While 
she 	 sir them to arrive. she 
him sonic hsh to tr y to get 
him down 
The arms final's 
their ladder and 	 thecx  
Mrs Brewin was delighted and 
them III tin some tel But as 
then 	 ten minutes later the% 
the cat and 	 is 
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In what follows , I outline two alternative approaches . The first (exercise 4) 
involves the use of schematic lexical associations with no additional contextual 
cueing : this approach is thus an example of a 'guided activity' . In the second 
adaptation (exercise 5) , lexical associations are more dependent on a particular 
context ; thus situational associations are used , together with some further 
contextual cueing (through pictures) in order to develop a 'semi-guided activity' 
in which the learner develops meanings which are arrived at independently . 
Adaptation A/Exercise 4 GUIDED ACTIVITY 
learners work largely with clear schematic lexical 
associations : no additional contextual information 
1) Learners sort out lexical categories : 
Choose an action word from column 8 for each of the word groups 
in column 4 : 
A: people/objects 	 B: action words 
[Mrs. Brewin - garden] 
[the firemen - cat] 
[cat - tree and couldn't get down] 
[the firemen - cat] 
[the firemen - house] 
[Mrs. Brewin - fire brigade] 
[cat - on the grass] 
[the firemen - ladder] 
[Mrs. Brewin - very happy] 
[the firemen - cat] 
work kill climb 
leave put up lie 
run over telephone 
be rescue 
2) Learners sort out relationships of sequence and simultaneity 
Using these words , make full sentences and decide in which order the events 
took place . When,vou think two things happened at the same time , put one 
in column A and the other in column 8: (grid is completed for clarification) 
A B 
1 	 : Mrs. Brewin was working in her garden : Her cat lay on the grass 
+ + + 
2 	 : The cat climbed a tree & couldn't get down  
+ + + 
3 	 : Mrs. Brewin telephoned the fire brigade 
+ + + 
4 	 : The firemen put up the ladder 
5 	 : They rescued the cat 
6 	 : Mrs. 	 Brewin was very happy 
7 The firemen left the house They ran over the cat 
 	 - 
8 	 : They killed the cat 
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The above task illustrates how learners can be encouraged to develop and express 
the notions of sequence/simultaneity/cause-effect by exploiting their knowledge of 
the world . In this case , the lexis has been chosen to maximize this capacity , so 
that various discourse relationships can be 'discovered' through contextual 
knowledge implicit in relatively transparent lexical relations : 
1. -+ 	 simultaneity/scene setter 
	  sequence 









	 result 	 and so on . 
In the next section I will look at how to create conditions in which particular 
grammatical devices are called upon ; it should be clear , though , that the grid 
above in itself provides a framework for exploiting grammar in order to make 
certain meanings clear . For example , the simultaneity relationship in 1. can only 
be made clear by using a past progressive inflection (mrs. 8rewin was working or 
her cat was lying on the grass) . 
Adaptation 8/exercise 5 : SEMI-GUIDED ACTIVITY 
learners use ambiguous lexical associations 
(ie. situational rather than schematic) together with 
optional additional contextual cues (the first 4 
pictures in the sequence) 
Use all the words in column A and atleast 8 of the words in 
column 8 to make a story . Use the grid below for your 









die 	 bite save 	 run over arrive 
leave 	 put up 	 thank 	 work 	 lie 
telephone climb garden tree 
ladder gras 
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These lexical items can associate in a much wider variety of ways than those in 
version A , both in terms of intra propositional relations and inter propositional 
relations : 
a) choice of intra propositional relations : 
[the cat died] - [Mrs. Brewin died] 
[the cat bit Mrs. Brewin] - [the cat bit the fireman] 
[Mrs. Brewin saved the fireman] - [the fireman saved the cat] 
b) choice of inter propositional relations : 
[the cat bit Mrs. Brewin while she was working in the garden] 
[the fireman died because the cat had bitten him] 
[the fireman climbed the tree to save the cat] 
[the fireman climbed the tree and so the cat bit him] 
Using the first 4 pictures provides the learner with some security , and ensures a 
degree of coherence between one account and another : picture one , for example , 
cues in the simultaneity relationship [Mrs. Brewin work garden]-[cat lie grass], 
ensuring that there is some potential for developing simultaneity relations and 
associated grammatical forms . 
This kind of task encourages the development of the learner's capacity to perceive 
and express meanings which are to some extent her own , rather than reacting to a 
prefabricated context . Wheras the original task is language dependent , these 
adaptations are oriented more to activity dependence (Widdowson 1984) . 
2.2.4 THE LEXICAL SGNALLING OF INTERPERSONAL MEANINGS AND PEDAGOGIC EXPLOITATION 
I have suggested that through the careful selection of words , the materials 
designer can give the learner variable degrees of guidance in the formulation of 
particular meanings , through providing lexical associations which converge with 
the learner's existing knowledge of the world . A similar procedure can be adopted 
with interpersonal language , though here it is not ideational schema which 
constitute the core of the system 
	 but interpersonal routines . Routines 
according to Widdowson 	 are : 
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... predictable patterns of language use . They vary in their 
predictability ofcourse : some routines , like those followed in church 
services , allow very little room for tactical manoeuvre , while others , 
of which academic argument might be an example , allow a great deal . 
(1984:225) 
Like ideational schema , then , routines constitute common points of reference , 
predictable patterns of association which are culturally more or less familiar to 
the language user . Both schemata and routines are stereotypic patterns which are 
"derived from instances of past experience which organize language in preparation 
for use" (Widdowson 1983:37) . Just as a schema may be self evident on the basis of 
lexical associations , so routines - precisely by virtue of their familiarity - may 
be recognized partly through the repeated use of lexical items and lexicalized 
holophrases , as in the following conventionalized exchange : 
a: (Could I have) a salami sandwich (please) ? 
b: 85 pence (please) 
a: thanks 
This kind of exchange is , ofcourse , very common in elementary level coursebooks , 
where it crops up again and again through introductory dialogues . But as I argued 
earlier , this dialogue presentation effectively conceals from the learner the 
dynamic relationships between cotext and context on which it is based . Rather than 
present these as a fait accompli , the teacher could allow learners to build up 
this kind of routinized vertical discourse for themselves . This could be done 
through providing learners with a selection of lexical items whose potential for 
combination in discourse is predictable given their relatively transparent 
association with a familiar routine . This lexical network might look as follows : 
50 - 60 - 70 - 80 -pence 





As with schematic lexical associations , this kind of lexical grouping might be 
sufficient on its own to facilitate the development of a basic 'discourse chain' 
through knowledge of the world . Implicit within this very simple lexical set is a 
whole range of implicit knowledge about the participants and processes in a 
buying/selling situation . In other words , merely by presenting these lexical 
items as a coherent grouping we can trigger in the learner a quite sophisticated 
awareness of its associated routine ie. the learner should be able to make sense of 
the lexical items presented above even if no further contextual information 
(pictures etc.) is made available . Once presented as a coherent lexical grouping , 
it becomes clear that salami relates to sandwich , and that salami sandwich is not 
merely a description of foodstuff but a reference to goods for sale , and so on . 
Alternatively , this kind of lexical grouping could be supplemented through further 
contextual information , or the teacher could simply present learners with relevant 
features of context - by showing them pictures of shops/customers/goods etc. - and 
then using this as the basis for elicitation of appropriate lexical items . 
What we have here , then , is a 'way in' to the pedagogic exploitation of the 
Givonian notion that grammar grows out of work with lexis - with ungrammaticized 











2.2.5 LEXIS , CONTEXT AND CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE : VARYING THE COGNITIVE LOAD 
So far I have suggested that both with ideational and with interpersonal meanings , 
careful selection of lexical associations and other contextual information can be 
used as the basis for a methodology in which learners 'create their own meanings', 
with more or less guidance depending on the initial lexical selection . In this way 
learners are given direct access to language both as a system and as the means of 






















cues (eg. pictures) 
in relation to routines 
exploiting situational lexical 
associations which are ambiguous 
outside of a specific context 
Fig. 4 
This distinction between guided and semi-guided activities depends for its validity 
on an intuitive appeal to the learner's knowledge of the world . In order to 
provide the learner with guidance of this kind , the materials writer has to make 
certain assumptions about the type and extent of the learner's cultural background 
knowledge . But clearly , there will be cases in which these assumptions may be 
called into question . If 	 for example , the kind of buying/selling routine which 
I referred to above is not familiar to the learner , then what is conceived as a 
guided activity may turn out to be a completely unguided one . 
Wherever possible , the materials designer establishes in advance what kind of 
material will be familiar to the learner , and what is likely to be new . To do 
otherwise , to select the cultural content of materials haphazardly , would 
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effectively encourage 'culture clashes' . The problems implicit in such mismatches 
have received considerable discussion (cf. Wallace 1986/Valdes 1986/Byram 1989) . 
As Valdes puts it , the reaction [to such a mismatch] may be all the stronger 
because [the learner] is faced by two unknowns simultaneously" (1986:vii) . 
But this is not to say that all activities should be based on contexts with which 
the learner is culturally familiar . Indeed , the great advantage of semi-guided 
activities is that the more unfamiliar the context , the more the learner will have 
to use her own capacity for making sense , for working towards a synthesis between 
language and context which has not already be worked out on her behalf . One way of 
exploiting this would be to work to a scheme whereby learners progressed from 
relatively familiar contexts through to relatively unfamiliar ones . In this way , 
they would move from the security of working with the familiar to the greater 
challenge of developing the less familiar . I am not suggesting that all 
activities at elementary level should take on a guided focus on ideational schemata 
and interpersonal routines 	 Rather , each unit could involve a development from 
the familiar through to the less familiar . 
This sort of development needs to be adopted with due care and attention to the 
background knowledge of learners ; but through programming a principled transition 
from the known to the unknown the materials writer can directly exploit culture 
gaps of this kind . As Valdes puts it : 
It is the responsibility of first and second language teachers to 
recognize the trauma their students experience , and to assist in 
bringing them through to the point that culture becomes an aid to 
language learning rather than a hindrance . 
(1986:vii) 
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3. BRINGING GRAMMAR INTO FOCUS : LEARNER CHOICE AND GRAMMATICIZATION 
3.1 Introduction and overview 
The basic premise of this methodology is that working with words and contextual 
information will lead learners to an appreciation of the communicative function of 
grammar ie. they will use grammar as a means of conveying their meanings more 
precisely (cf. Widdowson 1990) . What I have so far suggested is that by starting 
out with lexical associations , learners can be encouraged to formulate a wide 
variety of meanings . In this process there is no need to present them with 
prespecified grammaticized forms ; rather , the objective is that such forms should 
be drawn on , wherever possible , as the need arises , and in the course of working 
with lexical items in relation to contextual information . 
But this does not mean that working with lexis and context will inevitably lead 
learners , almost unconsciously , into grammatical conformity . The relationships 
between lexis/context and grammatical forms are more complex and variable than 
this . In this section I argue that we can divide grammar up , very crudely , into 
two categories : grammar which is likely be called upon again and again in the 
course of working with lexis , and grammar which may well be left out of this 
process . 
In the former category I include activities in which the use of lexis to convey 
meanings necessarily involves learners in sorting out particular aspects of the 
grammatical system . For example , using word order to clearly express role 
relationships : 'duckling kill farmer' and 'farmer kill duckling' , for example 
are transparently different in this respect . Similarly , the choice of particular 
verbs in itself has repercussions for the grammar : KILL (valency of 2) generates a 
basic SVO construction (farmer-kill-duckling) , while OFFER (valency of 3) 
generates constructions with indirect object (Bill offered Fred some tea) 
(Fillmore:1968/Rutherford 1987:48) . So from the very beginning , learners will 
need to use certain aspects of syntax in the process of further focussing the 
meaning of lexical associations . I have already looked at other forms of 
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grammaticization which grow - albeit slightly less directly - out of work with 
lexis and context : the use of conjuncts and inflections , for example , to clarify 
certain inter propositional relationships (as with example exercises 4 and 5 in the 
previous section) . 
But there are a great many features of the syntactic system which are less likely 
to emerge 'naturally' in this way , and this is my second category : grammatical 
forms which may require further , more explicitly focused tasks . In this context 
it is worth noting that grammar can frequently be circumvented by lexical 
paraphrase . There are , that is , a great many notions , regularly associated with 
particular grammatical forms , which can be adequately expressed through lexis . In 
the absence of further pedagogic contrivance , there is no guarantee that these 
forms will ever become clearly defined . The temporal coding of inflection through 
tense , for example , can be circumvented through using lexical items such as 
'tomorrow/yesterday/next week' and so on . A number of researchers have 
demonstrated how learners are able to use lexis as the basis for communication 
strategies , avoiding the need for grammaticizing which is unnecessary in 
particular contexts (eg. Dittmar:1981) . 
A further problem is that of shared context ie. a context which is knowingly shared 
between all learners in a classroom . If all learners know that the story about 
Mrs. Brewin and her cat is set in the past , then there is no great communicative 
need to use past tense inflections (cf. exercises 4/5) . 
Thus there are a number of factors - some to do with pedagogically contrived 
context , some to do with lexis and lexical paraphrase - which may reduce the 
perceived need to use grammar as a device for clarification . However , this does 
not mean that we need to fall back on a methodology which is entirely language 
rather than activity dependent . In language dependent tasks the materials 
designer asks the question 'what constitutes the grammatical target language here 
and how am I going to develop/focus on it?'. In the methodology suggested here , 
the question is rather 'what kind of lexical and contextual components are most 
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likely to lead the learner towards certain useful features of the target 
language 2'. In other words , it is possible to devise tasks which are specifically 
concerned with targeting particular forms of grammaticization , but which involve 
focussing on the grammatical consequences of the learner's (carefully directed) 
lexical choice , rather than 'presenting' learners with pre-formulated lexico-
grammatical units as devices for exemplification . 
As with section 2 , I will divide discussion here into two parts . The first 
concerns semi-focusing activities , and the second focusing activities . These are 
distinguished from guided and semi-guided activities in that the learner's lexical 
choice is guided more specifically to areas of 'semantico-grammatical' meaning . 
So , whereas a guided or semi-guided task may be directed towards general notional 
areas such as sequence/simultaneity or cause/effect (cf. exercises 4/5) , a 
focusing activity might lead the learner to distinguish between past and present 
simultaneity , or between circumstantial and participant causes , thereby focusing 
in on specific conjuncts and inflectional markers . With focusing activities , this 
element of controlled direction is stronger than with semi-focusing activities . 
What we have , then , is a network consisting of four types of activity : 
less directed 	 more directed 
General intra and/or inter 
	 + 	 + 	 + 	 + 
propositional relations & 	 : SENI-GUIDED ACTIVITY : 	 : GUIDED ACTIVITY 





+ 	 + 	 + 	 + 
: 
	
SERI-FOCUSING ACTIVITY : 	 : FOCUSING ACTIVITY 
+ 	 + 	 + 	 + 
It is important to note that there is no prescribed order to this model . In one 
sense , ofcourse , there is a clear gradient in terms of increasing specificity of 
focus/direction , which follows the pattern : semi-guided -> guided -) semi- 
focussing -> focusing activity . but this- 	 not a prescribed order for actual 
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teaching . The whole purpose of the less directional tasks is to give the learner 
every opportunity to 'call upon grammar' as the need for it is perceived , 
so that the teacher may only wish to utilize focusing activities where it is clear 
that certain important or required areas of grammar are being consistently 
neglected . 
In other words , the teacher might consider it prudent to begin wherever possible 
with tasks which maximize the learner's freedom of choice , thereby emphasizing the 
kind of activity dependence which is most congruent with real life communication . 
This approach roughly parallels that suggested by Brumfit (1980) : 






resources 	 shown to be necessary 
for effective communication 
Fig. 6 
 
However , there are features of Brumfit's model which are questionable . Firstly , 
we do not need simply to 'present' items which do not arise in the course of 
'communicating with all available resources' : as I have argued above , it is only 
where the learner retains some degree of choice that the communicative value of 
grammaticization is retained . Secondly , if we restrict ourselves to items 'shown 
to be necessary for effective communication' , we run the risk of ignoring items 
which can be circumvented without necessarily impairing communication , but which 
may nevertheless be necessary in terms of achieving social conformity in the world 
outside the classroom . 
In section 3.2 I will illustrate , through example , what I mean by semi-focusing 
activity , and in 3.3 I will go on to discuss the role and purpose of focusing 
activities . In both cases I will include some of the form/meaning congruences 
which I argued for in chapters 3 , 4 and 5 . 
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3.2 GRAMMATICIZATION AND SEMI-FOCUSING ACTIVITIES 
3.2.1 New vs. old information 
On virtually every occasion that learners work with lexis to develop narrative or 
descriptive texts , they necessarily make some kind of choice as to how new 
information should be introduced , and how old information should be referred to . 
Such choices are not governed by syntax , but by lexis-in-discourse ie. this kind 
of grammatical choice is discourse motivated (Hatch 1978/Rutherford 1987:59) . For 
example , in the 'Mrs. Brewin' text cited above (examples 4 and 5) , learners are 
constantly faced with the task of reintroducing participants in the narrative : 
Mrs. Brewin/she , the firemen/they , the cat/her cat/it etc. 
There are atleast two options open to the materials designer here . Firstly , she 
could explicitly 'cue' the learner towards an awareness of this aspect of discourse 
by building pro-forms into the lexicalized text , so that the learner has to use 
such signals as signposting towards developing a cohesive text : 
Example exercise 6 : sorting out new vs. old information 
Look at these words : order them to make a narrative 
It is about. Fred , and his trip to the cinema 
[he - walk through - door] 
[Fred - arrive - ticket counter] 
[ * - sit - back row] 
[it - be - very crowded] 
[ * - buy - £3 ticket] 
Here the lexis is carefully chosen so that the learner cannot deduce a self evident 
sequence purely on the basis of knowledge of the world : for example , he walked 
through the door is ambiguous - it could be the main entrance of the cinema (in 
which case it precedes arriving at the ticket counter) , or it could be the door 
leading to the actual screen (in which case it is subsequent to arriving at the 
ticket counter) . Thus the learner is forced to examine closely the various Pro 
forms in order to complete the task successfully . 
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Alternatively , we could reverse this procedure , allowing the learners to decide 
their own sequence and to create their own forms of coherent reference , as in 
version B/exercise 5 of the Mrs. Brewin narrative . 
3.2.2 Tense , time and context gap 
I argued in 3.1 that grammatically signalled time references will not necessarily 
grow out of lexical choice : both lexical paraphrase and shared context are likely 
to reduce the learner's perceived need to use inflection as a necessary device for 
clarifying meaning . What can materials designers do to reduce these problems? One 
option would be to build in a context gap constraint . By this I mean building in 
sufficient variety of choice so that final outcome is likely to vary (to some 
extent) between one learner and another . Thus when learners communicate their own 
particular 'product' , they need to explicitly signal temporal distinctions because 
the temporal context is not shared ie. these distinctions are not redundant . I 
would argue that this approach exploits the information gap principle in a way 
which is congruent with the level of information gap typical of everyday 
interaction . It is arguable that the standard approach to information gap tasks 
effectively reduces the scale and scope of the 'gap' to a minimum , so that it is 
only small scale information which remains outside the body of knowledge common to 
both interlocutors . 
Example exercise 7 : distinguishing regular from 'one off' activities 
Comment : The aim here is to get learners working with the concepts implicit in the 
use of the present tense (for regular/habitual activities) in contrast to the past 
simple tense (for events which occurred on a particular past occasion) without 
simply giving learners the appropriate grammar : 
Normally , Sill Palmer' has a very routine Saturday : he always dbes 
the same things . Last Saturday , though , was quite different. . 
Look at these words. Decide which activities are routine ,and which 
activities happened last Saturday . Order them using the table 
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activities 
drive - city centre 
watch - TV 
eat - breakfast 
telephone - police - ask - help 
read - newspaper 
go - pub 
lose - keys - car 
have - lunch - friends 
walk - park 
meet - friends 
watch - football match 
Table (with possible completion) 
+ + 	 + 
Bill's Saturday routine 	 i 	 Last Saturday  
+ + 	 + 
He eats breakfast 	 : He drove to the city centre 
+ + 	
+ He reads the newspaper 	 : and watched a football match 
+ + 	
+ He meets some friends 	 : but he lost his car keys 
 
+ + 	 + 
and goes to the pub with them 	 : so he telephoned the police 
+ + 	 + 
















+ 	 + 
. 	 . 	
+ + 	 + 
We can vary the degree to which this temporal distinction is a product of learner 
choice : in the above case , knowledge of the world is likely to discriminate in a 
number of cases . But it is crucial that some of the decision making is left to the 
learner , so that the final product is likely to vary between learners . Thus when 
learners communicate their results one to another there is not , or not just a gap 
of discrete propositional information , but a deeper context gap -in this case , 
having to do with the temporal setting of the ideational context . The subsequent 
task , then , might require a learner to communicate individual propositions ('he 
watches TV') which the rest of the class identifies as being either 'routine' or 
'one off' . 
3.2.3 Participant vs. circumstantial determinacy 
In the above task , the lexis and context are fashioned so as to focus on features 
of the ideational context . But what of notions which are more conceptual ? I 
argued in chapter 3 that the distinction between circumstantial and participant 
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modality is often coded through different inflectional forms : 
I'm going to visit the Louvre - participant modality (ie. source is 
the agent's own personal volition . 
I'm going to be attending a seminar - circumstantial modality (ie. source 
is likely to be external to participant) 
Since , as has been argued , this notional distinction operates across quite a wide 
range of language with reflexes in the grammar and the lexis , it is clearly worth 
exploiting pedagogically . 
Once again , it is a matter of devising appropriately facilitating lexis/contexts 
from which the learner can begin to work with these concepts , moving towards the 
associated grammar : 
Example exercise 8 : future events - participant volition vs. circumstance 
Allison Steadman is going to Paris on a business trip . There are a 
number of things her boss has asked her to do . There are other things 
she wants to do in her spare time . 
Here are her notes on 'things to do in Paris', but they've been 
mixed up : sort them out for her 
BUSINESS 	 SPARE TIME 
	  
buy teaching books 
visit Louvre 	  
	  attend language seminar 
see Eiffel Tower 	  
Again , knowledge of the world - exploited via careful contextualization and 
selection of lexis - enables learners to discriminate conceptually between notions 
of circumstantial modality (business) and participant modality (spare time) . In 
subsequent tasks this distinction can be made more linguistically explicit 
61ve/Write a brief description of Allison's planned trip . 
Choose some of the following words to help you 
going to 	 hope to 	 will (be) 	 - 	 want to 
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But ofcourse there is no guarantee that the target language will ever fully emerge 
from this kind of task ; the more we encourage learner choice , the more difficult 
it becomes to ensure that learners will come to grips with specific grammatical 
consequences of those choices . So we need something more , another approach to the 
grammar/lexis/context relationship which can act as a kind of filter - a way of 
reducing the variables of learner choice so that the grammar emerges clearly and 
unequivocally . This is where focusing activities come in . 
3.3 GRAMMATICIZATION & FOCUSING ACTIVITIES : AN 'ORGANIC' APPROACH 
3.3.1 Consciousness raising , propositional clusters and lexical choice 
As I outlined in 3.1 , the purpose of focusing activities is to direct the 
learner's choice more specifically to particular forms of grammaticization through 
setting up carefully directed lexico-contextual parameters . These , then , are 
areas of grammaticization which may not be sufficiently developed on the basis of 
'learner choice' activities discussed in section 3.2 above . 
The more flexibility is given to the learner through the choice of which lexical 
items to select and combine , and the looser the contextual parameters within which 
this decision making takes place , the less likely it is that certain grammatical 
forms will be adequately highlighted . There are , for example , some areas of 
speech act expression which resist easy interpersonal contextualization - eg. 
threat/warn/advise , which do not occur in predictable discourse contexts (cf. , 
for example , Crombie 1985b:13) , and which therefore are difficult to exploit via 
knowledge of the world . We can certainly devise tasks which call upon the learner 
to discriminate between degrees of interpersonal appeal (eg. in X situation do you 
request or advise ?) , but we cannot invisibly draw her attention to the 
inflectional and lexical features attendant on these distinctions . There are other 
grammatical forms which resist easy ideational contextualization -particularly 
notions which are inherently more conceptual , such as forms of hypothetical 
meaning which by their very nature are difficult to bring out without very specific 
tasks . 
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But 'controlling learner choice' does not mean simply presenting learners with 
lexico-grammar which is fully contextualized ; I argued strongly against this in 
section 2 . Rather , the objective is to bring together three interrelated 
objectives : 
a) a clear focus on particular features of the target language 
b) facilitation of grammaticization in a lexically marked discourse context 
c) retention of learner choice , albeit maximally restricted 
This approach has come to be known as consciousness raising (CR) . CR has to do 
with the (pedagogically controlled) degree to which learners are guided toward the 
recognition and formulation of target language forms . Sharwood Smith puts it this 
way : 
Strictly speaking , the discovery of regularities in the target language , 
whether blindly intuitive or conscious , or coming in between these two 
extremes , will always be self-discovery . The question is to what extent 
that discovery is guided by the teacher . The guidance , where consciousness 
raising is involved 
	
 can be more or less direct . It is one thing .... 
to set up an illustrative pair of examples and draw the learners attention 
to the relevant distinctions using .. "hints" and quite another to give a 
formal rule 	  
(1988:53) 
Illustrating a CR procedure , Rutherford (1987) offers the following task , 
designed to focus on the passive . Learners are presented with a fixed context 
(describing the layout of a room) , together with a fixed word order - but 
grammaticization is left up to the learner : 
Use grammar to link up these words in the order given : 
i) sofa - take up - room 	 leading to the sofa takes up the room 
ie. forcing the active form 
ii) room - take up - sofa 	 leading to the room is taken up by the sofa 
ie. forcing the passive form 
(Rutherford 1987:59) 
Here , the tact that lexis/word order and context are presented prescriptively 
forces the choice of the passive . Rutherford calls this kind of constraining 
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lexical association a propositional cluster , and he argues that by leaving the 
final grammaticization up to the learner , we are still remaining faithful to the 
'organic' (ie. what I have called communicative) relationship between words and 
grammar , or between language and discourse : 
.... just as grammaticization is a visible manifestation of the organic 
side of language , so must the attendant C-R [consciousness raising] 
procedures be likewise organically conceived . The nature of 
grammatical consciousness raising within a grammatical process model 
can derive only from the nature of the processes themselves. 
(1987:58) 
The value of retaining a discourse context , says Rutherford , is that while the 
learner works through the grammatical consequences of lexical choice , he is also 
becoming cognizant of the extra - grammatical factors that motivate these choices" 
(1987:59/60) . The shifting of ROOM to subject position in the above illustration , 
says Rutherford , is discourse motivated , and forces the passive ; thus 
grammatical choices are determined through discourse (1987:59) . Now clearly , 
when Rutherford talks about retaining a (discourse) context , he has in mind a much 
more controlling pedagogy than anything I have so far looked at . The kind of 
discourse development that would lead learners to the point of choosing between 
ROOM and SOFA as subject is given , for Rutherford nowhere suggests how learners 
might be guided less prescriptively towards reaching this point in the wider 
development of the discourse . This , however , is precisely the value of 
Rutherford's ideas : indeed , it is difficult to see how learners could be 'led' to 
a point where the passive is required without this kind of pre-selection . 
So , and by way of summary , we can constrain learner choice to the point of 
forcing a focus on specific target language forms through grammatical consciousness 
raising activities . Unlike the procedures discussed in section 4 , such activitieE 
involve making more choices on behalf of the learner : fixing the lexis , 
establishing a particular word order , making the discourse context non 
negotiable , perhaps providing certain explicit grammatical cues , and so on . But 
the crucial point is that while the materials designer makes a certain number of 
choices of this kind , she does not make them all : hence the learner still makes 
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choices (even though they are highly constrained) . Thus grammar is developed as a 
means rather than as an end , it is seen as a facilitator rather than an obstacle , 
the target forms are worked out by the learner rather than merely accumulated , and 
the whole procedure retains an element of 'process' within it (Rutherford 
1987:154/5) . 
3.3.2 FOCUSING ACTIVITIES AND THE IDEATIONAL CONTEXT 
Example exercise 9 : Focussing on participant determinacy together with 
hypothetical meaning through the means/purpose relationship 
(she did X in order to achieve Y) 
Opacity of conceptual forms 
There are 6 groups of words here . Together they form a short story 
about Sill last Saturday - what he did , and what he didn't do ! 
1) Read them carefully , then put them in order 
2) Underline which verbs represent things which Sill intended to do , but 
which he may not actually have done : 
(ordered and underlined version:) 
* Bill - wake up 
* be - beautiful day : decide - go - picnic 
* he - plan - walk - shops : buy - food 
go - bank - get - money 
* he - want - telephone - girlfriend : invite - her - come 
* BUT : he - remember - she - holiday - France 
* suddenly - Bill - hear - thunder - outside : decide - stay home ! 
There is a strong element of guidance here . Propositions are arranged so that the 
learner necessarily infers means/purpose relations at certain points . For example, 
since it is evident that Bill finally decided to stay at home , we can deduce that 
he didn't actually go to the bank , or telephone his girlfriend , or buy food . The 
concept of a hypothetical purpose (as opposed to an actual event) is lexically cued 
via plan and want . All this , though , is still presented in a discourse context . 
The learner's awareness of these meanings is thus raised without resorting to the 
,Iontrivance of simply presenting them in arammItlize,d frrl! 
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The next stage involves the learner in grammaticizing , and could be undertaken 
after explicit demonstration of the grammatical rules . Alternatively , the 
teacher could simply go ahead with the next stage without prior and explicit 
'presentation' of the grammar , subsequently using learners' own output for 
diagnostic purposes - or perhaps showing them a grammaticized version to compare 
with their own without engaging in explicit analysis . The advantages of this very 
useful technique are discussed in Devitt 1989:20) . 
3) Now re-write/tell the story , putting in the grammar . Try to include 
linkers such as because , so , in order to : 
(possible final version:) 
Bill woke up . He decided to go for a picnic , because it was a 
beautiful day . He planned to walk to the shops in order to buy 
some food , and to get some money . He wanted to telephone his 
girlfriend to invite her to come , but then he remembered that 
she was in France on holiday . But suddenly he heard thunder 
outside , so he decided to stay at home ! 
Example exercise 10: degrees of participant determinacy , from low (hope to) to 
high (decide to) together with grammatical coding ie. 
low degrees of intention are more inflectable than high 
degrees 
Comment: the target points here are more conceptually complex than in the previous 
task . The aim is to establish three related points : 
a) that lexical markers of participant determinacy vary in the degree to 
which they infer that participant intention will be realized , 
from low to high : hope/want -> plan -> intend -> agree/decide  
b) that congruent with this continuum there are inflectional restrictions: 
the stronger the implication of an intended result actually occurring . 
the more inflectionally restricted , so that agree/decide to are 
more inflectionally restricted than the others) 
c) that congruent with this continuum there are lexical restrictions : 
hope/want take statives (I hope to recognize him) . the 'stronger' 
forms do not (?I plan/intend to recognize him) . 
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Task 1) and task 2) sensitize the learner to a) and c) above ; task 3) focuses on 
b) (the grammar) . 
1) Look at these words . We can use them to talk about things we intend 
to do . But there are some things we intend to do very definitely ; 
and there are others which we know may not actually happen . Try to 
put 2 words into each of the 3 groups using the table below : 
agree to 	 want to 	 intend to 	 decide to 	 plan to 
	 hope to 
GROUP 1: WE'RE CLEARLY NOT SURE WE WILL DO IT 
hope to want to 
GROUP 2: WE'LL PROBABLY DO IT 
plan to intend to 
GROUP 3: WE EXPECT WE WILL DO IT 
agree to decide to 
2) Using this table to help you , decide which word to put 
in each of the spaces : 
hope plan agree want intend decide 
Gerry 	
 to win the pools . [HOPE/WANT] 
I just 	
 to see my children again . [HOPE/WANT] (CUED BY STATIVE) 
Jim finally 
	  to lend me the money I asked her for . [AGREE/DECIDE] 
I 	  to hear from you very soon . [HOPE/WANT] (CUED BY STATIVE) 
Mike has 	
 to go to Italy . He's leaving tomorrow . [AGREE/DECIDE] 
This task exploits knowledge of the world using cotextual cues to help learners 
come up with appropriate collocations . In normal circumstances , for example , one 
doesn't consciously expect to bring about a pools win , so that hope or want are 
much the most logical choices at this point . The aim is to firm up learners 
familiarity with the concepts involved , and in so doing to allow the teacher to 
demonstrate the related lexical restrictions (cf. point c) above) . 
3) Choose one of the 6 words to fill in each of the space below 
1. Bill 	  to be playing football tr.' 	 attorrk7.7,r1 
2. She 	  to have lett by 4.00 
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This kind of task alerts the learner to the point that only want/hope/intend/plan 
can easily take inflections of this kind . However , we can require the learner to 
do more than this . When we use inflections like those in 1. and 2. above , we 
usually do so only when we have a fairly specific time reference in mind : we can 
say she hopes to be playing tennis tomorrow rather more easily than we can say she 
hopes to be playing tennis when she arrows up . We can exploit this in the following 
way : 
Put the grammar into the following word groups : 
1. [Liz - hope - play - tennis - next year] 
2. [Bill - want - leave ] 
3. [Janet - agree - marry - Nick - next year] 
Example exercise 11: Condition/consequence relations . The focus here is on the 
type of inflection - transparent or opaque - as a device for 
coding grounds and degrees of probability/possibility (cf. 
chapter 4/section 5) . 
Comment: Once again , specific discussion of the concepts which underlie the 
grammar can either precede the task , or be dealt with as the need arises . 
1) Read the following text carefully : 
Frederick Frump , aged 33 , escaped from Ludlow prison four days ago . 
The escape was simple : all he did was jump over a wall . Police are 
not sure where he is , but they suspect that he has made his way to 
Oranga , an independent state in the Pacific . It is probable that he 
has taken up to $2 million of stolen money with him . According to 
the police , getting Frump back to Britain will not be easy . 
2) Now look at the following statements . Decide which category to put 
them in : 
1. Frump is living in Oranga 
2. Frump took $2 million with him 
3. Frump killed a prison guard in order to escape 
4. Frump will return to Britain 
5. Frump took $2,000 million with him 
PROBABLY TRUE : 1 , 	 2 
POSSIBLY TRUE : 4 
NOT 	 TRUE 	 : : 3 , 	 5 
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3) Now look at these word groups . Some represent conditions , some 
represent consequences . First , match them up together . Then 
put in the grammar - use the table above to help you : 
CONDITIONS 	 CONSEQUENCES 
If - he - live - Orange 	 he - go back - prison 
If - he - take - $2m 	 he - live - like a king 
If - he - kill - guard 
	 be - difficult - get him back 
If - he - take - $2,000m 
	 he - spend - lot of money 
If - he - return - Britain 
	 he - be - wanted for murder 
Comment: Thus learners are guided through the conceptual framework before having to 
account for it through grammaticization . The true/not true distinctions are 
established through the discourse context of the text , and logically generate a 
variety of open/closed conditional forms : 
* If he's living in Orange , it will be difficult to get him back 
* If he returned to Britain , he'd go back to prison 
* If he had killed a guard , he'd be wanted for murder 
Example exercise 12 : simple contrast vs. contra expectation 
This task is designed to make sure learners are aware of the conceptual distinction 
between contrast (but) and contra expectation (despite/although) , firstly out of 
context (using knowledge of the world/inference) , then in a particular context . 
The aim is to demonstrate how the perception of contra-expectation is highly 
context dependent , so that with the introduction of contextual variables in part 
3 , learners are likely to alter their interpretation. 
1) Nye can talk about the differences between things in 2 ways . 
a) where the difference surprises us (John is clever : he failed the exam) 
b) where it doesn't (this car is blue ; that one is red) 
Look at these groups of words ; can you decide which group each go in ? 
1. Bill left . He didn't say goodbye 
2. Fred played superbly . He lost the match 
3. Gina loves jazz 	 She hates classical muse• 
4. Ala laves an xandar . He works in Tula 
5. Jane is bright . Scott is stupid 
a b 
2) Grafflmaticize : put in the linkers 
Despite leaving , Bill didn't say goodbye etc. 
3) Now read these sentences . In each case decided again whether 
1 to S are surprising or not : 
274 
surprising 
1. Bill never says goodbye when he leaves : 
Bill left . He didn't say gcoodbye 
2. Xandar and Tuli are 400 miles apart : 
All lives in Xandar . He works in full 
3. Xandar and Tuli are next to each other : 
Ali lives in Xandar 
	 works in full 
4. Jane and Scott are twins : 
Jane is bright . Scott is stupid 
not 
surprising 
3.3.3 FOCUSING ACTIVITIES AND THE INTERPERSONAL CONTEXT 
Example exercise 13 : Request forms . 
Learners are sensitized to lexical change of meaning : 
ie. using a stative verb in the predicate neutralizes the 
illocutionary force of suasion , and instead gives the 
expression a 'literal' meaning (cf. chapter 5:1.4) . 
Look at these questions and answers : decide which answer 
goes with which question : 
Question 
Could you help me ? 
Could you recognize him again ? 
Can you see anything ? 
Can you pass the salt ? 
Can you understand me ? 
Could you give him a hand ? 
a b c Answer 
a) No , I can't 
b) I'd be delighted 
c) No , I couldn't 
    
Example exercise 14: Circumstantial justification vs. interlocutor dependence . 
Recognising the distinction between interlocutor dependent 
stems and stems which code a circumstantial justification : 
learners are required to link up speech act expressions with 
expressions of justification (which refer either to 
circumstances or to speaker WANT) cf. chapter 5:sections 3/4 
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Link the expressions in column 4 with the correct continuation in 
column B : 
Column A 
1. You should help me 
2. Could you have helped me ? 
3. You should have helped me 
4. Could you help me ? 
Column 
a) I really need your help 
b) It's too late now , ofcourse 
c) I just want to know 
d) you'll be in trouble if you don't 
4. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 
In this chapter I have described a pedagogic application of a general but 
principled relationship between grammar , lexis and context , in which the 
communicative function of grammar is exploited as the means whereby lexically 
signalled meanings are given greater focus in relation to contexts . This approach 
is sufficiently broad based to accommodate the Givonian notion of 
grammaticization , so that grammar is developed as part of the learning process, 
rather than as a construct which is pre-formulated (cf. Givon 1979b/Hatch 1978) . 
The emphasis is thus on the learner's capacity to make sense for herself , without 
losing sight of the need to retain some pedagogic control over classroom activity. 
In the next chapter , I argue that this kind of methodology is best serviced 
through a syllabus design which is supportive and flexible rather than 
prescriptive ; a syllabus design in which the traditionally 'item oriented' focus 




GRAMMAR , LEXIS & CONTEXT : AN APPROACH TO SYLLABUS DESIGN 
1. PROPOSALS FOR SYLLABUS DESIGN : INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Grammar , lexis and syllabus design : a perspective 
In chapter two I discussed some of the major developments in syllabus design since 
the onset of the structural syllabus . I argued that syllabus designers have for 
the most part given very little attention to relationships between grammar and 
lexis . With the structural syllabus it was grammar which was given priority , 
and considerations of lexis and appropriate contextualization were downgraded . 
Lexis was kept to a controlled minimum (just sufficient to provide adequate 
illustration of grammatical structure cf. Fries 1945) , while context was 
considered a matter for individual teachers at the classroom level (Widdowson 
1964) . 
The development in the 1970's of communicative methodology (following Hymes 1966) , 
with its new emphasis on meaning in context , was not paralleled by advances in 
syllabus design . The so-called notional/functional syllabus , although it embraces 
a much wider network of contextual specifications , continues to treat grammar as 
dominant over lexis . In chapter two I argued that this imbalance is explicable in 
terms of the organizing principle of such syllabus designs ; with this approach , a 
single component (usually grammar) is taken as dominant , so that other components 
(including lexis) are organized around and in reference to it . 
Both the structural and the notional/functional syllabus have been criticized on 
the grounds that they "present language as an inventory of units , of items for 
accumulation and storage" (Widdowson 1979:248) . Thus grammar and lexis , rather 
than being organized in a way which is complementary to their dynamic 
interrelationship , have tended to be presented as lexis subsumed by grammar . What 
is needed is a 'way in' to the organization of lexis 	 grammar and context which 
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facilitates not the simple accumulation of language items , but the investment of 
knowledge for future and unpredictable realization" (Widdowson 1990:132) , so that 
learners can be given direct access to the communicative function of grammar . 
Having described an approach to methodology in which this kind of investment is 
given prominence , and in which the potential generativity of language is opened 
up , what is required is a syllabus design which directly facilitates this 
process . A syllabus design , in short , which mediates an element of clear 
linguistic guidance in terms of product through a complementary recognition of the 
potential dynamics of the cotext/context relationship in terms of process . 
1.2 PROPOSALS FOR A REVISED SYLLABUS DESIGN : AN OUTLINE 
1.2.1 Separating out grammar , lexis and context 
In this chapter , then , I suggest a revised approach to syllabus design - one in 
which lexis and grammar are separated out , so that it is the learner (rather than 
the syllabus designer) who integrates them in the creation of meaning . This means 
that grammar is not a component of the core syllabus in the conventional sense . 
Rather , since it is treated as the end point in the learner's exploitation of 
lexical items , grammar takes the form of a checklist : essentially a list of 
structures with no prescribed sequence between one form and the next . Exactly if 
and when particular structures receive 'guided focus' is something which cannot be 
legislated about except in the specific circumstances of the classroom setting . 
In chapter six I discussed the crucial role of context , and how contextual 
information , in association with lexical items , can be used as a device for 
facilitating the 'onset' of grammaticization . Its function is to indicate those 
aspects of meaning (interpersonal , ideational) which will guide the learner to 
manipulate lexis toward particular areas of grammaticization . It allows learners , 
that is , to perceive the meaning potential of lexis . Contextual information , as 
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I argued in chapter 6 , may lie partly in lexical associations (particularly in 
lexical schemas and lexically transparent routines) and partly in the extra-
linguistic ideational and interpersonal context . In order to reflect this crucial 
distribution , the syllabus designer's job is to carefully sequence a lexical 
component and a contextual component . 
Thus the basic framework of the syllabus comprises a sequence of lexical 
items and example lexical associations (in the lexical component) related to 
a parallel sequence of 'contextual' specifications (the context component) . 
The latter includes notional/ideational and functional/interpersonal 
specifications . It is through taking bearings on these two components that 
the materials writer is able to decide on the kind of balance between lexical 
and contextual cueing appropriate for each task . The grammar checklist 
remains outside this sequence of lexical and contextual specifications , but 
grammatical forms which are deemed likely to occur over a series of 'lexico-
contextual' units are located roughly alongside them . Thus the materials writer 
can see at a glance which forms of grammaticization are 'targeted' in 
relation to which lexical and contextual specifications . 
For example , one cross-section of the syllabus may deal with such notions as 
temporal relations (sequence and simultaneity , past and future time) . The 
syllabus designer's task here is to provide an adequate contextual specification , 
to give a clear indication of the kind of schematic lexical associations which will  
be facilitative , and to indicate relevant areas of grammaticization . This cross - 
section , then , might look as follows 
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example schema (participant reactions) : 
John - feel - sick 
take - aspirin 
example schema (daily events) : 
eat - breakfast / drive - office / go - meeting etc. 
example schema (logical ordering of events) : 
1) Paul - want - take - holiday 
2) go - travel agent - look - brochure 
3) decide - fly - Rome etc. 
example schema (predictions) : 
Bill is a doctor 
get - pension - 65 years old (to cue probability) 
become - famous - surgeon (to cue improbability) 
LEXICAL COMPONENT 
example schema : 
Shakespeare - live - Stratford (to cue past) 
Vargas Llosa - live - Lima (to cue present) 
example schema (routine present vs. unusual past) : 
eat - breakfast / watch - TV (to cue present) 
lose - wallet / go - police station (to cue past) 
CONTEXTUAL COMPONENT 
Past time (completed) vs. 
present (ongoing) states 
Past time (completed) vs. 
present (habitual) events 
Future time : degrees of 
possibility/probability 
Sequence of events 
General cause/effect 
GRAMMAR CHECKLIST ; (example entries from a much larger list) 
Inflections (marking temporal distinctions) : -ing (progressive) 
-ed (past) 
Linking grammar words/conjuncts : so/because 
after/before/When/While 
Modal verbs : may/Might/will 
Fig. I Example crass-section from syllabus 
Contextual information , then , is effectively distributed between the contextual 
and the lexical components . However , while the notional (and functional) labels 
in the contextual component constitute key concepts which need to be systematically 
covered , the lexical component is suggestive rather than prescriptive . Thus the 
syllabus designer may , as in figure 1 	 include 'exemplar' schematic associations 
as a 	 , it is ultimately up to the teacw-r/materialE writer whetner 	 up 
,fl 	 o/ not . Similarly 	 it is tn,• todcner wnc 	 h w t),=,-L Lc a(7nieve an 
ap, ,robriate balance between more and 	 , r)etw.-er 
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schematic and routine-oriented lexical associations on the one hand , and the use 
of more 'open ended' situational associations on the other . 
1.2.2 Co-reference and co-occurrence 
As for sequencing and integrating , the contextual and the lexical components tie 
in closely with each other , so that for each entry in the former , the materials 
writer/teacher refers across to the lexical component in order to see which lexical 
items and associations may be relevant . At Elementary level , ofcourse , the 
lexical component is likely to be more detailed , perhaps including specifications 
of which individual items of vocabulary should be introduced at each stage . 
The relationship between the contextual and the lexical components is one of co-
occurrence, whereby the one is directly related 'horizontally' with the other . 
With the grammatical checklist there is no such direct association . It should be 
borne in mind that figure 1 is only a small cross section , and that in actuality 
there may be a single , unsequenced grammar checklist which refers to very large 
number of lexis/context co-occurrences . Thus there is no predetermined integration 
between grammar and lexis , but instead the relationship between grammar and 
lexis/context is one of co-reference . In other words , grammar does not subsume 
lexis , as it does in conventional 'product' syllabus designs . Those forms of 
grammaticization which underlie particular lexical associations are located in the 
same section of the syllabus . They are separate and in this sense they are not 
integrated , but they co-refer , so that the teacher/materials designer is able to 
see which aspects of the grammar might be firmed up in the course of particular 
activities . However , the actual integration of lexis with grammar is largely 
dependent on individual learners , and the decisions of individual teachers to 
focus on particular aspects of the grammar at appropriate stages . 
In short , while the syllabus outlines a seouence of ta&k,, based on work with , anc: 
co-occurrence between the lexical an,A th, cont,  wtual component 	 there is no 
prescribed integration between these components and the grammar . Since 
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grammaticization is dependent on the classroom synthesis of work with lexis and 
contextual configurations , the syllabus designer cannot legislate about which 
grammatical forms should be worked on at which point . The basic relationship 
between thee three components is thus as follows : 
+---- co-occurrence --+ 
+---+---+ 





In short , the whole concept of integration - conventionally considered a matter of 
product handed down by the syllabus designer - becomes a process facilitated by the 
syllabus designer . It is the learner who integrates , who grammaticizes lexis in 
relation to contexts . We can observe this whole process going on in studies of 
language acquisition (cf. chapter 6) ; the methodology attempts to create 
conditions in which it can take place in the classroom (fig.3) , and it is the job 
of the syllabus designer to devise an organised and coherent framework which 
harmonizes with this objective (fig. 4) 
lexical items 
associated 
via : 	 generating 	 leading to 
	 >context. 	 >discourse 	 >grammaticization 
ideational 
interpersonal 
Fig. 3 The methodological process : learner integration 
+ 	 co-reference 	 + 
+ 	 + 	 + 
+ 	 + 	 + 	 -+ 	 t- 	 +-  	 f 
:lexical items:<- co-occur -, context: 	 : grammar checklist 
4    + 	 ideational 	 *- 	 f 
interpersonal : 
Fig. 4 Syllabus design : co-occurrence and co-reference 
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1.3 SYLLABUS DESIGN AND THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DICHOTOMY 
1.3.1 Product syllabuses : the item-based approach 
Wilkins claimed the notional/functional syllabus was a genuinely semantic syllabus, 
but this claim has been strongly criticized on the grounds that the N/F syllabus , 
like the structural syllabus , is essentially about presenting discrete , pre-
formulated items of target language : 
The notional syllabus , it is claimed , ... [accounts for] communicative 
competence within the actual design of the syllabus itself . This is a 
delusion because the notional syllabus presents language as an inventory 
of units , of items for accumulation and storage . They are notional 
rather than structural isolates , but they are isolates all the same . 
.. it deals with the components of discourse , not with discourse itself. 
As such it derives from an analyst's and not a participants' view of 
language , as does the structural syllabus . 
(Widdowson 1978:248) 
It is very difficult to see how this kind of product syllabus can be fully 
justified through theories of language learning . As Widdowson says , product 
syllabuses are based on the analyst's perspective , rather than that of the 
language user . Brumfit justifies a grammatical organising principle in terms of 
systematicity , saying that such a claim has strong support in learning theory" 
(1981:91) , but what does this mean ? Where is the learning theory that says simply 
that the way we learn a language is by progressively mastering its structures ? - 
this is not so much a view of how we learn as a view of what we learn . Brumfit 
continues by saying that theorists do not claim that we learn grammar as grammar , 
rather "it is clear that grammar has always been seen as a means to a communicative 
end" (1981:91) . Yet much of recent research into learning strategies suggests that 
we first learn to communicate using whatever resources are immediately available , 
and that grammar is as an endo mota means in this process (cf. Hatch 1978/Peters 
1983/Givon 1979b) . 
Ofcourse there is a connection between systematicity and learning theory , but the 
appeal to learning theory as a justification for product syllabuses is 
superficial . The problem is that by pre-specifying target language , we constrain 
methodology , which attempts to present language in a meaningful context and to 
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focus (atleast to some extent) on meaning rather than form despite the inevitable 
tendency to manipulate learner output towards target language which is not the 
learner's own . We pre-empt the learner's own capacity to sake sense by refining 
and restricting target language in this 'product-oriented' way : 
Each dimension to a syllabus is a criterion for the choice of language 
samples to be used - that is to say , for the delimitation of language. 
If a sample of language has to meet two criteria simultaneously , it has 
fewer alternatives available than if it has to meet only one criterion . 
Samples of language which can meet 5 or 6 predetermined categories 
simultaneously 	  can be so specific that teaching is reduced to 
focussing on a fixed list of language forms 	  the more 'content' a 
syllabus has in the sense of 'detail' , the less exposure to language 
the learner is likely to get. 
(Prabhu 1987:92/3) 
1.3.2 Syllabus design and language learning 
Reviewing various proposals for syllabus design , Widdowson comments 
We might focus on elements of the abstract system as in the much 
maligned structural syllabus , or on the notions and functions which 
this system is used to express , or on idealized schematic constructs 
of situated language events 	  If one recognizes the stereotypic 
character of the syllabus , I am not convinced that it much matters 
which of these , or other , alternatives is taken 	 None of them 
self-evidently allows any greater latitude than any other for 
methodology to set up the most favourable conditions for actual 
learning . As defined here there is no such thing as a communicative 
syllabus : there can only be a methodology that stimulates 
communicative learning . ... For it is perfectly possible for a notional 
syllabus to be implemented by a methodology which promotes mechanistic 
habit formation and in effect is focused on grammar .... 
(1984:26) 
For any syllabus design which is based , covertly or overtly , on an inventory of 
linguistic units , it would be difficult to disagree with Widdowson . It is always 
going to be possible to turn a notional/functional syllabus upside down , so to 
speak , and to see it as little more than a structural syllabus with notional and 
functional labels tagged on . 
So by 'stereotypic syllabus' , Widdowson presumably means 'any syllabus which 
specifies target language as product' . Such syllabuses cannot go very far in 
setting up favourable conditions for learning 	 because they are not designed to 
capture the process of learning , nor are they necessarily designed to establish 
conditions in which target language will be developed by the learner . By virtue of 
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being item - oriented , they are necessarily concerned primarily with product . 
Despite the wide interest in communicative approaches to language teaching , 
syllabuses of notions and functions have never been able to adequately accommodate 
this crucial process aspect to language learning . Developments in methodology have 
far outstripped developments in syllabus design , as I suggested in 1.1 above . The 
only approaches to 'syllabus design' which have clearly gone in this direction - 
the Candlin/Breen process syllabus (Breen 1984) , and Prabhu's procedural syllabus 
(1987) - have only managed to do so by effectively downplaying the whole concept of 
syllabus as prior specification of language content , and by upgrading the role of 
methodology . Thus these approaches have been given the label 'method' syllabuses , 
to distinguish them form product-oriented 'content' syllabuses (White 1988:45) . 
The process syllabus is essentially 'retrospective' - no attempt is made to order 
or even to pre-specify language content in any way : the emphasis is placed instead 
on procedures for negotiating the style , process and content of lessons between 
teacher and learners (Breen 1984) . 
Similarly with Prabhu's procedural syllabus (1987) , there is no specification of 
content as such - either in linguistic or in semantic terms - but only a loosely 
ordered list of tasks . 
The implication seems to be that there is an intrinsic dichotomy between process 
syllabuses , which by definition emphasise the connection between how language is 
learned and how it can be taught , and product syllabuses , which are not concerned 
with how language is learned , and which have only a superficial justification in 
terms of learning theory . 
1.3.3 Process and product : dichotomy or continuum ? 
I would like to suggest that the approach to syllabus design presented here 
constitutes a mid-way point between stereotypic content syllabuses , and process 
syllabuses . This implies that process and product are infact two end points on a 
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continuum , emphasizing what language is learned at one end , and how language is 
learned at the other . 
The approach suggested here does not deal primarily with items of target 
language , though it is still a content syllabus in the sense of 
containing lexical and grammatical components . Conversely , it does not 
deal exclusively with processes of language learning , and yet it is a 
process syllabus in so far as it deals with the process of discourse 
creation rather than with abstracted and isolated components of discourse. 
I am not suggesting that it is , strictly speaking , a syllabus which is based on a 
semantic organizing principle . Decisions about the ordering and co-occurring of 
lexical and contextual specifications are not made in terms of abstracted semantic 
categories , but by reference to grammar and with careful regard to potential 
syntheses between grammar , lexis and context . In short , there is no single 
component which acts as the backbone of the syllabus ; the organizing principle is 
multiple , so that the emphasis is on potential combinations of grammar with lexis 
in contexts (actualized at the classroom level) , rather than on actual integration 
between one component and another . Thus there is no grammatical organizing 
principle in the conventional sense , because the grammar checklist remains covert, 
being neither tightly sequenced nor fully integrated with the other components . In 
this way the grammar does not constrain the distribution or the exploitation of 
other components in the syllabus . 
According to Widdowson , what is missing with the notional/functional syllabus is 
an appeal to cognition , to the language processing ability of the learner" 
(1979:249) . He goes on : 
There is no demonstration (in Notional Syllabuses) of the relationship 
between form and function , of the meaning potential in the language 
forms which are presented . And so there is no attempt to develop an 
awareness of how this potential is realized by interpretative procedures 
.... the focus of the notional syllabus is still on the accumulation of 
language items rather than on the development of strategies for dealing 
with language in use. ( ibid. ) 
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As long as the language content of syllabuses is defined in terms of discrete items 
which act in unison through being tied to a single organizing principle , I do not 
see any way in which this kind of meaning potential can be catered for . The 
difficulty , perhaps , is that while agreeing that syllabuses should be 
methodological supports , designers continue to 'over-structure' them : this 
grammatical form with this lexis realizing this meaning at this point in the 
programme (cf. Crombie 1985b/Yalden 1983/Yalden 1987) . As an alternative approach, 
I argue for a reduction in this kind of structural interdependence between syllabus 
components . By replacing integration with co-occurrence and co-reference , and by 
replacing the grammatical backbone with a grammar checklist , I argue that the 
process of realizing the meaning potential in language is accommodated more 
easily than with the structural or the notional/functional syllabus . 
In figure 5 I summarize this discussion of the process/product continuum , locating 
the approach outlined in this chapter in relation to product syllabuses on the one 
hand , and process syllabuses on the other : 
PRODUCT SYLLABUSES 
	
SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK 	 METHOD SYLLABUSES 
(structural , N/F) 	 (process/procedural) 






target language conceived 
as the product of 
pre-specification 
deals with the component 
parts of discourse as 
static but integrated items 
tight and pre-specified 
correlation between form 
and meaning/context 
Fig. 5 
target language conceived 
as the product of guided 
learner choice 
accommodates components of 
discourse together with 
procedures for its creation 
allows for meaning potential 
through co-reference and 
co-occurrence 
target language is the 
product of learner 
choice 
focus on conditions 
for the creation of 
• discourse 
'exclusive' focus of 
meaning : the 
learning of form is 
unconscious (Prabhu) 
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2. NOTIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION 
2.1 Product syllabuses : the problem of structural disorganization 
During the 1970's and the early 1980's , there was considerable discussion of how 
to resolve the conflict between a product syllabus with a single organizing 
principle on the one hand , and the desire to accommodate both notionally and 
functionally coherent target language on the other . The argument went as follows 
if we take functions as our organizing principle , then we are faced with the 
difficulty of retaining structural coherence in the notional components ; but if 
the syllabus has a grammatical organizing principle , then we are faced with the 
problem of accommodating functional exponents which resist explicit structural 
grading . In the latter case , according to Johnson , "it is difficult to impose 
any kind of structural grading" (1982:92) . Brumfit put the case in stronger terms: 
Unless we can produce a relatively finite set of rules for functioning 
within a given language , and demonstrate that such rules are not 
largely available to learners through their knowledge of how to operate 
in their mother tongues , there is little argument for building up a 
syllabus of functions . A syllabus which consists of unrelatable because 
unsystematizable items can be no more than a checklist . 
(1984b: 93) 
Others have taken the line that since functional exponents are too important to be 
left to chance in the way suggested by Brumfit , we should dispense with structural 
grading and replace it with a functionally organized syllabus . Nattinger (1980) 
argues for what he calls a 'lexical phrase grammar', supported by a syllabus which 
is organized around lexicalized phrases , and in which there is no evident place 
for structural criteria of any kind : 
since patterned phrases are more functionally than structurally defined, 
so also should be the syllabus . Thus we would take the desired 
communicative ability as a starting point , for what people want to do 
with language is more important than mastery of that language as an 
unapplied system ....the items we select to teach would not be chosen 
on the basis of grammar but on the basis of their usefulness and 
relevance to the learners' purpose in learning . 
r1980 342) 
The difficulty with all the- e aro, Im: 1 	 that th,. n ∎ - 	 r laic! ci - ri,,tomv 
between grammar (the ...,temati,_ ope.dtpt,r 	 prr: u 1 	 c 	 and le',.- rth,: 
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unanalysed occurrence of lexicalized units) : we have to choose , it seems , 
between one or the other . But as I have already argued , neither of these 
perspectives adequately captures the nature of language as a construct whose 
'systematicity' and 'generativity' is necessarily conditioned by the 
interdependence between grammar , lexis and context . What we have , in effect , is 
degrees of analysability , and most language forms are neither completely 
accessible to rule making nor completely impervious to it . 
I do not wish to suggest that applied linguists have been unaware of this 
perspective . The problem has been that a syllabus based on a single organizing 
principle cannot by its very nature accommodate this concept of continuum : a 
single organizing principle inevitably leads to the highlighting of one component 
at the direct expense of another (cf. discussion in chapter two:section 5) . 
2.2 Grammar as process : accommodating the grammar/lexis continuum 
However , the organizing principle of the model suggested here is essentially 
multiple : both notional and functional language is subject to the same 
systematized relationship between lexis and context in relation to grammar . It is 
not a question of constraining one component to fall in line behind another . 
Instead , the variable balance between grammatical and lexical material - between 
one degree of analysability and another - is accounted for by virtue of the 
separation between grammar and lexis within the syllabus organization . Those 
features of the language which are most open to generalization through rule are 
entered into the grammar checklist and are targeted through carefully chosen 
lexical and contextual specification . Conversely , those features of the language 
(including formulaic holophrases) which are the least productive , the least open 
to generative reassembly , are entered in the lexical component and are thereby 
treated as extended lexical items . 
But this does not mean that functions- occur in the lexical component and notions in 
the grammar checklist . What actually happens is that formulaic units are gradually 
broken down , so that having been first specified as single units in the lexical 
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component , they are subsequently segmented and their most grammatically salient 
parts re-allocated to the grammar checklist . Thus , for example , the request form 
could ,vou help me ? , initially entered as a single unit , is later divided up so 
that the grammaticizing stem (coulc/,vou) is entered in the grammar checklist . In 
this way the learner is guided (through careful contextual specification) towards 
perceiving the need to specify a clear and on record request through grammaticizing 
with the could you stem in reference to context . Furthermore , even where 
lexicalized units are entered as undifferentiated wholes in the lexical component , 
this does not mean that they are simply 'given' to the learner as part of a matrix 
of predetermined target language . The whole purpose of the lexical component is to 
provide an indication of how certain lexical items (whether individual items or 
larger units) can be loosely associated by the materials writer so that it is the 
learner who formulated their final assimilation through reference to context . 
But it is not only with functional language that different degrees of analysability 
are accounted for through the grammar/lexis distinction in the syllabus . The same 
process can be adopted with notional/ideational language . For example , the fixed 
participle inflection on the passive form (cf. chapter 4 :section 3.5.2) might 
first be entered as an unanalysed in the lexical component ; subsequently it may be 
transferred to the grammar checklist , in which case the learner is called upon to 
further invest in the meaning potential of the passive form , by grammaticizing 
with the participle inflection in relation to a guiding contextual specification . 
Once again , then , the syllabus organization specifically supports an approach 
whereby the learner progressively breaks down language units and increasingly 
invests in the meaning potential of grammar in relation to lexis and context . 
What I have attempted to demonstrate through this brief argument is that , both 
with functions and with notions , the syllabus explicitly allows for the learner's 
investment in the meaning potential of language form , to a greater or lesser 
degree depending on the choice of lexical or grammatical specification . The 
crucial point here is that 	 since there is no determining grammatical 
organization , there is no sense in which potential target language is 
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'disorganized' . With the single organizing principle the (artificially enhanced) 
difference between notions and functions is unavoidably problematic . But with 
this 'grammar-as-process' model 	 it is not these distinctions which are central , 
but rather the similarities between them , since in both cases it is the 
grammar/lexis/context relationship underlying language generativity which informs 
the organizational framework . 
3. THE GRAMMAR CHECKLIST 
3.1 Overview 
One of the main reasons why the syllabus has sufficient flexibility to support a 
methodological emphasis on language as meaning potential is that grammar remains a 
checklist specification . But an undifferentiated checklist may well lack the kind 
of focus which is required for a methodology which facilitates degrees of 
grammatical.focus . In other words , the more the teacher wishes to develop 
(grammatical) focusing and semi-focusing activities , the more she may require a 
syllabus in which such grammatical focus is anticipated and built in to the system. 
It is with this in mind that I suggest , in this section , an approach whereby 
certain 'targeted' grammatical forms can be highlighted and marked for their 
potential convergence with specific contextual and lexical specifications . 
3.2 Horizontal and vertical checklists 
I argued in chapter six that there are many forms of grammaticization which are 
pervasive , whose function is to code the most common features of context , and 
which are therefore likely to recur again and again without the need for specific 
focusing tasks . In contrast , other forms of grammaticization code very specific 
meanings , resist easy contextualization and are particular to a relatively small 
number of structures : conditional forms , relative clause structure , and so on . 
Given this kind of distinction , there is a strong case for making a parallel 
distinction between two kinds of grammar checklist . The first I reter to as the 
vertical checklist . The vertical checklist includes common and pervasive 
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grammatical forms which are listed vertically - that is , without any kind of one-
to-one co-reference with lexical or contextual specifications . They are forms 
which are likely to occur so often that detailed co-referencing would be 
uneconomical and counter productive . Thus the vertical checklist comprises a 
single , unsequenced list of grammatical forms which refer to a very large number 
of sequenced lexico-contextual specifications . 
There will be many opportunities for these forms to get 'firmed up': each and every 
time learners work through a narrative or descriptive task , they may grammaticize 
through tense , word order , suffixes , affixes , and so on . So for a large 
number of structures , there need not - indeed , there should not - be a 
prescribed , linear sequence . 
The second kind of grammar checklist , consisting of grammatical forms which code 
more complex meanings resisting easy contextualization , is a horizontal checklist. 
The horizontal checklist refers to those features of the grammar for which specific 
focusing and semi-focusing tasks are designed , and is located alongside a single 
unit ; in this way the teacher/materials writer can see at a glance that certain 
structures have been targeted for specific attention at or by certain points in the 
programme . 
Let us say , for example , that the syllabus is divided up so that each series of 
four lexico-contextual specifications constitutes a unit of work lasting 
approximately 12 hours , and that we are looking in figure 6 at the overall 
framework for an entire intermediate course which lasts 72 hours , so that there 
are six units in the course . In these circumstances 	 there might be a single 
vertical checklist whose reference spans the entire course . In figure 6 I have 
highlighted just one of the units involved , summarizing the main semantic focus of 
each , and indicating a horizontal checklist which co-refers specifically to these 
two units : 
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+ 	  
VERTICAL CHECKLIST (UNITS 1-6) : 
UNIT 1 Cm] [***] Present Tense (habitual) 
(***] [***] Past tense of irreg. verbs 
[***] [***] Progressive aspect (past/present) 
[4(**] [***] Clarifying linkers : so/because 
after/before/while/when 
UNIT 2 [***] [***] 
[***] [***] Clarifying pronouns (definite/indefinite) for 
[***] [***] coding new vs. old information 
[***] [***] etc. 




UNIT 4 	 [condition/consequence] ----+ 	 HORIZONTAL CHECKLIST 
[condition/consequence] 	 : 1) second conditional structure 
+---+ 2) third conditional structure 





[***] 	 [***] 
[***] 	 [***] 
[***] 	 [***] 
[***] 	 [***] 
[***] 	 [***1 
[***] 	 [***] 
[***] 	 [***] 
[***] 	 [***] 
3.3 The grammar checklist : varying the control 
Ofcourse the situation is not likely to be quite as neat and tidy as figure six 
implies . The teacher may well find , for example , that learners are working 
toward areas of grammaticization which were unforeseen by the syllabus designer . 
Unlike product syllabus designs , this grammar-as-process model is not intended to 
inhibit such developments , since it represents a variable balance between 
organized pre-specification and the variable learning routes taken by individual 
learners . 
In chapter six I suggested that the teacher/materials writer can guide the learner 
towards particular areas of grammaticization , and that this can be done more or 
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less explicitly , from 'unguided' through to 'guided' activities . There will , 
after all , be many circumstances in which the teacher and/or the learners require 
that particular structures are 'covered' within a certain period of time , perhaps 
in relation to examination requirements . In such circumstances , the teacher is 
able to 'step up' the amount of guidance , leaning more towards guided and semi-
guided activities , but without having to fall back on the conventional 
'presentation' of target language . Thus the methodology allows considerable 
flexibility in responding to the varying demands of different situations . 
This kind of flexibility can be accommodated not only within the methodology but 
also at the syllabus level . By altering the distribution of grammatical 
specification between the vertical checklist (less control) and the horizontal 
checklist (more control) , the syllabus designer can make the framework more or 
less 'process-oriented' ; a syllabus where the horizontal arammar checklist is 
given greater prominence will be more appropriate in situations where specific 
items of target language are required at regular , pre-specified intervals . 
Alternatively , if the vertical checklist is made more prominent and the horizontal 
checklist is de-emphasized , then the syllabus will be more process-oriented . 
In many circumstances a 'fully process' syllabus - along the lines of the 
Candlin/Breen model (Breen 1984) or Prabhu's Procedural syllabus (1987) - may be 
considered excessively open-ended . As Brumfit has pointed out , the chief 
justification for a product syllabus is that it ensures "there are some controls on 
the activity that takes place in the classroom (1984b:117) . I would argue that in 
order to provide this kind of security while at the same time facilitating the 
exploitation of language as meaning potential , we need to limit the degree of 
specificity in the syllabus design . This is the main justification for having 
grammar as a checklist rather than as the controlling and dominant component . 
Within this perspective , it is the vertical checklist which is most crucial , 
because it is chiefly through the vertical checklist that grammaticization is 
allowed to develop 'naturally' through learner choice . 
294 
3.4 Contextual distance and grammaticization : an approach to sequencing 
I have suggested that the problems of tight integration between one component and 
another , problems which are characteristic of product syllabus designs , do not 
present any great difficulties with the grammar-as-process model . The reason for 
this is simple : it is the learner , not the syllabus designer , who integrates 
grammar with lexis . The job of the syllabus designer is to facilitate this 
integration by providing principled co-occurrences and co-references between all 
three components - contextual , lexical and grammatical . 
As for sequencing , it is useful to distinguish between functional language and 
notional language . With functions and functional exponents , I have already 
suggested (in 2.2) a progression from lexical entry (where exponents are listed as 
unanalysed chunks) to grammatical entry (where they are segmented according to 
their syntactic saliency) . In more general terms , I see no good reason for 
sequencing from contextual (implicatures) through to conceptual (coding 
interpersonal meaning) . Rather , it remains a matter of introducing functions 
on the basis of their "usefulness and relevance to the learners' purpose in 
learning" (Nattinger 1980:342) . 
With notions the situation is rather different . It seems to me that the congruence 
between notion and forms of grammaticization is sufficiently salient for the 
syllabus designer to exploit it as a guide to the sequencing of notional/ideational 
concepts in the contextual component . What I propose here is a development from 
contextual to-conceptual . For example , the syllabus designer could begin with 
chronological sequence (on the basis of knowledge of the world schemata , and 
subsequently move into non chronological sequence . Chronological sequence is , by 
definition , iconic with the actual patterning of events in the ideational context. 
With non chronological sequence , the language user is at one step removed from 
this actuality , deliberately rearranging and reformulating in order to express her 
own conceptualization . Thus Bill at down and then he had a drink is contextual , 
iconically faithful to the sequence of events as they occurred ; before having a 
drink , Bin sat down (non chronological) is more conceptual . 
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In order to realize this kind of sequencing in a principled fashion , ofcourse , 
the syllabus designer needs to provide appropriate co-references between the 
contextual component and the grammar checklist ; the more specific the targeted 
forms of grammaticization , the more 'directing' should be the lexical and 
contextual specification . Thus I am not arguing for a notional classification and 
sequence in the abstract , but for careful co-referencing between lexis/context on 
the one hand , and the grammar checklist on the other . In this way , objections to 
notional organization per se are obviated (cf. Brumfit 1981:91/2) . 
More generally , a sequence from contextual to conceptual supports a gradual 
focussing on more complex syntax . For example , the early exploitation of general-
cause/effect relations - which can be expressed through the simple juxtaposition of 
propositions - might develop into specific focus on the means/purpose and the 
means/result relation , both of which require the use of conceptual forms for their 
grammatical clarification (cf. chapter 3 : section 4) . Similarly , an early 
concentration on general contrast relations might give way to the exploitation of 
more conceptual contra-expectation relationships , where the latter involve the use 
of more complex conceptual forms (cf. chapter 4 : sections 3.4.3/3.5.4) . 
In all these cases the targeting of more complex semantic relationships in the 
contextual component might well be paralleled by greater use of the horizontal 
gramMar checklist , on the assumption that more complex/specific inter-
propositional relations often tend to correlate with a more complex (and often more 
conceptual) forms of grammaticization 
Thus a sequencing from contextual through to conceptual can be justified not only 
because it realizes a gradual progression towards more complex grammatical forms , 
but also because it is paralleled by increasing semantic complexity . Recent 
studies in second language acquisition tend to add weight to the belief that 
conceptual forms - and particularly the use of infinitive and gerund forms - are 
properly mastered only after the acquisition of language requiring less complex 
forms of grammaticization (cf. Sato 1988) . 
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4. THE LEXICAL AND CONTEXTUAL COMPONENTS : GIST SPECIFICATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
In mainstream pedagogy , syllabus designers have tended to treat lexis as a 
subsidiary component , dependent on and subsumed by grammar . The choice of which 
lexical items to select and decisions about how they should be organized are 
matters which , broadly speaking , are likely to be determined through the handling 
of other components in the syllabus : 
.... lexical choices , if they are to be principled , will arise out of 
the other [syllabus] categories . Morphological , syntactic and notional 
criteria , as well as situational , functional and content criteria , 
will always have a major effect on selection of lexis ....Consequently , 
wheras checklists of items in all the other analyses will have value in 
defining the appropriate range of particular sets of materials and 
syllabus specifications , the lexicon can be regarded as potentially . 
always present , to be called upon , as a dictionary is by adults , 
whenever there is a need in terms of one of the other items . 
(Brumfit 1984b:97/8) 
I have already suggested that this view - with the implication that lexical 
ties (with other components) necessarily imply lexical subservience (on other 
components) - is not the only possible perspective on the relationship between 
lexis and other parts of the syllabus . 
More generally , it is precisely this kind of rigorous subservience of one syllabus 
component to another which is symptomatic of a product syllabus dealing with pre-
defined and tightly integrated target language . In section 2 I argued that grammar 
in the form of a checklist is one way in which this sort of tight integration can 
be reduced . But in order to properly represent the process element in the 
methodology , it is also necessary to provide lexical and contextual 
specifications which are deliberately partial , in the sense that they do not 
specify all aspects of fully integrated target language : they are , that is , gist 
specifications which refer only to those features of lexis and context which are 
sufficient to give the learner a general semantic direction . The primary function 
of these components is to facilitate the classroom exploitation of meaning 
potential {rather than to define component parts of a prefabricated meaning) . What 
is required , therefore , is just sufficient information to help set up tasks which 
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emphasize the role of learner choice , but not so much that the learner reacts to 
choices made , on her behalf , by the syllabus designer . 
4.2.1 Lexical and contextual specification : interpersonal meaning 
In chapter six (section 3.2.4) I outlined an Elementary level task based on the 
context of buying/selling goods . I argued that this kind of simple , routinized 
exchange can be lexically cued through providing learners with a few lexical items 
- cheese sandwich/please/thankyou etc. . Alternatively , a similar activity can be 
contextually cued through presenting learners with (for example) pictures of shops 
and eliciting the kind of language typical of buying/selling exchanges . 
This kind of activity may be represented in the syllabus in the following way 
(INTERPERSONAL) CONTEXT 	 LEXIS 
Fig. 7 
buying/selling goods 
interpersonal schema: buyer/ 





please - thanks 
The specification in both components is partial , in the sense that there are 
component parts of a 'fully worked out' exchange which are left unspecified . The 
items in the lexical component are not intended to provide a complete specification 
of a 'target dialogue' . Thus the teacher/materials designer is explicitly given 
'space' to introduce additional , unfamiliar lexical items which might call for 
further procedural work on the part of the learners . Furthermore , there is no 
mention of the precise register adopted by each interlocutor - polite , familiar 
etc. This omission is deliberate , since this signalling of role relations , 
together with its grammaticized expression through the selection of appropriate 
stems ( eg. could 1 have 	 ?) , is left open to tne learners . So both the 
contextual and the lexical component consist not of a complete definition of target 
specifications , but of what we might call gist specifications : that is, jusi 
sufficient information to motivate the learners toward making guided choices . 
2cf 
Ofcourse , the kind of language which learners finally settle on may be 
indistinguishable from coursebook target language . The crucial point , though , is 
that with the approach suggested here , it is the learners themselves who are 
directly involved in the process of formulating the language used . This is in 
contrast to the more traditional approach to the teaching of suasion and of request 
forms , where lexis and grammar tend to be presented as preformulated units in 
association with a context in which the role relationship between interlocutors has 
already been established . This is the approach taken in the following example 
(from Swan and Walter 1984:54) : 
4 Work in pairs: ask to see things, and answer. 
Could you show me those. glosses ? Could I See. 






Here you are. Yes,thost. This one? 







U . j 
6 Work in pairs: ask to see things again, and answer. Examples: 
'Could I see that box, please? 	 'Could you show me those glasses, please? 
'This one?' 	 'These?' 
'No, the one behind the teapot.' 	 'No, the red ones.' 
4.2.2 Lexical and contextual specification : valency & ideational meaning 
The kind of gist specification I outlined above applies equally to the ideational 
context . At Elementary levels , individual verbs can be finely graded according to 
the number of arguments which they infer . For example , a verb like SEE has two 
40* 
arguments (agent and goal: John saw Mary) while a verb such as OFFER has three 
(agent , object and goal: Mary offered John a chocolate) . I argued in chapter one 
that these case relations between a verb and its semantic arguments lie on the cusp 
between grammar and lexis , so that the choice of lexical item as verb has clear 
reflexes in the grammar : SEE leads to a [subject - verb - direct object] frame , 
while the choice of OFFER leads to a [subject - verb - direct object - indirect 
object] frame . There is a clear sense in which verbs with fewer arguments are less 
complex than verbs with more arguments , and L2 interlanguage development is 
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characterized by a development from the former to the latter (Rutherford 1987:48) . 
What we have here is a congruence between syntactic valency (such as the selection 
of direct and indirect objects on the basis of the choice of verb) and semantic 
valency (the different case roles which the choice of verb implies) . There are 
clear pedagogic applications here , since by specifying particular lexical items as 
verbs , certain syntactic consequences can be predicted on a principled basis (for 
an extended discussion here , see Lachlan Mackenzie 1988) . Given that the higher 
the valency , the more complex and the more difficult to acquire , it makes sense 
as a general principle for the syllabus designer to gradually introduce verbs with 
higher valencies , provided this kind of lexical specification does not lead to 
incongruous co-occurrences with the contextual component . In other words , it 
makes little sense to begin by introducing only verbs with , say , a syntactic 
valency of 2 where this might well lead to incongruous juxtapositions in terms of 
contextual/situational coherence . 
Figure 8 indicates the kind of lexical and contextual specification which might 
occur early on in an Elementary syllabus , where the emphasis is on verbs of low 





agent - process - objective 
Inter-propositional : 
chronological sequence 
Topic : daily routines 
wake up - 10.00 
eat - breakfast/lunch 
drive - car - office 
write - report 
etc. 
Fig. 8 : contextual & lexical specification : Elementary level 
Once again these are gist specifications : the focus is on contextual and lexical 
parameters which are sufficiently specific to guide the learner's choice within the 
general context of agent/process/objective relations . However , there is no 
prespecified constraint in terms of the temporal context , and the lexical 
specification - being non prescriptive - explicitly allows for the development of a 
variety of meanings depending on learner choice . It is with this kind of 
Example schema : 
Bill - want - visit - Italy 
go - travel agent 
get - information 
BUT - office - closed 
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specification that the horizontal grammar checklist - referring to those features 
of context which most commonly require further focussing - comes into its own . 
Tense (marking a temporal context) , basic word order , time and place prepositions 
may all be required in order to clarify the learner's meaning . 
At Intermediate levels , there will be less need to continue to specify this kind 
of basic intra propositional relationship , but specification of inter-
propositional relations can be developed so that more complex meanings are 
targeted , as I argued in section two . For example , one section of the syllabus 
might be concerned with the notion of intention , and the coding of cause/effect 
relationships involving participant determinacy : means/purpose , means/result and 
so on . Instead of providing a detailed lexical specification - which would be 
unwieldy and constraining - the syllabus simply provides a gist specification ie. 
example lexical associations which may help the materials designer in the 
construction of lexically cued tasks : 
CONTEXTUAL COMPONENT 	 LEXICAL COMPONENT 
Participant determinacy : 
means/purpose relation 
Topic : planning/preparing for a holiday 
Fig. 9 Contextual & lexical specification : Intermediate level 
This kind of specification is not intended to be prescriptive , and anyway it is 
far too brief to constitute the basis for the design of actual tasks . It simply 
gives an indication of the kind of schematic lexical association which could be 
developed in order to lexically cue expressions of participant determinacy (eg. he 
wanted to visit Italy) and the means/purpose relation (eg. he went to the travel 
agent's to get some information , but the office was closed) . As I argued in 
section 2 , the specification of more specific and more complex binary values is 
likely to correlate with more specific (arid more complex) forms of 
grammaticization . Consequently the kind of specification illustrated in figure 9 
may well co-refer to a horizontal grammar checklist which include infinitive and 
complement clause structures coding expressions of participant determinacy . 
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4.3 THE MENTAL LEXICON AND LEXICAL SPECIFICATION 
So far I have discussed the roles of the lexical component and the grammar 
checklist using examples which support the traditional distinction between 'content 
lexical items' (entered into the lexical component) and 'grammar words' (entered 
into the grammar checklist) . But how should lexicalized holophrases be dealt with 
in such a syllabus ? 
In chapter one I discussed how studies in first language acquisition (eg. Peters 
1983) and second language acquisition (eg. Vihman 1982) suggest that learners begin 
by memorizing fixed phrases as multi-word chunks associated with specific contexts 
of use , and that atleast some of these formulaic units are subsequently broken 
down and stored through syntactic parsing . Widdowson (1990) argues that with this 
in mind , we should consider : 
presenting language as lexical units , both as single words and as complex 
packages , and then creating contexts which constrain the gradual 
elaboration of the first , the gradual analysis of the second . 
(1990:96 My highlighting) 
This approach to 'gradual analysis' is not only consistent with current theories of 
language learning , but is also facilitated in a syllabus which makes a structured 
distinction between grammar 	 lexis and context : formulaic units are first 
encountered in the lexical component (where they are entered as lexicalized chunks) 
and those which are usefully segmented are subsequently entered in the horizontal 
grammar checklist . In this way lexical entries are given to the learner as 
unanalysed units and as part of the process of lexical cueing , and these units 
later re-appear in the grammar checklist as segmented and potentially analysed 
structure , targeted as the outcome of directed work with context and lexis . 
For example , the syllabus designer might begin by entering certain stem/predicate 
forms (such as could you/would VOL' twit) arc 	 as holophrases in the lexical 
component 	 In this case , those teatur--s pt the int,r) r -)nal cant-,xt havincl 	 dc, 
with register and the grammatical 0,  ,cling 	 r 	 (tnr(Aigh the  
could you stem) are all part of the contextual information which is given to the 
learner . This kind of specification might look as follows : 




Setting : service encounters 
eg. bank/post office 
(Could I help you ?j 
(Could you help me ?.] 
cash - cheque 
buy - stamp 
etc. 
Fig. 10 : Lexical entry of formulaic units at early Elementary level 
At a slightly later stage , these forms are segmented so that stem and predicate 
are separated out for generative reassembly through reference to context . That is, 
the stem (whose function is to place the predicated action on record through a 
coded appeal to the hearer's deference , cf. chapter 5) is entered into the 
horizontal grammar checklist ; the predicate , which is lexically variable in 
response to relevant features of the particular context , remains in the lexical 
component . In this case the syllabus designer specifies those features of context 
which will guide the learner toward perceiving the need for attaching these stems 
to appropriate predicates in order to make her meaning clear : 
I - borrow - £20/30/50 	 : Could you/I 





Topic : asking for a loan 
Roles : 
formal (friend/friend) 




+ + 	  
 
Fig. 11 : Segmentation of formulaic unit at late Elementary level 
The additional specification of roles in the contextual component , together with 
its co-reference to the grammar checklist , tells the materials writer that at this 
point the learner needs to be guided to the coding of interlocutor dependence ; on 
this basis , a context gap task may be developed in which learners need to 
distinguish between the expression of formal (interlocutor dependent) and informal 
suasion . 
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Otcourse the range of formulaic units is far too vast for the syllabus to 
accommodate more than a few , particularly salient and useful examples . The point, 
though , is that by making a principled distinction between lexical and grammatical 
entry in this way , the syllabus designer is able to develop a framework which is 
consistent with the methodological emphasis on learner choice and learner 
investment . 
5. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS 
In this final chapter I have proposed a syllabus design which stands mid-way 
between product and process frameworks , retaining some of the advantages of each . 
As a product syllabus , it does not lose sight of the need to maintain some control 
over classroom activity , so that it is possible to develop programmes with 
explicit objectives which can be scrutinized , and which can be keyed in to the 
requirements of educational authorities . In terms of process , the syllabus deals 
not with items of target language pre-specified for learner accumulation , but with 
components of discourse only partially assembled by the syllabus designer . In this 
way , the organization of the syllabus can reflect a view of language as meaning 
potential , congruent with the methodological emphasis on learner choice and 
learner grammaticization 
Central both to the methodology and to the syllabus design is a conception of the 
processes underlying language generativity and language learning . Grammar , lexis 
and context are separated out so that the ontogenetic development of grammar 
(Givon) can be directly exploited . 
APPENDIX A 
A SEMANTIC CLASSIFICATION OF STATIVE VERBS 
STATIVE VERBS 
states not brought into existence through deliberate action 
receiving emotive innate states unaffecting unintended 
sensory input states of affairs intellectual states effects 
hear regret reseible believe iepress 
see feel possess understand please 
hope look expect awe 
desire have wean appall 
want lack know horrify 









A siwilar but wore detailed categorization can be found in Quirk et al. 1985:198-205 . 
APPEINII I 
A CATEGORIZATION OF INIONSPEVERNS IA TERNS OF CONTEXTUAL CONSTITUENCY 
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one contextual cottoned (idioms) 
Be born under a lucky star 
Be full of oneself 
Be worth its weight in gold 
Be the making of someone 
Be at death's door 
Be at wits end 
Be in the know 
Be in a rut 
Blow one's trumpet 
Blow the gaff 
Blow one's top 
Cast an eye over 
Catch fire 
Come down to earth 
Come into force 
Come into play 
Come to one's senses 
Come to pass 
Do someone down 
Do the honours 
Do the trick 
Eat humble pie 
Eat one's heart out 
Fall in love 
Follow suit 
Get someone's back up 
Get on someone's nerves 
Get up someone's nose 
Get the sack 
Get wind of 
Give the slip 
Give up the ghost 
Give the cold shoulder 
Go to the wall 
Hang fire 
Have a hand in 
Have one's head in the clouds 
Kick the bucket 
Land on one's feet 
Lose one's head 
Lose one's heart 
Make a clean breast 
Make a scene 
Pull a fast one 
Put one's foot down 
Read between the lines 
Ring a bell 
Sit on pins and needles 
Snit bricks 
Shoot the bull 
Take the piss 
tuo contextual components (idiots) 
Break a record 
Break the news 
Break someone's heart 
Break a promise 
Break the law 
Break a rule 
Cast a new light on 
Clear the air 
Clear the decks 
Clear the table 
Close a deal 
Cook the books 
Drive a hard bargain 
Drive someone mad 
Gain the upper hand 
Give the game away 
Go to great expense 
Have other fish to fry 
Hold the fort 
Keep the wolf away from the door 
Play A off against B 
Put a case 
Put someone in the picture 
Set the ball rolling 
Set someone's mind at rest 
Set the scene 
Spin a yarn 
Spill the beans 
Take the bull (firmly) by the horns 
Turn someone's head 
Turn the tables 
Waste time 
Weave a web of lies 
Pop the question 
Pull someone's leg 
Put all eggs in one basket (prov.) 
Reach a pretty pass 
to contextual comments (proverbs) 
Absence makes the heart grow fonder 
All good things come to an end 
All that glitters is not gold 
Beggars can't be choosers 
Better the devil you know 
Do as you would be done by 
Fools rush in where angels fear to tread 
It never rains but it pours 
Money talks 
Necessity is the mother of invention 
No news is good news 
The early bird catches the worm 
Where there's a will there's a way 
3I 
PAMIR 
CONTINUE Of CONTEXTUAL DISTANCE : °NERVIER 
probable with grounds possible/unlikely with grounds possible without grounds impossible with knowledge 
HYPOTHETICAL 
low circumstantial/participant sodality high circumstantial/participant sodality 
HYPOTHETICAL 0 
I 
expectation 	 hope/wish 	 intention 	 indirect preemption 	 direct preemption 
	 $- 	  
PARTICIPANT DETERMINACY P 
indirect circ.determinacy direct circ.deterainacy U 
	  A 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL DETERMINACY 
circumstantial justification 	 interlocutor dependence 
low speaker determinacy high speaker determinacy 
  
INTERPERSONAL 
two component idiots 
 










When all the components and sub-components of conceptual leaning are arranged alongside each other in this way , it becomes clear 
that contextual distance can be appraised in one of two ways . It can be appraised horizontally , so that the focus is on increasing 
degrees of conceptualization within each individual string . Or it can be appraised vertically , in which case we focus wore on the 
correspondences between the development of one string (such as participant modality) and another (such as participant determinacy) . 
Where the latter perspective is adopted , it is worth noting that the model is not completely systematic . I have presented it so 
that the semantic correspondences between one string and another cross-refer in a coherent and logical way . Thus , it seems to me , 
there is a logical parallel between interlocutor dependence (interpersonal) and intention (speaker determinacy) , and between low 
circumstantial modality (hypothetical) and circumstantial justification (interpersonal) . But in order to emphasize this coherence , 
I have had to allow correspondences in terms of conceptual lexico-grammar to become slightly disorganized . 
We could re-formulate the model so that the 'organizing principle' (so to speak) is primarily linguistic rather than semantic . In 
this case we would have to line up the component parts of , say , participant determinacy somewhat differently : expectation , 
hope/wish , intention and preemption would all be located at the same point , but the 'low' and 'high' variables of each would be 
separated out , with the latter - representing greater linguistic restriction - being further along the continuum than the former . 
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